Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Epistemic Virtues in Business

  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper applies emerging research on epistemic virtues to business ethics. Inspired by recent work on epistemic virtues in philosophy, I develop a view in which epistemic virtues contribute to the acquisition of knowledge that is instrumentally valuable in the realisation of particular ends, business ends in particular. I propose a conception of inquiry according to which epistemic actions involve investigation, belief adoption and justification, and relate this to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ analysis of knowledge. I defend the view that epistemic virtues enable and/or motivate people to perform epistemic actions. An examination of the key epistemic virtues of love of knowledge, epistemic courage, temperance, justice, generosity and humility provides some initial evidence suggesting that the way epistemic virtues enable or motivate is by countering a number of biases that have been uncovered by behavioural economics, and also indicates ways in which the instrumental epistemic value view is superior to other approaches to epistemic virtue offered in the literature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Pritchard (2005) mentions medical ethics. Marcum (2009) is an empirical rather than a normative piece on epistemic virtues in medical decision-making. Without using the term epistemic virtue, similar research exists in accounting (Charron and Lowe 2008). De Bruin (2014) is the first monograph on epistemic virtues in business ethics, under contract to Cambridge University Press.

  2. Baehr uses the term intellectual virtue, but such terminology has unpleasant intellectualist connotations, suggesting, for instance, that these virtues are especially important to rather high-end sorts of belief formation. Hence I use epistemic virtues.

  3. Most virtue epistemologists use terms such as open-mindedness, fairness or impartiality to describe the virtue. Nothing, I believe, would prohibit us from staying closer to Aristotle’s terminology, so I use the term justice here.

  4. If humility is used as a translation of mikropsuchia, humility would be the other extreme of megalopsuchia. Much can be said in favour of translating mikropsuchia as false humility, though, and recalling that humility derives from humus (earth), humility (possibly prefixed by appropriate) or down-to-earthness could be used as a translation of the virtue of megalopsuchia. That, at least, is how humility is understood here.

  5. More precisely, the insight of Black, Scholes and Merton was that to find the price of an option one need not calculate the risk premium, because the risk premium is already contained in the asset’s price; to calculate the price of the option, the only significant variable to be plugged in is the asset’s volatility. The theory does not say anything—and cannot say anything—about the right way to estimate volatility. A history of only 5 years turned out to be too meager.

References

  • Aikin, S. F., & Clanton, C. J. (2010). Developing group-deliberative virtues. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(4), 409–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alzola, M. (2008). Character and environment: The status of virtues in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(3), 343–357.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anscombe, E. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33, 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas (2006). In W. Hughes (Ed.), St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae: Volume 23 (1a2ae. 55-67): Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Argandoña, A. (2011). Beyond contracts: Love in firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(1), 77–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Argote, L., & Ingram, P. (2000). Knowledge transfer: A basis for competitive advantage in firms. Organizational Behaviour & Human Decision Processes, 82(1), 150–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle. (1963). Ethica Nicomachea. In I. Bywater (Ed.), Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Arjoon, S. (2000). Virtue theory as a dynamic theory of business. Journal of Business Ethics, 28(2), 159–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, J. S. (2011). Evidence-based advertising. International Journal of Advertising, 30(5), 743–767.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axtell, G. (1996). Epistemic-virtue talk: The reemergence of American axiology? The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, 10(3), 172–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baehr, J. (2011). The inquiring mind: On intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, J. (2009). Virtue and behavior. Review of Social Economy, 67(1), 3–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2002). Online investors: Do the slow die first? Review of Financial Studies, 15(2), 455–487.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2002). A survey of behavioral finance. Cambridge: NBER.

    Google Scholar 

  • Battaly, H. (2010). Epistemic self-indulgence. Metaphilosophy, 41(1–2), 214–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beadle, R., & Knight, K. (2012). Virtue and meaningful work. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(2), 433–450.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beaulieu, P., & Reinstein, A. (2010). Belief perseverance among accounting practitioners regarding the effect of non-audit services on auditor independence. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29(4), 353–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bertland, A. (2009). Virtue ethics in business and the capabilities approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 25–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blumenberg, H. (1970). Neugierde und Wissenstrieb: Supplemente zur Curiositas. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 14, 7–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borenstein, J. (2002). Authenticating expertise: Philosophical and legal issues. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16(1), 85–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brady, M. S., & Pritchard, D. (2003). Moral and epistemic virtues. Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2), 1–11.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, A. (2009). Philosophy and public policy: A role for social moral epistemology. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26(3), 276–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bull, C., & Adam, A. (2011). Virtue ethics and customer relationship management: Towards a more holistic approach for the development of best practice. Business Ethics: A European Review, 20(2), 121–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, L., et al. (2011). Comments on J. Scott Armstrong’s evidence-based advertising: An application to persuasion. International Journal of Advertising, 30(5), 769–794.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cass, K. (1996). Expert systems as general-use advisory tools: An examination of moral responsibility. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 15(4), 61–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charlier, S. D., et al. (2011). Teaching evidence-based management in MBA programs: What evidence is there? Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10(2), 222–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charron, K. F., & Lowe, D. J. (2008). Skepticism and the management accountant: Insights for fraud detection. Management Accounting Quarterly, 9(2), 9–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cloyd, C. B., & Spilker, B. C. (1999). The influence of client preferences on tax professionals’ search for judicial precedents, subsequent judgments and recommendations. Accounting Review, 74(3), 299–323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Code, L. (1984). Toward a “responsibilist” epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 29–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Couchrane, M. J., Surette, B. J., & Zorn, P. M. (2004). Subprime borrowers: Mortgage transitions and outcomes. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 29(4), 365–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crisp, R. (2010). Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Metaphilosophy, 41(1), 22–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Curzer, H. J. (1991). Aristotle’s much maligned megalopsychos. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69(2), 131–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Curzer, H. J. (1997). Aristotle’s account of the virtue of temperance in Nicomachean Ethics III. 10–11. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35(1), 5–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Bruin, B. (2014). Ethics in finance: Epistemic virtues for bankers, clients, raters and regulators. Cambridge University Press, under contract

  • Dobson, J. (2009). Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelian business ethics: A critique. Journal of Business Ethics, 86(1), 43–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doris, J. M. (1998). Persons, situations and virtue ethics. Noûs, 32(4), 504–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drake, M. J., & Schlachter, J. T. (2008). A virtue-ethics analysis of supply chain collaboration. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(4), 851–864.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferguson, N. (2008). The ascent of Monet. New York: The Penguin Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flood, A. T. (2008). Epistemic badness. Journal of Philosophical Research, 33, 253–262.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fontrodona, J., & Sison, A. J. G. (2006). The nature of the firm, agency theory and shareholder theory: A critique from philosophical anthropology. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(1), 33–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power & the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gowri, A. (2007). On corporate virtue. Journal of Business Ethics, 70(4), 391–400.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graafland, J. J. (2010). Do markets crowd out virtues? An Aristotelian framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(1), 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 109–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, M. A. (2011). Motivating reflective citizens: Deliberative democracy and the internal deliberative virtues. Journal of Value Inquiry, 45(2), 175–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hare, J. E. (1988). Eleutheriotes in Aristotle’s ethics. Ancient Philosophy, 8, 19–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (2003). No character or personality. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(1), 87–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, H. (2002). Is love a management virtue? Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 21(3/4), 173–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartman, E. (2011). Virtue, profit and the separation thesis: An Aristotelian view. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(1), 5–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hindriks, F. (2009). Corporate responsibility and judgment aggregation. Economics and Philosophy, 25(2), 161–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jankélévitch, V. (1949). Traité des vertus. Paris: Bordas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, R. (2007). What to ask the person in the mirror. Harvard Business Review, 85(1), 86–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence, D., et al. (2011). The introduction of a non-traditional and aggressive approach to banking: The risks of hubris. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(3), 401–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, M. (2011). The big short: Inside the doomsday machine. New York: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, J., & Chen, Y. (2003). Knowledge sharing proficiencies: The key to knowledge management. In H. W. Holsapple (Ed.), Handbook on knowledge management (p. 410). Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue: A study in moral theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, A. (1994). Truthfulness, lies and moral philosophers: What can we learn from Mill and Kant. In G. B. Peterson (Ed.), The Tanner lectures on human values. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marcum, J. (2009). The epistemically virtuous clinician. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 30, 249–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markopolos, H. (2010). No one would listen: A true financial thriller. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Melé, D. (2008). Integrating ethics into management. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(3), 291–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messick, D., & Bazerman, M. (1996). Ethical leadership and the psychology of decision making. Sloan Management Review, 37(Winter), 9–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mills, M. J. (1980). The discussions of Andreia in the Eudemian and Nichomachean ethics. Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 25, 198–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Misra, S. (1992). Is conventional debriefing adequate? An ethical issue in consumer research. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 20(3), 269–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montmarquet, J. (1993). Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. (2005). Corporate character: Modern virtue ethics and the virtuous corporation. Business Ethics Quarterly, 15(4), 659–685.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. (2008). Re-imagining the morality of management: A modern virtue ethics approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(4), 483–511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nash, L. (1990). Good intentions aside: A manager’s guide to resolving ethical problems. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nevicka, B., et al. (2011). Reality at odds with perceptions: Narcissistic leaders and group performance. Psychological Science, 22(10), 1259–1264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: How Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nuyen, A. T. (1999). Vanity. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36, 613–626.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palanski, M. E. (2011). Team virtues and performance: An examination of transparency, behavioral integrity, and trust. Journal of Business Ethics, 99, 201–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pieper, J. (1934). Vom Sinn der Tapferkeit. Leipzig: Jakob Hegner-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plato. (1963). Meno. In J. Burnet (Ed.), Plato Opera (Vol. III). Oxford University Press: Oxford.

  • Pritchard, D. (2005). Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge. Philosophical Explorations, 8(3), 229–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajko, A. (2012). Behavioural economics and business ethics. Abingdon, OX: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, C. R., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 96(2–1), 197–216.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, H. B., Sirtes, D., & Weber, M. (Eds.). (2011). Collective epistemology. Frankfurt: Ontos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schudt, K. (2000). Taming the corporate monster: An Aristotelian approach to corporate virtue. Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(3), 711–723.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwartz, D. (2004). The paradox of choice: Why more is less. New York: Ecco.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shepherd, D. A., & Griffin, D. (2006). A hubris theory of entrepreneurship. Management Science, 52(2), 160–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sison, A. J. G. (2007). Towards a common good theory of the firm: The Tasubinsa case. Journal of Business Ethics, 74(4), 471–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sison, A. J. G. (2008). Corporate governance and ethics: An Aristotelian perspective. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, R. C. (1992). Corporate roles, personal virtues: An Aristotelean approach to business ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(3), 317–339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, R. C. (1999). Business ethics and virtue. In R. E. Frederick (Ed.), A companion to business ethics (pp. 30–37). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, R. C. (2003). Victims of circumstances? A defense of virtue ethics in business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(1), 43–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, M. (2005). Groupthink versus the wisdom of crowds: The social epistemology of deliberation and dissent. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 44, 28–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid: Coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1), 3–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sparks, C., & Tulloch, J. (2000). Tabloid tales: Global debates over media standards. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, M. (2003). Risk and organizational narcissism at long term capital management. Human Relations, 56(5), 523–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, A. (2010). The genealogy of epistemic virtue concepts. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), 345–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tiberius, V., & Walker, J. D. (1998). Arrogance. American Philosophical Quarterly, 35(4), 379–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Trottmann, C. (2003). Studiositas et superstitio dans la Somme de Théologie de Thomas d’Aquin, enjeux de la défiance à l’égard des “sciences curieuses”. In T. Marchetti, et al. (Eds.), Ratio et Superstitio: Essays in honor of Graziella Federici Vescovini (pp. 137–154). Louvain-La-Neuve: Brepols.

    Google Scholar 

  • van de Ven, B. (2008). An ethical framework for the marketing of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(2), 339–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiss, H. W., & Knight, P. A. (1980). The utility of humility: Self-esteem, information search and problem-solving efficiency. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 216–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whetstone, J. (2001). How virtue fits within business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 33(2), 101–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicks, A. C. (1997). On MacIntyre, modernity and virtues. Business Ethics Quarterly, 7(4), 133–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (2002). Truth and truthfulness: An essay in genealogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Nettelbosje 4, 9747 AE, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Boudewijn de Bruin

  2. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Boudewijn de Bruin

Authors
  1. Boudewijn de Bruin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Boudewijn de Bruin.

Additional information

I am indebted to Joan Fontrodona, Alejo Sison, three anonymous referees, and audiences in Cambridge, Groningen, Louvain, Oxford and Tilburg for discussions of earlier drafts of this paper.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

de Bruin, B. Epistemic Virtues in Business. J Bus Ethics 113, 583–595 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1677-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1677-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation