Abstract
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bargainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive a share of the bilateral surplus, and (b) while she may not participate in all periods of the negotiation, she cannot remain entirely inhibited. Our main findings are:(1) the stakeholder’s (reverse) liquidity constraint implies the existence of a multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria that include outcomes with very asymmetric bilateral agreements, and (2) the partial participation of the stakeholder may be the source of severe inefficiency
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Manzini, P., Ponsati, C. Stakeholder bargaining games. Int J Game Theory 34, 67–77 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0006-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0006-1