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Norms and Standardization

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Definition

Standard is a written definition, limit, or rule, approved and monitored for compliance by an authoritative agency as a minimum acceptable benchmark. Standardization is a framework of agreements to which all relevant parties in an industry or organization must adhere to ensure that all processes associated with the creation of a good or performance of a service are performed within set guidelines. Standards occupy a middle position between information measures, representing low intervention and prior approval, representing high intervention. Standard is also the legal or social criterion that adjudicators employ to judge actions under particular circumstances. Standards provide a greater degree of flexibility to judges and allow them to consider fact-specific circumstantial evidence. Norms are behavioral regularities associated with a feeling of obligation supported by normative attitudes.

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Correspondence to Mitja Kovac .

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Kovac, M. (2021). Norms and Standardization. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_654-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_654-2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Norms and Standardization
    Published:
    28 April 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_654-2

  2. Original

    Norms and Standardization
    Published:
    25 February 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_654-1