Abstract
An attempt is made to evaluate the performance of several distribution mechanisms, using experimental data on ethical judgements. Among the mechanisms examined are the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes, utilitarianism, the maximin, and several mechanisms based on bargaining. Also studied is the extent to which differences in needs, in tastes, and in beliefs may account for unequal distribution.
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Yaari, M.E., Bar-Hillel, M. On dividing justly. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 1–24 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00297056
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00297056