Abstract
The rectangle attack and the related-key attack on block ciphers are well-known to be very powerful. In this paper we combine the rectangle attack with the related-key attack. Using this combined attack we can attack the SHACAL-1 cipher with 512-bit keys up to 59 out of its 80 rounds. Our 59-round attack requires a data complexity of 2149.72 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2498.30 encryptions, which is faster than exhaustive search.
This work was supported by MOST research fund (M1-0326-08-0001).
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Kim, J., Kim, G., Hong, S., Lee, S., Hong, D. (2004). The Related-Key Rectangle Attack – Application to SHACAL-1. In: Wang, H., Pieprzyk, J., Varadharajan, V. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3108. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_11
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