Abstract
The argument presented in this chapter challenges three related positions: (i) that collective entities, such as organizations, do not, strictly speaking, have real existence; (ii) that organizations do not act, strictly speaking; and (iii) that, as non-agents, organizations are not responsible and so are amoral. Using the Neo-Aristotelian doctrine of analogy of attribution with regard to existence, action and goodness, with a quasi-person model of organizations, analogies are made between natural persons and artificial persons (organizations) in six respects grounding the use of an analytical procedure that assesses goals, repertoires, evaluations, acts, outcomes, and society (abbreviated as GREAOS). Organisations are not persons but act, exist, and make moral judgments in similar personal ways. In order to establish the collective ethical responsibilities of organizations as organizations, this chapter describes the presuppositions underpinning the GREAOS procedure, presents an explanation of how its component criteria should be applied to define the ethical responsibility of an organization, and illustrates the utility of such an application for management.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Ardagh D (1999) Wellbeing, rules, and conscience. The use of casuistry by professionals. Prof Ethics 7(3/4):137–154
Ardagh D (2011) A quasi-personal alternative to some Anglo-American pluralist models of organizations: towards an analysis of corporate self-governance for virtuous organizations. Philos Manage 10(3):41–58
Ardagh D (2012) Presuppositions of collective moral agency: analogy, architectonics, justice, and casuistry. Philos Manage 11(2):5–28
Ardagh D (2013) A critique of some Anglo-American models of collective agency in business. Philos Manage 12(3):5–26
Ardagh D (2017) Towards an acronym for organizational ethics: locating responsible agents in collective groups. Philos Manage 16(2):137–160
Ardagh D (2019) The natural law tradition and belief. Nova Science Publishers, New York
Austin JL (1967) Agathon and Eudaimonia in the ethics of Aristotle. In: Moravscik JEM (ed) Aristotle: a collection of critical essays. Doubleday, New York
Bakan J (2003) The corporation big picture media. University of British Columbia, Vancouver
Black wave: legacy of the Exxon Valdez (2008) Director R. Cornellier, Mocamba Productions, distributed by Bullfrog Films, Oley, PA
Chisholm R (1968) Supererogation and offence. In: Dworkin G, Thompson J (eds) Ethics. Harper and Row, New York
Chisholm R (1991) On the simplicity of the soul. In: Philosophical perspectives 5, Philosophy of religion. Ridgeview, Atascadero, pp 167–181
Danley J (1999) Corporate moral agency. In: Frederick R (ed) A companion to business ethics. Wiley Blackwell, Oxford
De George R (1996) Business ethics. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Dine C (2000) The governance of corporate groups. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York
Donaldson T (1982) Corporations and morality. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Donaldson T, Werhane P (eds) (2007) Ethical issues in business, 7th edn. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Friedman M (1962) Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
French P (1979) The corporation as a moral person. Am Philos Q 18:207–215
French P (1992) Corporate ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gilbert M (2000) Sociality and responsibility. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham
Gocke B (ed) (2012) After physicalism. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
Goetz S, Taliaferro C (2011) A brief history of the soul. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford
Goodpaster K, Matthews J (1982) Can a corporation have a conscience? January issue of Harvard Business Review 60:132–141
Haldane J (2010) Reasonable faith. Routledge, London
Hare R (1958) The language of morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Jensen A, Toulmin S (1988) The abuse of casuistry. University of California Press, Berkeley
Korten D (1995) When corporations rule the world. Kumarian Press, Boulder
Kretzmann N (with Stump E) (1991) Being and goodness. In: MacDonald S (ed) (1991) Being and goodness. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Ladd J (1983) Morality and the ideal of rationality in organizations. In: Donaldson T, Werhane P (eds) Ethical issues in business, 7th edn. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
MacDonald S (ed) (1991) Being and goodness. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
MacIntyre A (1999) Dependent rational animals. Open Court, Chicago
May L (1987) The morality of groups. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
Miller S (2002) Against collective agency. In: Meggle G (ed) Social facts and collective intentionality. Dr Hansel-Hohenhassen, Frankfurt, pp 273–298
Nussbaum M (1988) Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach. Midwest Stud Philos 13:32–52
O’Connor T (ed) (1995) Agents, causes, and events: the problem of freewill. Oxford University Press, New York
Perry J (2014) God, the good, and utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Polanyi M (1959) The study of man. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Polanyi M (1968) The tacit dimension. Doubleday, New York
Porter J (1995) Moral action and Christian ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Searle J (1983) Intentionality. Cambridge University Press, London
Smart N (1958) Philosophers and religious truth. SCM Press, London
Swinburne R (1993) The evolution of the soul. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Taylor C (1989) Sources of the self. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Urmson J (1968) Saints and heroes. In: Melden A (ed) Essays in moral philosophy. University of Washington Press, Seattle
Velasquez M (1983) Why corporations are not responsible for anything they do. Bus Prof Ethics J 2:1–18
Vollmer E (1999) Agent causality. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht
Williams BOA (1962) Aristotle on the good: a formal sketch. Philos Q 12(49):289–296
Wisor S (2011) Against shallow ponds; an argument against Singer’s approach to global poverty. J Glob Ethics 7(1):19–32
Yandell K (1993) Hume’s inexplicable mystery. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Ardagh, D. (2020). Using Aristotle’s Metaethics to Assess the Moral Responsibility of Organizations as Artificial Persons. In: Neesham, C., Segal, S. (eds) Handbook of Philosophy of Management. Handbooks in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48352-8_4-2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48352-8_4-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-48352-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-48352-8
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Religion and PhilosophyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Humanities
Publish with us
Chapter history
-
Latest
Using Aristotle’s Metaethics to Assess the Moral Responsibility of Organizations as Artificial Persons- Published:
- 17 February 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48352-8_4-2
-
Original
Using Aristotle’s Metaethics to Assess the Moral Responsibility of Organizations as Artificial Persons- Published:
- 18 December 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48352-8_4-1