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The Economics of Justice

  • Chapter
Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research

Abstract

This chapter reviews important contributions to justice research in economics with an emphasis on empirical findings that bear on leading theories of justice. We consider evidence from both incentivized economics experiments and self-reported surveys and explore their relation to justice theories that have been treated in both the descriptive and prescriptive branches of economics. We discuss theories of and evidence on different approaches, including equality, efficiency, equity (or proportionality), desert (or merit), context, and pluralism (or multi-criterion justice), and explore very recent findings on the relationship between fairness and risk-taking.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is also more general by allowing for aversion, not only to inequality, but also to fairness norms that call for unequal allocations.

  2. 2.

    Lexicographic preferences are when someone prefers more of one thing (say, good X) to any amount of another (say, good Y), but if two bundles contain the same amount of X, the bundle with more Y is preferred. In the current context- ->, it means agents always prefer more for themselves, but for a given amount for themselves, they prefer more for others.

  3. 3.

    This task has also been employed in subsequent studies, e.g., Falk and Ichino (2006) and Carpenter et al. (2010).

  4. 4.

    There is now a very substantial literature on self-serving fairness biases- ->. A few such studies include Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995), Piovesan and Wengström (2009), Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012), and Ubeda (2014).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kiel University, Kiel, Germany

    James Konow

  2. Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    James Konow

  3. Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Germany

    Lars Schwettmann

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Correspondence to James Konow .

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  1. University of Haifa Faculty of Education, Haifa, Israel

    Clara Sabbagh

  2. Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau, Germany

    Manfred Schmitt

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Konow, J., Schwettmann, L. (2016). The Economics of Justice. In: Sabbagh, C., Schmitt, M. (eds) Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-3216-0_5

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