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Non-Ideal Virtue and Situationism

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Abstract

Several philosophers, known as situationists, have argued that evidence in social psychology threatens to undermine Aristotelian virtue ethics. An impressively large amount of empirical evidence suggests that most people do not consistently act virtuously and lack the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Since possessing moral virtues requires these features, situationists have argued that Aristotelianism does not accurately describe the character traits possessed by most people, and so the theory cannot lay claim to various theoretical advantages such as explanatory power and egalitarian character education. In contrast to previous defenses which either downplay the relevance of psychological evidence or revise philosophical conceptions of virtue to fit the data, this paper appeals to previously neglected psychological evidence on self-efficacy and mental contrasting in combination with “non-idealized” interpretations of Aristotelian moral virtue to support the view that the available empirical evidence is compatible with widespread possession of virtuous character. These “non-idealized” interpretations of virtuous character allow for serious deviations from virtuous conduct, especially in the contexts described by the psychology experiments. Furthermore, decades of research on mental contrasting and self-efficacy suggest that subjects in the psychology experiments acted for reasons and possessed the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Hence, situationists are mistaken in thinking that, based on the empirical data, Aristotelianism is deprived of various theoretical advantages.

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Notes

  1. Aristotelians typically identify one of these conditions as having a good enough upbringing so that the agent can begin to grasp ethical truths.

  2. Christian Miller (2013, 2014) has instead argued that the evidence implies that many of us lack a specific subset of global traits countenanced by Aristotelianism.

  3. See Alfano (2013), Doris (2002), Miller (2013, 2014) and Sabini and Silver (2005) for some extended discussions of these experiments.

  4. Experimenters wrote: “Subjects who had not reported the smoke […] uniformly said that they had rejected the idea that it was a fire. Instead, they hit upon an astonishing variety of alternative explanations, all sharing the common characteristic of interpreting the smoke as a non-dangerous event” (Latané and Darley 1968: 219).

  5. There is a difference between acting from vice and acting in accordance with vice. The former implies that an agent’s moral vice causes the action, whereas the latter allows for other traits (including the virtues) to produce that behavior.

  6. It is compatible with this view that individuals may harbor unexpressed blame for minor deviations.

  7. The argument here is not to be confused with Sabini and Silver’s (2005) argument that these acts are too morally trivial to be relevant in evaluating one’s character traits in general. The claim made here is that such acts are neither morally trivial nor entirely irrelevant for character attributions. Instead, the present argument is that these acts are too blameless for concluding any lack of virtue.

  8. For an in-depth interpretation of these passages see Curzer (2005).

  9. An alternative interpretation of these passages is that the actions performed merely appear excessive or deficient from the third-person “observer” perspective, but are virtuous from the perspective of the virtuous agent. This alternative does not help the situationist argument either since the subjects in the experiments may have nevertheless acted virtuously.

  10. Since Aristotelian virtues are defined as a mean between two extremes, this label is slightly misleading because people cannot be too virtuous. Being “virtuous-to-a-fault” does not mean that an agent is too virtuous, but rather that their behavior or other responses are excessive (or deficient) relative to the virtuous mean. 

  11. It may be objected here that, since people often encounter situational influences in a way that disrupts their virtuous behavior, most people do not even qualify as “virtuous-to-a-fault.” However, there is evidence for thinking that, if subjects repeatedly encounter helping-relevant situations with obedience or bystander effects, most subjects tend to not be influenced by these factors and act virtuously. For more on this see Taylor (2019) .

  12. Kevin Cherry (2015) has interpreted the kind of judgments expressed in this passage as linked to the virtue of sunesis.

  13. There is also some empirical support for this idea. See Woolley et al. (2015) for empirical evidence suggesting the individual intelligence of each member in a group can be exceeded by what researchers call “collective intelligence.”

  14. It is assumed in Aristotle’s ethical works that persons are living in a minimally just society that allows for people to morally develop parts of the virtues. It is also assumed in my defense of Aristotelianism that industrialized western cultures (where many of the experiments were conducted) permit individuals to at least develop enough parts of the virtues to be generally trustworthy.

  15. This is not to say that excessive trust from sunesis always psychologically overrides or outweighs the other virtues (e.g., helpfulness) in the situationist experiments. Indeed, there are many variants of the experiments where virtues such as helpfulness may have been driving increases in helping behavior. In the obedience experiments, the subjects acted helpfully when the authority figure was giving commands remotely, or when they could physically see the confederate being harmed, or when there was group pressure to disobey, or when experts disagreed about whether to continue, or when the subject knew the learner intimately (Haslam et al. 2014). In the bystander experiments, the subjects acted helpfully when the bystander was judged to be unable to help (Bickman 1971; Ross and Braband 1973) or inexperienced (Ross 1971), or when they could physically see the distressed person (Solomon et al. 1978). These different conditions may have changed the degree of trust or the content of the peer judgments. For example, subjects may have began to distrust the authority figure when they delivered commands remotely because subjects viewed them as detached, careless, and less interested in ensuring the safety of the learner.

  16. A similar interpretation can be applied to the “Good Samaritan” and ”Stanford Prison” experiments (e.g., Darley and Batson 1973; Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973). Subjects were given instructions by experimenters—to hurry on to deliver a lecture or simulate a prison experience—and subsequently trusted the expert’s judgments about what to do.

  17. There may be a deeper situationist concern here. Perhaps the situationist will revise the present argument so that, the mere observation that any situational factor has any (indirect) causal effect on behavior (even when reasons accompany them) is sufficient for the disconfirmation of virtuous character. In response, the situationist needs to provide some evidence that advocates of Aristotelian virtue ethics would accept such a strong requirement on virtue. Aristotelians have typically recognized that upbringing and many other situational factors (e.g., wealth, social roles, friendship, political power, passions, and honor) may play an indirect causal role in the production of behavior. It is therefore unlikely that Aristotelians would (or should) accept such a strong requirement for possessing virtue.

  18. A similar move can be made in response to more recent findings discussed by Doris (2015). He identifies other odd influences on helping behavior such as images of eyes, framing effects, and name similarities. However, several experiments have also found that these odd influences also causally produce differences in self-efficacy or other related concepts (Conty et al. 2016; Droney and Brooks 1993; Polman et al. 2013; Riet et al. 2008; Vorauer 2012). Hence, these additional odd factors can be included in the self-efficacy model.

  19. I would like to give special thanks to an anonymous reviewer at this journal for calling attention to this objection.

  20. There may be disagreement to some extent about which properties are sorted in which process type, but for the purposes of this paper I will assume the standard distinction between automatic and analytic processing offered by John Bargh (1994).

  21. I have offered a competing interpretation of this evidence, but I will assume for the sake of argument in this section about rational control that their “moral disassociation” interpretation here is correct. My argument is that even if persons are victims of this kind of disassociation, they do not lack the kind of rational control countenanced by Aristotelianism.

  22. Some of the situationist authors with concerns about rational control (e.g., Gilbert Harman and Maria Merritt) have either explicitly endorsed Humean accounts of instrumental rationality or at least accepted Humean moral psychology. It should be noted that Aristotelian accounts of practical rationality are not reducible to Humean instrumentalism. For more on this issue see Callard (2021).

  23. Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer at this journal for raising this objection.

  24. See Taylor (2019) for an empirically informed argument for thinking that people can improve their helping behavior utilizing strategies of moral practice so that they are less susceptible for situational pressures. There is some good reason for thinking that, if most people qualify as “virtuous-to-a-fault” or “incompletely virtuous,” they can take remedial steps to better approximate perfect virtue.

  25. There is also some textual support for this second interpretation within the situationist literature. For example, Doris (2002: 54) claims that “knowing something about a person’s character is supposed to render their behavior intelligible and help observers determine what behaviors to expect.” Alfano (2013: 25) describes predictive power in the following conditional: “If someone possesses a virtue, then reference to that virtue will sometimes enable one to predict her behavior.” These are claims about behavior simpliciter, rather than valence-consistent behavior.

  26. A different concern here may be that features of the situation (e.g., peer judgments, self-efficacy) more strongly explain and predict the behavior of the (non-ideal) virtuous agent than any character traits. But this claim about comparative strength has been challenged by some situationists themselves (e.g., Alfano 2013: 106). It is entirely compatible with this view to allow the situation to play an important predictive role in tandem with character. For example, MacIntyre (1983: 199) explicitly claims that character-based explanation and prediction is merely “the first step towards explaining why those actions rather than some others were performed.” He does not say that it is the one and only step.

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    Matthew C. Taylor

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Taylor, M.C. Non-Ideal Virtue and Situationism. J Ethics 26, 41–68 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-021-09375-1

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