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Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

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Abstract

This paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in OECD countries. I analyze a dataset of non-manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy, transport and communication industries in 21 OECD countries over the 1980–2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology. The results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process: market-oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy, transport and communication industries. This finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box 138, 78457, Konstanz, Germany

    Niklas Potrafke

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Potrafke, N. Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries. Public Choice 143, 135–155 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9494-z

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