Abstract
The paper is concerned with zero-sum two-person repeated games with lack of information on one side. The main result in the construction of an optimal strategy for the uninformed player in the infinitely repeated game.
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Kohlberg, E. Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 4, 7–24 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766399
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766399