Abstract
Tests were carried out on thirty pairs of subjects, using three different sets of conditions, for the purpose of experimentally validatingNash's axioms (and also, incidentally, certain other hypotheses of two-person bargaining). Under validation, it was found that subjects' responses conformed to both thesymmetry andindependence of irrelevant alternatives axioms. On the other hand, the axiom ofinvariance under linear transformations of utility was constantly violated. This may be due to the fact that subjects, whenever possible, try to effect an interpersonal comparison of utility.
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Nydegger, R.V., Owen, G. Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms. Int J Game Theory 3, 239–249 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766877
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766877