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Topics in noncooperative game theory

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Mathematical Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Mathematics ((LNMCIME,volume 1330))

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Shmuel Zamir

Authors
  1. Shmuel Zamir
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Antonio Ambrosetti Franco Gori Roberto Lucchetti

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© 1988 Springer-Verlag

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Zamir, S. (1988). Topics in noncooperative game theory. In: Ambrosetti, A., Gori, F., Lucchetti, R. (eds) Mathematical Economics. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol 1330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0078159

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50003-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45883-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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