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Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

  • Book
  • © 1994

Overview

Authors:
  1. Bettina Kuon

    1. Wirtschaftstheorie I, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 412)

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Table of contents (15 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-IX
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  2. Introduction

    1. Introduction

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 1-4

  3. The Game Theoretic Analysis

    1. Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 5-10

    2. The Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 11-53

  4. The Game Playing Experiment

    1. Related Bargaining Experiments

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 54-60

    2. The Experimental Design

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 61-66

    3. The Agreement Outcomes

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 67-104

    4. Break Offs

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 105-129

    5. Further Aspects

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 130-157

    6. The Bargaining Process

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 158-180

    7. Individual Adaptation to Experience

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 181-185

    8. A Picture of the Subjects’ Behavior

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 186-194

  5. The Strategy Experiment

    1. The Strategy Experiment

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 195-211

    2. Typicalness of the Final Strategies

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 212-244

    3. An Evolutionary Tournament

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 245-265

    4. Summary and Conclusions

      • Bettina Kuon
      Pages 266-274

  6. Back Matter

    Pages 275-298
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Keywords

About this book

Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wirtschaftstheorie I, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Bettina Kuon

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