Abstract
In the previous chapter a first analysis of the final strategies was done by studying the average payoffs of the four different types of players which emerged from the strategies. In this chapter we shall investigate the algorithms of the final strategies. It is our aim to draw a picture of the typical strategy. After the introduction of the method of measuring the typicalness of behavior in Section 13.1, we shall apply this method to the final strategies in order to give a picture of the typical strategy (Sections 13.3 to 13.5) and discuss the results of the analysis in Section 13.6. Section 13.2 contains some notes on the evaluation of the typicalness.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kuon, B. (1994). Typicalness of the Final Strategies. In: Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 412. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-57920-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48777-4
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