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Lobbyismus und Geschenke

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Zusammenfassung

Trotz ihrer weiten Verbreitung sind Wirkungen von Geschenken durch Lobbyisten an politische Entscheidungsträger untererforscht. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über experimentelle Evidenz zu mannigfaltigen verhaltensökonomischen Mechanismen, die ursächlich eine Verzerrung von Einstellungen, Annahmen sowie letztlich Verhalten und Entscheidungen von Politikern durch Geschenke seitens Lobbyisten hervorrufen, ermöglichen oder erleichtern können. Zudem werden Faktoren dargestellt, die Selbsttäuschungsprozesse erschweren sowie Implikationen für die Eindämmung der Beeinflussbarkeit diskutiert.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wir verwenden zur einfachen Lesbarkeit das generische Maskulinum, womit Personen jedweden Geschlechts eingeschlossen sein sollen.

  2. 2.

    Für einen Konzeptartikel zu dem Konzept des Sozialkapitals in Verbindung mit dem Austausch von Geschenken vgl. Dolfsma et al. (2009).

  3. 3.

    In dieser Arbeit werden Effekte auf Individualebene (d. h. bei einzelnen Politikern) diskutiert und daher Beeinflussungen durch Spenden an Parteien (z. B. Fowler et al. 2020; Großer et al. 2013; Kalla und Broockman 2016) nicht vordergründig adressiert.

  4. 4.

    Für eine Synthese aus 38 Definitionen zu Lobbyismus, vgl. Schwaneck (2019, S. 18–26 sowie S. 363–371).

  5. 5.

    Für Einzelheiten sei auf die Norm verwiesen sowie auf den Gesetzesentwurf (BT-Drucks. 19/28784 2021), auf die Textsammlung des Deutschen Bundestags mit Verhaltensregeln (Deutscher Bundestag 2021) sowie einen kommentierenden Aufsatz von Austermann (2021).

  6. 6.

    Die Bezeichnung „intrinsisch“ folgt einer stark vereinfachenden Sicht, bei welcher Motivation dichotom in intrinsisch und extrinsisch unterschieden wird. Intrinsische Motivation bezeichnet nach einer der führenden Motivationstheorien – der Selbstbestimmtheitstheorie – die Ausübung einer Tätigkeit motiviert durch eine inhärente Befriedigung, d. h. eine Befriedigung durch die Tätigkeit selbst und nicht über (antizipierte) Konsequenzen (Ryan und Deci 2000, S. 71). Der Begriff der intrinsischen Reziprozität nach Sobel (2005, S. 392–393, 411) erstreckt sich jedoch überdies auch auf Motivationsfacetten, die der extrinsischen Motivation angehören. Dies wird auch in Abschn. 3.2 deutlich.

  7. 7.

    Introjizierte, identifizierte und integrierte Regulation gehören gleichfalls wie die externale Regulation der extrinsischen Motivation an. Für einen Überblick über diese Facetten der extrinsischen Motivation siehe Deci und Ryan (2000, S. 235–236), Ryan und Deci (2000, S. 71–72); Gagné und Deci (2005, S. 334–335).

  8. 8.

    Für eine Übersicht über etablierte laborexperimentelle Spiele siehe Levit und List (2007, S. 155).

  9. 9.

    In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Definitionen zur Selbsttäuschung. Sie alle eint, dass die Selbsttäuschung aus einem Wunsch entsteht, sich selbst und die Welt auf eine Weise zu sehen, die das eigene Selbst begünstigt (Hippel und Trivers 2011, S. 104).

  10. 10.

    Für die Bedeutung von sozialen Normen für kooperatives Verhalten siehe Fehr and Schurtenberger (2018). Siehe auch Banerjee (2016) für laborexperimentelle Evidenz in Korruptionsspielen.

  11. 11.

    Die Autoren lösten das durch die Selbstselektion der Teilnehmer (die Entscheidung den Gutschein einzulösen oder nicht einzulösen) bestehende Endogenitätsproblem kausalen Schließens durch ökonometrische Verfahren. Genauer wurden Vergleichspersonen mit ähnlichen Kovariaten gebildet und die Robustheit mittels Sensitivitätsanalysen bestätigt (Becker et al. 2013, S. 357–358).

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  1. Universität Vechta, Vechta, Deutschland

    Maximilian Alex Kuntze & Vanessa Mertins

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  1. Maximilian Alex Kuntze
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  2. Vanessa Mertins
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Correspondence to Maximilian Alex Kuntze .

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    Andreas Polk

  2. Universität Münster, Münster, Deutschland

    Karsten Mause

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Kuntze, M.A., Mertins, V. (2023). Lobbyismus und Geschenke. In: Polk, A., Mause, K. (eds) Handbuch Lobbyismus. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32320-2_48

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