Abstract
Well-being is that which is non-instrumentally good for a person. It is identical to how well someone's life goes. There are three main theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and objective list theories. Each of these theories is subject to criticism, which has led some philosophers to posit a hybrid theory in which well-being is defined as taking pleasure in objective goods. One problem that comes with such an account is the possibility of what I will call harmless pleasures; that is, pleasures that while not taken in something bad, are neither linked to objective goods. It is counterintuitive to say that such pleasures do not make a person's life go better, yet this seems to be what hybrid theories entail. I call this the harmless-pleasure objection. In this paper, I argue that there is no obvious solution to this objection and this result casts doubt on hybrid theories of well-being.
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Notes
For a sustained discussion of this distinction, see Kagan (1994).
For a more detailed discussion of the defects of subjective and objective theories of well being respectively that motivate hybrid theories, see Woodard (2016).
The multiplicative version of the hybrid theory is that which I focus on throughout the paper. However, one could adopt an additive model: W = P + O. This version is different from the multiplicative model that is more widely addressed in the literature. For the sake of space, I will not give a detailed discussion of the additive model here.
There is a problem here that the two sides of the equation have different units, but let us sidestep this problem here.
To see the complexity with the notion of opposites of objective goods, Kagan (2015) focuses on the good of knowledge. If knowledge is justified true belief, would its opposite be justified false belief? Or unjustified true belief? Or unjustified false belief? As Kagan notes, ill-being is a relatively unexplored notion in the literature on well-being.
Adams takes the view I am advocating with respect to pleasure in objective bads: “Unfortunately, however, there is some enjoyment [or taking pleasure] that is not enjoyment of an excellence because it is the enjoyment of the bad. Among the clearest cases of this are enjoyments that are malicious or vain, such as schadenfreude or the savoring of inflated fantasies of one’s own importance. These seem to me not to contribute noninstrumentally to our good at all; one reason they do not may be that the enjoyments themselves are bad in a way that diminishes the excellence of our lives” (Adams 1999, 100-101).
Or, perhaps a brute pleasure is structurally similar to a neutral and “no object” could be represented as zero. There is either no multiplicative function at all or, like the neutral case, there is a zero multiplier. If one favors this view, then what we say about assigning positive value to pleasures in neutrals would apply to brute pleasures as well. One would need to avoid the zero multiplier, perhaps by using N+1.
Bramble (2013) defends the distinct feeling theory against alternative phenomenological theories and attitude theories.
It should be noted that Feldman believes there is not just a heterogeneity among sensory pleasures and attitudinal pleasures (those pleasures taken in states of affairs or objects). There is also heterogeneity among sensory pleasures themselves. To use his own example, the pleasures of sunbathing does not “feel the same” as the pleasures of drinking a cold beer (Feldman 2004, 79).
Recall the earlier discussion of hedonism. If one adopts certain versions of the attitude theory of pleasure, she might already believe that all pleasures necessarily have objects.
On some prominent theories of health, disease requires biological dysfunction. There are competing accounts of the nature of dysfunction. Boorse (1977, 1997, 2011) has a statistical view according to which dysfunction involves the failure of tissue, organ, system, etc. to make the standard contribution to biological fitness. Wakefield (1992) takes an evolutionary view according to which dysfunction is the failure of a biological part to perform the function that is the reason for its existence (in addition to dysfunction Wakefield also believes disease requires a harm). If one believes that the absence of health is tied to biological dysfunction (regardless of the particular view of dysfunction one takes), it is very difficult to see how the pleasure in something like a massage is health promoting. One would need to show its connection to some biological function.
If one adopts an attitude theory of pleasures such as Kershnar (2010), there is a problem with the structure of pleasure in the object of pleasure. Pleasure in an object like knowledge is best understood as an attitude, but if pleasure is also an object itself, then there is a contradiction. If pleasure is an attitude then it is not an object; and if it is an object, then it is not an attitude.
A version of this paper was presented at the 2015 PANTC conference hosted by the University at Buffalo. I am thankful for the helpful comments I received from the attendees, especially David Hershenov, Kenneth Shockley, Catherine Nolan-Sweeny, Neil Feit, and Christopher Boorse. I am also greatly indebted to Stephen Kershnar for providing substantial feedback on an earlier draft.
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Delaney, J.J. Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: the Harmless Pleasures Objection . Philosophia 46, 281–294 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9903-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9903-3