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Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims

Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations

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Abstract

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Simon Gächter

  2. IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl

  3. School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

    Simon Gächter

  4. Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Arno Riedl

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  1. Simon Gächter
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  2. Arno Riedl
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Correspondence to Arno Riedl.

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Gächter, S., Riedl, A. Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 571–594 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0141-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0141-z

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