Abstract
For a class of repeated two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information it was proved byAumann andMaschler that\(\mathop {\lim }\limits_{n \to \infty } v_n\) exists,Ν n being the value of the game withn repetitions. As for the speed of convergenceAumann andMaschler showed that the error termδ n=¦Ν n−limΝ n¦ is bounded from above byc/√n for some positive constantc. Both results have been generalized byMertens andZamir. It is shown in this paper that the above mentioned theorem about the speed of convergence is sharp in the sense that there are games in whichδ n≥c′/√n for some positive constantc′. However there are games for which δn is of a lower order of magnitude, for instancec′(logn)/n≤δ n≤c (logn)/n orc′/n≤δ n≤c/n. Sufficient conditions are given here for games to belong to one of these categories as well as examples of games from each category.
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Aumann, R. J., andM. Maschler: Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament. Report to the U.S.A.C.D.A. (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.) Final report on Contract ACDA/ST-80, prepared by Mathematica, Princeton N.J. Chapter V, June 1966.
Harsanyi, J. C.: Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players. Parts I, II, III. Management Science,14, No. 3, 5, 7, 1967–1968.
Mertens, J.-F., and S.Zamir: The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. International Journal of Game Theory,1, No. 1, 1971.
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Part of this paper is based on a chapter of the author's Ph. D. thesis done at the Institute of Mathematics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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Zamir, S. On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 1, 179–198 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753442
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753442