Abstract
We consider a new solution set for majority voting tournaments recently proposed by Banks (1985), and we examine its internal structure. In particular, we demonstrate that, in the absence of a Condorcet winner, there is always a cycle including precisely the points in the Banks set. We introduce the concept of “external stability” in order to facilitate analysis.
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This research was partially supported by NSF grants SES 85-09680 to Miller and SES 85-09997 to Grofman.
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Miller, N.R., Grofman, B. & Feld, S.L. The structure of the Banks set. Public Choice 66, 243–251 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125776
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125776