Abstract
The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.
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Data availability
The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Notes
Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.
A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).
See Appendix for a full list of respondents.
Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.
Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”
Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.
Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.
The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).
Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.
Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.
Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.
Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.
Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.
Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.
Interviews 16,22,27–38.
Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.
Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.
Interviews 16,22,27–38.
Interviews 16,22.
Interview 22.
Interview 22.
Interviews 16,22,27–38.
Interview 23.
Interview 23.
Interview 23.
Interview 23.
Interview 23.
Interviews 1,20.
Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.
Interviews 15–16,20,22.
Interview 22.
Interview 22.
Interview 22.
Interviews 27–31.
Interviews 27–31.
Interview 24.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 2,6,10.
Interview 22–23.
Interviews 14,18,32–38.
Interviews 32–38.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.
Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.
Interview 16.
Interviews 2–3.
Interview 3.
Interviews 27–31.
Interview 3.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
Interview 15.
Interviews 2–3,6,15.
BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.
Interview 15.
Interviews 3–4.
Interview 1.
Interview 3.
Interview 3–4,6,10,12.
Interview 7.
Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.
Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.
Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.
COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.
Interviews 3–4,6–7.
Interviews 3–4,6–7.
Interview 6.
Interviews 14–15,25–26.
Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.
Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.
Interviews 27–31.
Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.
Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interview 21.
Interview 2.
Interview 14,21,49.
Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.
Interviews 1,2.
Interviews 1,2.
Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.
Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.
Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.
Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.
Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.
Interview 15.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
Interview 15.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
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Appendix: List of interviews
Appendix: List of interviews
All identifying markers were removed to help ensure confidentiality. Interviews performed from 2013 to 2015.
Number | Occupation |
|---|---|
1 | Executive Director - Pro-democracy NGO |
2 | Professor |
3 | Secretary General - National Pro-democracy NGO |
4 | Chairperson - International Pro-democracy NGO |
5 | Chairperson - National Pro-democracy NGO |
6 | Executive Director - Pro-democracy NGO |
7 | Assistant Professor |
8 | Former Director - Teaching Institution |
9 | Professor |
10 | Professor |
11 | Corporate Secretary - Pro-democracy NGO for Western Mindanao |
12 | President - Pro-democracy NGO for Western Mindanao |
13 | Executive Director - Anticorruption NGO |
14 | Nobel Peace Prize Nominee (former) |
15 | Founder & Director - Development NGO for Western Mindanao |
16 | University President (ret.) |
17 | Congressperson of the Philippines |
18 | Political family member |
19 | Campaign Manager |
20 | Anticorruption Grass Roots Advocate |
21 | Former Candidate for Governor |
22 | City Councilor |
23 | Provincial Judge |
24 | Lider |
25 | Barangay Treasurer / Lider |
26 | Barangay Captain |
27 | Farmer |
28 | Farmer |
29 | Farmer |
30 | Farmer |
31 | Farmer |
32 | Farmer |
33 | Farmer |
34 | Farmer |
35 | Farmer |
36 | Farmer |
37 | Farmer |
38 | Farmer |
39 | Student |
40 | Student |
41 | Student |
42 | Student |
43 | Student |
44 | Student |
45 | School Teacher (ret.) |
46 | Farmer |
47 | Restaurant Employee |
48 | Housewife |
49 | Singer/Musician |
50 | Chaplain |
51 | Secretary |
52 | Philippine National Police (PNP) – Chairman Level |
53 | Member of Government Peace Panel for MILF Talks |
54 | Professor |
55 | Professor |
56 | Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center |
57 | United States Agency of International Development (USAID) |
58 | Assistant Ombudsman |
59 | Former Secretary of the Interior and Local Government – Cabinet Member in charge of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) |
60 | Professor |
61 | Professor |
62 | Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) |
63 | Mayor of a Metro Manila city |
64 | Philippine National Police (PNP) – Deputy Director Level |
65 | Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation |
66 | Former Mayor of Metro Manila city |
67 | Asian Development Bank – Director’s Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) |
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Guth, A. The Philippines: a social structure of corruption. Crime Law Soc Change (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10140-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10140-2