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Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate

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Abstract

We examine legislative shirking under conditions of imperfect constituent monitoring. Our core argument states that variation in information costs and constituent memory leads to systematic variation in constituent monitoring over time. Assuming that legislators are responsive to multiple cues, we expect to observe time-dependent legislative shirking. We develop a theoretical model of legislative behavior with time-dependent monitoring, which we test empirically using Senate roll call data. Our findings show that a substantial number of senators engage in systematic, time-dependent shirking, and that senators consistently move toward extreme positions when monitoring is low and toward moderate positions when it is high.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

    René Lindstädt

  2. Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Ryan J. Vander Wielen

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  1. René Lindstädt
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  2. Ryan J. Vander Wielen
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Correspondence to René Lindstädt.

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Lindstädt, R., Vander Wielen, R.J. Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate. Public Choice 148, 119–148 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9649-y

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