Abstract
In the bargaining game each new demand that has to be made before an agreement is reached causes a discounting of the alternatives and the coalition value. To avoid nonnecessary discounting steps a player should select each demand carefully. This is especially true for the initial demand. If it is accepted, no discounting occurs.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kuon, B. (1994). Further Aspects. In: Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 412. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-57920-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48777-4
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