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Fitting Fulfilment – Fitting Objective or Rational Attractiveness?

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Abstract

Susan Wolf has developed a promising answer to the problem of the meaning of – or better in – life’. Wolf’s hybrid-view of meaning in life can be briefly summarized by the catchphrase: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’. Accordingly, on her account, both an objective and a subjective element are needed for a life to be meaningful. For the objective element at least four characteristics can be identified in Wolf’s writings: the element must be subject-independent (independency claim), it must ground the subject’s fulfilment (grounding claim), the subject must be able to recognize it as source of fulfilment (possibility of recognition claim) and the subject can be fallible regarding this recognition (possibility of fallibility claim). Apart from this, Wolf is silent about objectivity. This is a gap in her account. Additionally, objectivity seems to be a highly metaphysically burdened category. Therefore, searching for an alternative account might be worthwhile. I argue that objectivity should be replaced by rationality. Judgments about meaning in life are evaluative judgments. It is argued that evaluations are expressions of pro- or con-attitudes and that these expressions can be rational. If one has a pro-attitude towards a certain project of one’s life, and if it is rational to have it, then there is to that extent meaning in life. So, meaning arises when subjective attraction meets rational attractiveness.

Zusammenfassung

Susan Wolf hat einen vielversprechenden Hybrid-Ansatz in Hinsicht auf die Frage, was dem Leben Sinn gibt, entwickelt. Diesem Ansatz entsprechend ist ein Leben ein sinnvolles Leben, wenn das, was jemanden subjektiv anzieht, auf objektive Attraktivität trifft bzw. wenn sich jemand aktiv für etwas in seinem Leben engagiert, das objektiven Wert hat. Es werden also im sogenannten Fitting-Fulfilment View subjektivistische und objektivistische Aspekte von Sinnhaftigkeit vereint. Hinsichtlich des objektiven Elements bleibt Wolf allerdings äußerst vage. Es können zwar bestimmte Kriterien, die das objektive Element bestimmen, in Wolfs Ausführungen identifiziert werden (Unabhängigkeit vom Subjekt, Grundlage für das Gefühl des subjektiv angezogen Seins, Erkennbarkeit für das Subjekt sowie Möglichkeit der Fallibilität), aber darüber hinaus wird nicht festgelegt, was unter objektiver Werthaftigkeit zu verstehen ist. Da objektive Werthaftigkeit allerdings eine große Rolle in Wolfs Ansatz spielt, lässt einen diese Vagheit unbefriedigt zurück, nicht zuletzt auch, weil die Kategorie objektiver Werthaftigkeit häufig mit einigem metaphysischen Ballast versehen ist. Da die Kriterien, die von Wolf für das objektive Element veranschlagt werden, Objektivität auch nicht exklusiv bestimmen, scheint die Suche nach einer Alternative lohnenswert zu sein. Ich argumentiere dafür, dass Wolfs Objektivität durch Rationalität ersetzt werden sollte. Urteile in Bezug auf die Sinnhaftigkeit von (individuellem) Leben sind als evaluative Urteile aufzufassen, die bestimmte pro- oder con-Einstellungen zum Ausdruck bringen, und diese Einstellungen können rational sein. Sofern man eine solch positiv-rationale Einstellung in Bezug auf ein Lebensprojekt hat und sich engagiert diesem Projekt widmet, ist das Leben als sinnvoll auszuweisen. In Umformulierung des Wolfschen Slogans kann man daher sagen, dass ein Leben dann sinnvoll ist, wenn subjektive Anziehung auf rationale Attraktivität trifft.

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Notes

  1. Wolf, Susan: Happiness and Meaning. p. 112.

  2. ib., p. 109.

  3. Taylor, Richard: Good and Evil.

  4. Purely objective views do not require the existence of supernatural entities. What is essential for them is, that they deny that „subjective attraction plays any constitutive role in conferring meaning in life.“ Metz, Thaddeus: The Meaning of Life. Wolf rejects these accounts because she thinks that subjective attractiveness is an essential element of meaningfulness.

  5. Wolf, Susan: Life, Meaning of.

  6. The Blob is a person spending her whole time watching TV and drinking beer, the Useless is a person engaged in activities without a point (the pig farmer buying more land to grow more feed to have more pigs in an endless loop) and the Bankrupt is someone engaging in projects which fail. Cf. Wolf, Susan: The Meaning of Lives. p. 92f.

  7. These examples of meaningless activities are from Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life. p. 16.

  8. ib. p. 17.

  9. ib. p. 17.

  10. ib. p. 18.

  11. Cf. ib. p. 41.

  12. Nagel, Thomas: The Absurd. p. 720.

  13. cf. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life. p. 19. I do not think that Wolf can claim strict independency of all subjects. She proposes that “[one get involved with] something other than oneself – that is, with something the value of which is independent of and has its source outside of oneself.” ib. p. 19. If strict independency were needed, this would collide with the recognition claim. If the features worth value were fully independent from us, then they would even be epistemically unrelated, and therefore we could not recognize them as such. That interpretation fits Wolf’s characterization of worthy projects: “the value of these activities, whatever it is, does not depend on one’s own contingent interest in them.” Ib. p. 19. Therefore, I conclude that the value should be independent from the evaluation of the pure and single individual subject but not independent of human evaluation at all.

  14. cf. Ib. p. 22.

  15. cf. Ib. p. 24. Both the grounding claim and the recognition claim are crucial features of Wolf’s account, indicating that the subjective and the objective element of meaningfulness are not two unrelated elements (that would be called the Bipartite View; cf. ib. p. 18f) but fitted together “to a coherent feature a life might or might not possess” ib. p. 20.

  16. cf. ib. p. 39. This feature avoids the danger of elitism regarding judgments about the “relative value of what other people do with their lives”. ib. p. 39.

  17. The experience is explained in the next chapter.

  18. She discusses some aspirants of objectivity but dismisses all considered candidates. She dismisses radical objective accounts for being metaphysically mysterious, implausible and obscure. Idealized individual accounts are dismissed for providing no cognitive force of hypothetical responses of an idealized individual for persons like you and me to value in the same way. Last but not least, intersubjective accounts are rejected because she thinks it not plausible that a group’s judgment should have more weight than that of one person alone. Cf. ib. p. 46.

  19. I do not explore other possible criticisms of Wolf’s account, such as criticism of Wolf’s aspect of subjective fulfilment (Adams, Robert: Comment), or of the aspect of success in Wolf’s objective component (Koethe, John: Comment). My inquiry is closer to Nomy Arpaly’s and Jonathan Haidt’s question whether objective values are really necessary for meaning in life (Arpaly, Nomy: Comment; Haidt, Jonathan: Comment). However, my results differ from their Aristotelian inspired solution.

  20. Wolf, Susan: The Meaning of Lives. p. 96 [emphasis in bold letters mine].

  21. Wolf argues herself not explicitly for a conceptual linkage between meaningfulness and objectivity. She refers in this regard to Wiggins’ paper; see Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life p. 110 footnote 3. I return to Wiggins’ account in chapter 3.

  22. Wiggins, David: Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. p. 140.

  23. For an overview see: Gethmann, C. F.: Rationalität.

  24. See the argument from queerness. Cf. Mackie, John L.: Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong.

  25. Macedo, Stephen: Introduction. p. xii.

  26. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life, p. 26 emphasis by italics mine.

  27. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life, p. 28.

  28. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life, p. 28.

  29. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life, p. 32.

  30. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Life, p. 45 The talk of objectivity is in itself ambiguous as Richard Hare remarks in ‘Objectivity and Rationality’ (Chapter 12 from ‘Moral Thinking’). It could indicate an ontological distinction regarding value entities and factual entities. It could also mark out some of the following distinctions: something factual vs. something that is contra factual; it could also mean something that is about entities that are publicly observable vs. something that is not so or it means something unbiased vs. something biased. Sometimes judgments are called objective, “if they not merely say something about observable objects and their properties, but are made, and can be made, because those objects have those properties.” (p. 210) Perhaps you judge a project of life being good to engage in because it has properties like the projects of Gandhi, Einstein etc., indicating that such a project has descriptive properties. Be it as it may, if it is not made clear in what way ‘x is objectively worthy’ is used, we don’t know what we are talking about. The meaning of ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ may overlap in the aspect of unbiasedness (if meant as a kind of subject independency) or in the characteristic that descriptive properties play a role. However, metaphysical burdened components are excluded if we are using ‘rationality’ instead of ‘objectivity’. So, the rationality account – being compatible with the endoxic method Wolf is using – fits to the phenomenon of asking life-meaning-questions as well or even better than using the ambiguous ‘objectivity’.

  31. Wiggins, David: Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. p. 138.

  32. ib. p. 140f.

  33. Wiggins sees the conceptual structure of values founded in both the specific human (mental) states and their objects. Cf. Wiggins, David: Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. p. 141.

  34. Wolf, Susan: Why it Matters. p. 47.

  35. This could also mean that she thinks that she is not actively engaged in a project of worth or not engaged at all in something like that. Because the target of my proposal is the specific aspect of worth, I exclude such possibilities here.

  36. Hare, Richard: The Language of Morals. p. 111 et seqq.

  37. Hare does not distinguish between the prescriptive content of normative and evaluative predicates (for example ‘ought’ and ‘good’), and therefore for both kinds of predicates he identifies a commandment as being the prescriptive content. I’m following here Oliver Hallich, who distinguishes between evaluative predicates expressing a pro-attitude or a con-attitude and normative predicates for which Hare says they entail a commandment. A pro-attitude is an emotion whereas a prescription according to Hare recommends a choice. cf. Hallich, Oliver: Die Rationalität der Moral. p. 790 et seqq.

  38. Cf. Hallich, Oliver: Die Rationalität der Moral. p. 812.

  39. Alan Gibbard argues for the possibility of emotions being rational. Cf. Gibbard, Alan: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. p. 38f.

  40. Gibbard distinguishes between ‘it makes sense for person x to be in an emotional state y’ and ‘it makes sense that person x is in emotional state y’. cf. Gibbard, Alan: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. p. 38.

  41. ib. p. 6.

  42. This line of thought is due to considerations of Richard Brandt’s ‘A Theory of the Good and the Right’ and of Richard Hare’s ‘Moral Thinking’. However, it is only a sketchy line of thought and should not indicate a full agreement to their positions.

  43. So, the aim of the normative discussion is not factual acceptance and not a majority votum – not a factual consensus of all or the most –, but acceptability. ‚x is rational‘ is here to be understood as something being discursively well justified, resulting in universal (or intersubjective) acceptability. For a procedural account of rationality see Gethmann, Carl Friedrich and Sander, Thorsten: Rechtfertigungsdiskurse.

  44. It is a kind of procedural understanding of rationality, in content differing from Gibbard’s naturalistic and somehow sociological account, from where the notion of ‘normative discussion’ stems. But I think it is legitimate to borrow that term and use it in the described way. So, the aim of a normative discussion in case of meaningfulness is to give universalizable reasons to think a life or life projects being preferable. Other decision methods with which universalizability of reasons could be proofed are also conceivable. Possible candidates were for example a deliberation procedure under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance or a kind of representational account like the one Richard Hare proposed.

  45. Wolf, Susan: Why it Matters. p. 40.

  46. Cf. Hare, Richard: The Language of Morals and id.: Freedom and Reason. Some say that this way of analyzing moral judgments confronts the Frege-Geach problem. This is due to a misunderstanding of the way words like ‘ought’ can be used. Such words can be used in a prescriptive as well as in a descriptive way (for example in a conventional or an ‘inverted commas’ way) and thus avoid the problem. Cf.: Hare, Richard: The Language of Morals p. 118-126, 165-172. In embedded contexts the latter seems to be the case. Cf. Hallich, Oliver: Why the Frege Geach Problem does not Refute Expressivism.

  47. Cf. Williams, Bernard: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. p. 5. Another difference between morality and meaningfulness is the relevancy of subjective attractiveness. In moral matters, subjective attractiveness is not relevant whereas in Wolf’s hybrid account of meaningfulness it is crucial.

  48. Wolf, Susan: Happiness and Meaning. p. 110.

  49. ib. p. 110.

  50. Wolf, Susan: Meaning in Lives. p. 46.

  51. These thoughts are speculative because Wolf does not say anything about metatheoretical presuppositions she makes.

  52. So, it seems likely to call Wolf a cognitivist regarding evaluational judgments, because she seems to hold that 1. Evaluational judgments are judgements about facts and 2. that evaluational judgments are capable of bearing truth and eventually that evaluational judgments can be justified. It is a little step further to assume, that she thinks the latter because of 1. and 2. This theoretical setting was criticized by Richard Hare, indicating that evaluational judgments are for one thing prescriptive and for another thing they can be - although prescriptive in meaning - reasonably justifiable. Cf. Hare, Richard: The Language of Morals. For the characteristics of a (moral) cognitivist: Hiekel, Susanne and Hallich, Oliver: Nonkognitivismus/Nondeskriptivsmus. In: Rüther, Markus (ed.): Grundkurs Metaethik. p. 69 et seqq.

  53. For a critique of (moral) validity claims being strictly bound to objectivity see: Gethmann, Carl Friedrich: Werden die Geltungsansprüche moralischer Urteile durch ihre ‘Objektivität’ eingelöst? Zur Kritik des moralischen Realismus.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer provided helpful comments to an earlier draft of the paper. I want particularly to thank Karsten Witt whose suggestions helped to improve the paper, too.

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Hiekel, S. Fitting Fulfilment – Fitting Objective or Rational Attractiveness?. ZEMO 1, 57–74 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-018-0007-y

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