Abstract
AES is currently the most important block cipher. There are three variants, i.e., AES-k with \(k\in \{128, 192, 256\}\) denoting the key size in bits. At ASIACRYPT 2009, Biryukov et al. carried out the rectangle attack against the full AES-192 and achieved the best results under the related-key setting so far. During our research, we found that the time complexity of each phase in the attack proposed by Biryukov et al. is unbalanced. More specifically, the time complexity of the quartet processing phase far exceeds that of the other phases. Therefore, the key of our work is to balance the time complexity of each phase so that the overall time complexity of the attack against the full AES-192 is reduced. In this paper, we adopt a strategy of pre-guessing some subkey bits. Indeed, pre-guessing subkeys increase the time complexity of some phases, but we can get more filter bits to reduce the time complexity of processing quartets. Using the above concepts, the time complexity of the rectangle key recovery attack on full AES-192 under the related-key setting can be reduced from \(2^{176}\) to \(2^{158}\).
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program (No. 2018YFA0704704, No. 2022YFB2701900, No. 2022YFB2703003) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants 62022036, 62132008, 62202460, 62172410).
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Liang, X., Chen, Y., Song, L., Yang, Q., Feng, Z., Huang, T. (2023). Improved Related-Key Rectangle Attack Against theĀ Full AES-192. In: Wang, D., Yung, M., Liu, Z., Chen, X. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14252. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7356-9_2
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