Abstract
This paper asks the question whether political ideology affects economic growth. Voters may demand inefficient levels of redistribution and government intervention, and they may care too little for aspects that really matter for the economy. Their norms and perceptions of society might, via their political ideology, affect economic performance. The paper presents evidence suggesting that rightwing societies have grown faster in the last decades than other democratic societies. Further analysis suggests that these societies develop better legal systems and less government intervention, which in turn explain some but not all of the growth difference.
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Bjørnskov, C. Does Political Ideology Affect Economic Growth?. Public Choice 123, 133–146 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0263-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0263-3