Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Norms and Standardization

  • Mitja Kovac
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_654-1

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to survey the academic literature on the economics of norms and standardization in the domain of administrative law and to synthesize their main themes. The chapter begins by introducing basic economic framework and continues addressing the issues of norms and tax compliance. Next, the chapter surveys some of the most important areas in the administrative law and economics literature. Topics include norms and environmental compliance, standards in traditional law and economics scholarship, the issues of norms, standards and regulatory functions of the state and the occupational heatly and safety standards and norms.

Keywords

Market Failure Subsidy Scheme Environmental Compliance Optimal Safety Beneficial Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Buckley FH (2003) The morality of laughter. University of Michigan Press, Ann ArborGoogle Scholar
  2. Carlson A (2001) Recycling norms. Calif Law Rev 89:1231–1300CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Choi JP (1996) Standardization and experimentation: Ex ante vs. ex post standardization. In:Holler MJ, Thisse JF (eds) The economics of standardization, Special issue of the European journal of political economy, vol 12. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 273–290Google Scholar
  4. Coase R (1961) The problem of social cost. J Law Econ 3:1–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cooter RD (1996) Decentralized law for a complex economy: the structural approach to adjudicating the new law merchant. Univ Pennsylvania Law Rev 144:1643–1696CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Ellikson RC (1991) Order without Law: how neighbors settle disputes. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  7. Ellikson RC (1998) Law and economics discovers social norms. J Leg Stud 27:537–552CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Epstein JM (2001) Learning to be thoughtless: social norms and individual computation. Comput Econ 18(1):9–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Goerke L, Holler MJ (1998) Strategic standardization in Europe: a public choice perspective. Eur J Law Econ 6:95–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Gómez-Barroso JB (2016) Market failure (analysis). In: Marciano A, Ramello GB (eds) Encyclopedia of law and economics. Springer, New York, pp 1–5Google Scholar
  11. Hasen RL (1996) Voting without law? Univ Pennsylvania Law Rev 144:2135–2179CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hirschelifer D, Rasmusen E (1989) Cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with ostracism. J Econ Behav Organ 12:87–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Jeanneret MH, Verdier T (1996) Standardization and protection in a vertical differentiation model. In: Holler MJ, Thisse JF (eds) The economics of standardization, Special issue of the European journal of political economy, vol 12. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 273–290Google Scholar
  14. Kahan DM (2001) The limited significance of norms for corporate governance. Univ Pennsylvania Law Rev 149:1869–1900CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Kaplow L (1995) A note on subsidizing gifts. J Public Econ 58(3):469–477CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Kaplow L, Shavell S (2002) Fairness versus welfare. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  17. Lederman L (2003) The interplay between norms and enforcement in tax compliance. Ohioa State Law J 64:1453–1513Google Scholar
  18. Luppi B, Parisi F (2011) Rules versus standards. In: Parisi F (ed) Production of legal rules. Encyclopedia of law and economics, vol 7. Edward Elgar, pp 43–53Google Scholar
  19. Mahoney PG, Sanchirico C (2003) Norms, repeated games and the role of law. Calif Law Rev 91:1281–1329CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Marneffe W, Bielen S, Vereeck L (2015) Transaction costs. In: Marciano A, Ramello GB (eds) Encyclopedia of law and economics. Springer, New York, pp 1–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. McAdams RH (1996) Groups norms, gossip and blackmail. Univ Pennsylvania Law Rev 144:2237–2292CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. McAdams RH, Rasmusen EB (2007) Norms and the law. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) Handbook of law and economics, vol 2. North-Holland, AmsterdamGoogle Scholar
  23. Ogus AI (2004) Regulation: legal form and economic theory. Hart Publishing, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  24. Picker RC (1997) Simple games in a complex world: a generative approach to the adoption of norms. Univ Chic Law Rev 64:1225–1287CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Ponser EA (1996b) The regulation of groups: the influence of legal and non-legal sanctions on collective action. Univ Chic Law Rev 63:133–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Posner EA (1996) The legal regulation of religious groups. Legal Theory 2(1):33–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Posner EA (2000a) Law and social norms. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  28. Posner EA (2000b) Law and social norms: the case of tax compliance. Virginia Law Rev 86:1781–1820CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Posner RA, Rasmusen E (1999) Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions. Int Rev Law Econ 19:369–382CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Schäfer HB (2001) Enforcement of contracts. DSE World Bank. Inst Found Mark Econ 3:141–146Google Scholar
  31. Scott RE (2000) The limits of behavioral theories of law and social norms. Virginia Law Rev 86:1603–1645CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Shavel S (2002) Law versus morality as regulators of conduct. Am Law Econ Rev 4:227–257CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Sunstein CR, Schkade D, Kahneman D (2000) Do people want optimal deterrence? J Leg Stud 29:237–253CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Swan GMP (2000) The economics of standardization. Standards and Technical Regulations Directorate Department of Trade and Industry, United KingdomGoogle Scholar
  35. Thomas MW (1948) The early factory legislation: a study in legislative and administrative evolution. Thames Bank Pub. Co, Leigh-on-SeaGoogle Scholar
  36. Vandenbergh M (2003) Beyond elegance: a testable typology of social norms in corporate environmental compliance. Stanf Environ Law J 22:55–144Google Scholar
  37. Weigel W (2006) Why promote the economic analysis of public law? Homo Econ 23(2):195–216Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economic Theory and Policy, Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of LjubljanaLjubljanaSlovenia