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The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

Chapter
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Summary

We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known “chaos theorems,” which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.

Keywords

Social Choice Condorcet Winner Public Project Feasible Allocation Distributive Politics 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of WarwickWarwick
  2. 2.California Institute of TechnologyUSA
  3. 3.University of Toulouse 1Toulouse

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