Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions

  • Papers
  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A description is given of the class of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions by associating with each of these solutions a monotonic curve in the triangle ofR 2 with vertices (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). Also the family of globally individually monotonic bargaining solutions is characterized with the aid of monotonic curves in the unit square ofR 2.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Harsanyi, J.C. andR. Selten: A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. Management Science18, 1972, 80–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jansen, M.J.M. andS.H. Tijs: Continuity of Bargaining Solutions. International Journal of Game Theory12, 1983, 91–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E.: Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining. International Journal of Game Theory6, 1977, 129–133.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E. andR. W. Rosenthal: Arbitration of Two-Pary Disputes Under Ignorance. International Journal of Game Theory7, 1978, 65–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E. andM. Smorodinsky: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem. Econometrica43, 1975, 513–518.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kihlstrom, R.E., A.E. Roth, andD. Schmeidler: Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem. In: Game Theory and Mathematical Economics (Eds. O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke), North Holland Publ. Cie, Amsterdam, 1981, 65–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koster, R. de, H.J.M. Peters, S.H. Tijs, andP. Wakker: Risk Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity of Bargaining Solutions. Mathematical Social Sciences4, 1983, 295–300.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J.F., Jr.: The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica18, 1950, 155 -162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters, H. andS. Tijs: Risk Sensitivity of Bargaining Solutions. Methods of Operations Research44, 1981, 409–420.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A.E.: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Springer Verlag, Berlin 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, W.: Replication Invariance of Bargaining Solutions. University of Rochester, 1984.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    H. J. M. Peters

  2. Department of Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld, 6225 ED, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    S. H. Tijs

Authors
  1. H. J. M. Peters
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. S. H. Tijs
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Peters, H.J.M., Tijs, S.H. Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions. Int J Game Theory 14, 219–228 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769309

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769309

Keywords

Search

Navigation