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Transversality of the Shapley value

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Abstract

A few applications of the Shapley value are described. The main choice criterion is to look at quite diversified fields, to appreciate how wide is the terrain that has been explored and colonized using this and related tools.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Unit of Molecular Epidemiology, National Cancer Research Institute, Largo R. Benzi 10, 16132, Genoa, Italy

    Stefano Moretti

  2. DIPTEM, University of Genova, P.le Kennedy–Pad D, 16129, Genoa, Italy

    Fioravante Patrone

Authors
  1. Stefano Moretti
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  2. Fioravante Patrone
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Correspondence to Stefano Moretti.

Additional information

This invited paper is discussed in the comments available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0045-4, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0046-3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0047-2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0048-1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0049-0, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0050-7.

The title is inspired by a tutorial that one of the authors planned to deliver at the 7th meeting on Game Theory and Practice (Montreal, 2007), but was unable to do it for personal reasons. Thanks to Georges Zaccour whose invitation sparked the present survey.

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Moretti, S., Patrone, F. Transversality of the Shapley value. TOP 16, 1–41 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0044-5

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