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Coalitions

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Abstract

Coalitions appear in an incredible diversity of economic and game-theoretic situations, ranging from marriages, social coalitions and clubs to unions of nations. We discuss some of the major approaches to coalition theory, including models treating why and how coalitions form, equilibrium (or solution) concepts for predicting outcomes of models allowing coalition formation, and current trends in research on coalitions. We omit a number of related topics covered elsewhere in this dictionary, such as matching and bargaining.

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    Myrna Wooders

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  1. Myrna Wooders
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  2. Frank H. Page Jr.
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We are grateful to Harold Kuhn for his generous assistance in tracking down the origins of the concept of the core.

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Wooders, M., Page, F.H. (2018). Coalitions. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1933

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