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Clientelist corruption networks: conceptual and empirical approaches

Klientelistische Korruptions-Netzwerke – Konzeptionelle und empirische Ansätze

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Abstract

Corruption is widespread all over the world. It is seen as a serious problem for wealth, equality, democracy and development. In many countries, corruption is not a deviant behaviour but the norm, generally practised by actors; hence corruption is an informal institution. Despite this, a consensual definition of corruption is nowhere in sight. One way of approaching corruption might be to study forms of corruption. A form or variant often mentioned is corruption networks, or clientelism. In this paper, clientelism is analysed in order to proceed further towards an understanding of corruption. With this perspective, corruption is not seen as a deviant behaviour but the social embeddedness of corruption is better understood. First, concepts and definitions of corruption and clientelism are discussed, highlighting core characteristics and analysing the relationship. Second, different approaches of studying and measuring clientelism are introduced—interpretative, ethnographic field studies, the use of proxies, surveys and expert surveys.

Zusammenfassung

Korruption als ein global verbreitetes Phänomen wird als schwerwiegendes Problem für Wohlstand, Gleichheit, Demokratie und Entwicklung wahrgenommen. In zahlreichen Staaten gilt Korruption nicht als abweichendes sondern als Norm-konformes Verhalten. Korruption kann dann als informelle Institution betrachtet werden. Dieser Beitrag analysiert eine Spielart von Korruption, den Klientelismus. Er präsentiert Ansätze, um Klientelismus als gesellschaftlich verankerte Interaktionsform differenzierter zu verstehen.

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Notes

  1. I owe this idea to the suggestions of one of the anonymous reviewers.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Colonel-Kleinmann-Weg 2, 55099, Mainz, Germany

    Wolfgang Muno

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Muno, W. Clientelist corruption networks: conceptual and empirical approaches. Z Vgl Polit Wiss 7 (Suppl 1), 33–56 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-013-0156-7

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