Abstract
The yolk is an important new concept for analysis of the instability of majority choice by committees. This paper reports a generalization of the definition of the yolk which extends its applicability to even-numbered committees and to supramajority choice. It also reports the results of computation of the location and size of the yolk for committees of different sizes. The results confirm earlier conjectures and findings that majority choice is likely to be confined to a centrally located subset of an issue space which is small and which decreases in size with increases in committee membership.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ferejohn JA, McKelvey RD, Packel EW (1984) Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models. Soc Choice Welfare 1: 45–67
Feld SL, Grofman B, Richard Hartley R, Kilgour M, Miller NR, Noviello N (1987) The uncovered set in spatial voting games. Theory Decision 23: 129–155
Feld SL, Grofman, B, Miller NR (1986) The geometry of majority rule. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
Feld SL, Grofman B, Miller NR (1988) Centripetal forces in spatial voting: on the size of the yolk. Public Choice 59: 37–50
Feld SL, Grofman B, Miller NR (1989) Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games. Math Model 12: 405–416
McKelvey RD (1986) Covering, dominance, and institution free properties of social choice. Am J Polit Sci 30: 283–314
Miller NR (1980) A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting. Am J Polit Sci 24: 68–96
Miller NR (1983) The covering relation in tournaments: two corrections. Am J Polit Sci 27: 382–385
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR (1984) Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions. Am J Polit Sci 28: 49–74
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I wish to thank an anonymous referee for a number of valuable suggestions.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Koehler, D.H. The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 231–245 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01395724
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01395724