Introduction

Creativity is key to organizational success from both the economistic (e.g., Taylor 1947) and humanistic management perspectives, as it is connected to both the creation of wealth and well-being (Pirson 2017). By spurring innovation, creativity fosters sustained competitive advantage, organizational effectiveness, and organizational efficiency (Lengnick-Hall 1992; Hult et al. 2004; Anderson et al. 2014). The creative process also fosters wellbeing and flourishing (Dolan and Metcalfe 2012; Forgeard and Eichner 2014; O’Brien and Murray 2015; Conner et al. 2018; Kaufman 2018) and reinforces feelings of employee autonomy and involvement (Wang and Cheng 2010; Li et al. 2018; Liu 2022), constructs central to humanistic management (Melé 2016). As a result, humanistic managers have added incentives to nurture creativity beyond achieving performance goals (Paul et al. 1999).

Yet managing the creative process is not straightforward. It involves social processes such as sharing ideas and collaboration (Anderson et al. 2014; Zhou and Hoever 2014), and these processes can have negative interpersonal outcomes (Baer and Brown 2012; Ellis 2022). Humanistic management prioritizes the development and maintenance of positive relationships and collaboration at work (Clark et al. 2019; Fisk et al. 2019; Baker and Lee 2020; Matheson et al. 2021). Thus, managers who don’t shepherd the social aspects of the creative process risk both dimming performance and reducing employee wellbeing. The current work seeks to illuminate how sharing ideas can trigger negative individual and interpersonal consequences that may erode personal wellbeing and harm interpersonal relationships, and to suggest a path to ameliorate this harm.

When generating ideas, people commonly propose ideas that are related or even identical to ones proposed earlier (Dugosh et al. 2000; Nijstad and Stroebe 2006; Paulus and Brown 2007; Stark and Perfect 2007; Perfect and Stark 2008a, b). An important question is how idea originators—those whose ideas are repeated or adapted by their counterparts—think, feel and act. Research on behavioral mimicry and interpersonal similarity finds their social consequences to be strongly positive, prompting greater rapport, interpersonal closeness, liking and empathy (Byrne et al. 1971; Hoyle 1993; Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Lakin and Chartrand 2003; Chartrand et al. 2005). It would be reasonable to conclude that the proposal of identical and similar ideas might have similarly positive interpersonal outcomes.

Instead, early work on idea theft has shown that imitation does not always flatter (Baer and Brown 2012; Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022; Ploeger-Lyons et al. 2022; Ploeger-Lyons and Bisel 2023). In what is likely the first published empirical investigations of idea theft Ellis (2022) draws from cross-disciplinary fields to define idea theft as “an actor pursuing, or taking credit for, an idea that is perceived to be owned by another,” (2022, p. 3). Across six studies, Ellis found that reading vignettes of idea theft causes third-party participants to assume that internal attributions motivate idea thieves. Participants then judged the thieves’ character negatively. The causality of character judgements and whether individuals assign either internal or external attributions to alleged idea thieves might be bi-directional in ambiguous situations. In an ethnographic study of Los Angeles comics Reilly (2018) found evidence that judgements of character can predict assignment of blame for joke stealing. If a comic is seen as authentically dedicated to the craft, they are less likely to be labeled a joke thief. Presumably, external attributions are more salient in the case of authentic comics: the target just happened to have created a similar joke.

Why are responses to idea theft so emotionally laden? Recent work on idea theft builds on literature that categorizes ideas as part of the extended self. People may feel psychological ownership of their ideas, just as they do to their possessions (Beggan 1992; Pierce et al. 2001; Baer and Brown 2012; Dawkins et al. 2017; Kirk et al. 2018; Gray et al. 2020). A creative idea is seen as an expression of the self, even if it does not obviously relate to one’s personal characteristics. For example, Goncalo and Katz (2020) asked participants to invent creative (vs. generic) forms of common consumer products, such as potato chips or candles. Participants who developed creative products experienced more self-focus and felt their answers revealed more about themselves. The authors suggest that when an individual shares with another person an idea they created or refined, they experience that sharing as a form of self-disclosure, i.e., sharing personal information (Cozby 1973; Wheeless and Grotz 1976; Chelune 1979; Baer and Brown 2012; Goncalo and Katz 2020).

Evaluation apprehension curtails the sharing of ideas (Geen 1985). Given that creative ideas are so closely tied to a sense of self, sharing them creates acute vulnerability as we open ourselves to the possibility of self-threat (Rouse 2020). This self-threat can also hamper the development of ideas by impeding the adoption of feedback. For example, when a colleague refines a focal individual’s idea by eliminating elements of that idea, the focal individual experiences a sense of personal loss, even though the feedback might improve the idea (Baer and Brown 2012).

In summary, an emerging body of literature suggests that idea theft may be a significant obstacle toward successful idea sharing in organizations (Baer and Brown 2012; Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022). Idea theft threatens individual wellbeing (Baer and Brown 2012), leads to relationship conflict (Reilly 2018), and likely throttles idea sharing. In other words, idea theft can undo precisely the results that organizations seek to engender by promoting creativity: innovation and increased wellbeing. Furthermore, idea theft challenges concepts central to humanistic management, namely positive social processes (Clark et al. 2019) and collaboration between “all participants…at their full human potential,” (Fisk et al. 2019).

In the current research, we are motivated not only to expand understanding of this complicated, understudied phenomenon, but also to test a potential palliative solution that may reduce the substantial intrapersonal and interpersonal harm that stems from idea theft. Our work stems from a different theoretical tradition than Ellis (2022) and Reilly (2018) and incorporates different methodologies. Yet we aim, in part, to reinforce their previous work by exploring the negative interpersonal outcomes of the phenomenon while establishing additional constructs related to idea theft. Notably, we extend the investigation of idea theft to both identical and related ideas. We develop theory and present results on whether idea originators assign malign attributions and experience negative moral emotions toward counterparts who propose identical and related ideas, and in turn ostracize those counterparts.

In keeping with literature that evaluates the psychological consequences of socially sharing one’s ideas as a form of self-threat (De Dreu and Van Knippenberg 2005; Baer and Brown 2012; Goncalo and Katz 2020; Rouse 2020), we argue that the reason these effects occur is because the originator of the idea experiences the relatedness of the colleague’s related idea as a form of self-threat. We thus propose and test a model for soothing the self-threat of idea theft. Our model features self-affirmation as a prophylactic measure to protect the self against the negative consequences of idea theft. We show that individuals high in need for uniqueness particularly benefit from a self-affirmation intervention, suggesting that it is this aspect of the self most threatened by idea theft. More broadly, our results suggest that, although negative consequences might follow the proposal of related ideas, there are solutions that mitigate them so that creative idea development can proceed.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Idea Theft and Relationship Conflict

Although prior research on how idea originators are likely to respond when others propose identical or related ideas is still sparse, emerging scholarship on idea theft (e.g., Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022) suggest that such reactions are likely to be characterized by negative internal attributions toward and a lack of support for the perpetrator.

Ellis (2022) demonstrates that idea thieves are judged more negatively than money thieves. Her vignette studies suggest these negative outcomes persist even when the value of the stolen idea/money is held constant. In other words, perceptions of idea theft do not merely reflect instrumental concerns. People might even want to punish idea thieves beyond the scope of similar infringements (i.e., traditional theft of tangible goods). Given the collaborative nature of contemporary knowledge work, reactions to idea theft will have real-world consequences for coworkers and teams. Feelings of suspicion and distrust experienced by the idea originator can prompt negative emotions in others (Kramer and Wei 2014), distracting from the work at hand, undermining feelings of being respected and valued and reducing the possibility of close collaboration (Tyler and Lind 1992).

Previous work on idea theft has focused specifically on taking credit for an unspecified identical idea (e.g., Ellis 2022) or did not overtly delineate between identical and related ideas (Reilly 2018). We propose that ideas that are merely related to the idea originator’s original idea may cause the same effects as proposal of an identical idea (i.e., idea theft).

Malign Attributions

The proposal of a related idea could be attributed to innocuous processes. Unconscious plagiarism, or cryptomnesia (Bink and Marsh 2000; Perfect and Stark 2008a, b) is common. People frequently remember the content of an idea but not its source. Indeed, “sourceless” truths are the basis of semantic memory—facts one knows but does not explicitly remember learning (Yee et al. 2014). When the source of an idea is not explicitly recalled, one might incorrectly assign it to one’s own mental processes, fabricating a false source (oneself) as the originator of the idea. Even if the idea source is not in question, a person might perceive the proposal of a related idea as merely following the normative expectations of a task such as brainstorming (Osborn 1957).

People may draw particularly negative inferences about the motives of those who propose identical or related ideas. Indeed, when the self is highly salient, such as when self-consciousness is high, people make quite sinister attributions about others’ behavior (Fenigstein and Vanable 1992; Kramer 1994). Idea generating contexts are often rife with evaluative apprehension (Geen 1985; Camacho and Paulus 1995; Paulus and Brown 2007) which is likely to promote greater self-consciousness. As a result, idea originators may form quite cynical attributions about their counterpart’s behavior. Idea originators may perceive identical ideas as evidence of inattention to the idea originator’s contributions, or as attempted theft.

Reilly (2018) found links between negative character judgements and whether a comic was suspected to have stolen a joke. In the case when a comic makes a related joke but is also recognized to be authentically dedicated to the craft, they are less likely to be labeled a joke thief, and vice versa. Ellis (2022) found that participants in vignette studies asked to judge third parties who have stolen an idea do not make benign attributions toward the thief. Instead, participants assigned internal attributions (e.g., greed, callousness) more than external motivations (e.g., great need) to idea thieves more often than they did to money thieves. Given these results, it is likely that counterparts who propose related ideas would be seen to be both less trustworthy and driven by malign intentions.

H1

The more related the idea originator’s and counterpart’s subsequent ideas are, the more the idea originator will assign malign attributions to the counterpart.

Negative Moral Emotions

Given that idea originators are likely to apply negative attributions to counterparts who propose related ideas, it is reasonable to assume that idea originators would experience negative moral emotions when their counterparts propose related ideas. Discrete moral emotions have previously been associated with distinct cognitive appraisals (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Van de Ven et al. 2012). Anger follows from an assessment that there is a direct threat to the self (Hutcherson and Gross 2011) and/or one’s valued goals, typically by another individual (Ellsworth and Smith 1988). In comparison, moral disgust and contempt stem respectively from an appraisal that the emotion’s target is morally untrustworthy or incompetent (Hutcherson and Gross 2011). Furthermore, situations that are experienced as unfairness intentionally enacted by another person prompt resentment (Van de Ven et al. 2012).

If the idea originator does experience idea relatedness as a negative outcome, that person might experience harm. Much emotions research, from appraisal theories to social constructionist models, has coalesced around the view that when individuals experience harm they perceive to be unjustified, avoidable, a violation of what is right and deserved, and attributable to someone other than the self, they experience anger (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Frijda 1986; Scherer 1986, 1997; Smith and Lazarus 1993).

If an idea originator perceives they have been avoidably wronged when a counterpart proposes a related or identical idea, the originator will experience anger. This anger could be multifaceted. First, the originator may anticipate that the counterpart will obtain partial or complete credit for the idea if others do not recognize the counterpart’s idea as related. Additionally, the originator may anticipate that the counterpart will get credit that is not commensurate with the amount of effort invested in generating the idea from scratch—which would represent a violation of equity expectations and thus a violation of what is right and deserved (Adams 1965). This concern is particularly significant in a workplace because professional success can accompany creative ideas (Amabile 1998; Hennessey and Amabile 2010). Additionally, anger is provoked when people feel they are unable to achieve a desired goal (Berkowitz 1993, 2012). The counterpart’s proposal of a related interferes with the idea originator’s ability to see themself as distinctive and unique (Steele 1988).

Idea originators are likely to experience negative moral emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, contempt, and resentment) following the counterpart’s proposal of an idea that is related or identical. Furthermore, we anticipate that idea relatedness will be associated with only the moral emotions and not with negative emotions that lack a moral substrate.

H2

The more related the idea originator’s and counterpart’s subsequent ideas are, the more the idea originator will experience negative moral emotions toward the counterpart.

The experience of negative moral emotions, particularly anger, is associated with the desire to attack the individual who is perceived to have been the cause of one’s anger (e.g., Berkowitz 2012). This response is facilitated by the fact that anger prompts an approach-motivated state (Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009) which frees individuals to take risks and to attack others (Harmon-Jones and Allen 1998).

Ostracism

One of the most aggressive and hostile behaviors that people in groups can engage in is ostracism—defined as the act of “excluding or ignoring of individuals or groups” (Williams 2009: p. 276)—as this behavior directly threatens individuals’ need for belongingness, widely recognized to be one of the most important psychological motives (e.g., Baumeister and Leary 1995). Indeed, more recent research suggests that ostracism threatens not only the need to belong, but also three other important psychological motives, namely the need for self-esteem, control, and recognition (Williams 2007, 2009). Thus, ostracism is an acutely hostile act that results in extensive and multi-dimensional psychological harm to the target.

While existing research on ostracism largely focuses on how individuals react to being ostracized (for recent reviews, see Williams 2007, 2009), past work highlights that ostracism likely serves as an adaptive mechanism by which counter-normative social behavior can be regulated by group members (Gruter and Masters 1986). In this way, within both close relationships and with others, ostracism is often used intended to punish targets for perceived transgressions (Williams et al. 1998; Sommer et al. 2001). For instance, those who behave aggressively towards others are often ostracized (McDougall et al. 2001). For idea originators whose ideas are subsequently adapted or repeated by their counterparts, and who experience harm, ostracism is one tool that they can use to ‘right the wrong’ they feel that they have experienced and attack the person they attribute to be the source of the harm, their counterpart. We propose that:

H3

The more related the idea originator’s and counterpart’s subsequent ideas are, the more the idea originator will express an intent to engage in workplace ostracism of their counterpart.

Relationship Conflict

The prior hypotheses focus primarily on the idea originator’s reactions. We now turn to considering the idea originator and his/her counterpart’s perspectives simultaneously. However, before doing so it is important to consider the nature of ideas and how this influences idea originators’ abilities to shape others’ impressions about their feelings of attachment towards their ideas.

By virtue of being intangible, ideas cannot be easily controlled. Unlike physical property, ideas’ intangibility makes it difficult to thwart their potential appropriation by “marking” them as one’s own property (Brown et al. 2005). Ideas are also nonexcludable. A physical good can only be used in a restricted location and time, others’ use of an idea cannot be similarly regulated. As a result, when an individual generates and shares an idea, they cannot prevent others from using it. At the same time, those who hear the idea are unlikely to recognize the idea originator’s feelings of psychological ownership toward the “unmarked”, nonexcludable idea.

The perceptions of originator and their counterpart could be entirely at odds: while the idea originator might feel they have an exclusive right to the idea, this right might not be recognized (or even noticed) by their counterpart. It is possible the counterpart will also not recognize that they will be harming the originator by appropriating, adapting or otherwise using the idea. These diverging perceptions might permit the counterpart to infringe upon the owner’s “territory” (Kirk et al. 2018)—such as by proposing an identical or related idea—and not recognize that they have done anything wrong. In opposition, the idea originator might feel as if the counterpart has behaved disrespectfully. Finally, the counterpart may engage in unconscious plagiarism or cryptomnesia (Bink and Marsh 2000; Perfect and Stark 2008a, b) or propose of a related idea to conform to the normative expectations of a task (such as brainstorming rules; Osborn 1957).

When the perspective of the idea originator and counterpart are considered simultaneously, it is clear the two parties are likely to experience that “their goals or interests are incompatible or in opposition”, the definition of relationship conflict (Pelled 1996; Korsgaard et al. 2008; Ren and Gray 2009). Relationship conflict is conflict rooted in personal, as opposed to task-related, issues and is often characterized by interpersonal tension and friction (Van de Vliert and De Dreu 1997; Simons and Peterson 2000; Jehn and Mannix 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Peterson and Behfar 2003). Hence, we hypothesize that:

H4

The more related the idea originator’s and counterpart’s subsequent ideas are, the more relationship conflict will be experienced by the idea originator.

Soothing the Self-Threat of Idea Theft

We propose that idea theft causes anger and negative downstream relational consequences. Emerging evidence supports this conjecture (i.e., Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022). To understand how to ameliorate these effects, we must understand the mechanisms and boundary conditions involved. Considering the self-idea connection suggests both mechanism and solution, as well as boundary conditions. Specifically, we propose that self-threat accompanies the proposal of related ideas. Affirming valued aspects of the self, as described by self-affirmation theory (Steele 1988; Sherman and Cohen 2006), can provide a palliative protection against this self-threat, except in the case that the idea originator is high in need for uniqueness (for a review of need for uniqueness, see Lynn and Snyder 2002).

Self-Threat

The burgeoning idea theft literature (Baer and Brown 2012; Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022) suggests that self-threat accompanies idea theft. Self-threat is a synonym for ego threat, a construct characterized by contemporary literature as damage to one’s self-esteem or self-image (Leary et al. 2009). Encountering a self-threat causes a person’s self-esteem to drop (e.g., Vohs and Heatherton 2003). This unpleasant sensation causes a cascade of psychological defense mechanisms, including motivating that person to restore their self-image.

The self-threat engendered by sharing creative ideas stems from various sources. Past research provides extensive evidence that people feel psychologically attached to valued possessions which may also become part of the extended self (Belk 1988; Beggan 1992). Such psychological attachment may extend to accomplishments and ideas (Pierce et al. 2001; Brown et al. 2005; De Dreu and Van Knippenberg 2005; Brown and Robinson 2011; Baer and Brown 2012).

Creative ideas may reflect their originator’s idiosyncratic perspective (Goncalo and Katz 2020). Sharing them may mimic the feelings and vulnerability inherent in the self-disclosure of personal information. This effect is consistent even when the creative ideas are merely task related, such as inventing new potato chip flavors (Goncalo and Katz 2020). Feelings of psychological ownership rise when one invests creative time and effort into an idea. Baer and Brown (2012) had participants finish (as opposed to merely retype) a proposal for a fictional restaurant. The participants that invested time in finishing the proposal with their own ideas developed more attachment to them. They felt a sense of personal loss when a counterpart provided feedback that a subtractive (as opposed to additive) change would benefit the idea (Baer and Brown 2012). Rouse (2020) discusses the paradox of involving others in one’s creative process. Others can provide ideas and feedback that enhances one’s creative idea, yet sharing creative ideas creates such vulnerability that we may forgo sharing them rather than encounter the self-threat engendered by doing so.

Anger results from a direct threat to the self (Hutcherson and Gross 2011) and/or one’s valued goals, especially when the cause is another individual (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 1988). Hence, when a person reports anger following an event, we can infer that they have experienced that event as a threat to the self that was caused by another individual.

The proposal of an identical idea is also likely to be viewed also as a violation of plagiarism norms which are common in many workplaces including academia, journalism, standup comedy and business (Vandervoort 1995; Nitterhouse 2003; Samson 2005; Oliar and Sprigman 2008; Reilly 2018). Given the prevalence of anti-plagiarism norms, idea originators are unlikely to expect their counterparts to propose identical ideas. Such expectancy violations themselves have been found to generate feelings of threat (Mendes et al. 2007). Hence, individuals are likely to experience identical ideas as self-threatening.

H5

Proposal of an identical idea by a counterpart (i.e., idea theft) will cause the idea originator to experience self-threat.

H6

Self-threat will mediate the relationship between idea theft and relationship conflict.

Self-Affirmation

Given the prevalence of self-threat when sharing creative ideas, we draw on self-affirmation theory to suggest mechanisms and a potential remedy for the negative consequences of idea theft. Self-affirmation theory suggests that individuals seek to maintain self-integrity, a sense of the self as “coherent, unitary and stable” and “capable of controlling important outcomes” (Steele 1988: p. 262). When these aspects of the self are shaken, individuals are likely to experience self-threat (Baumeister et al. 1996). As possessions and ideas can be part of the extended self, their involuntary loss can threaten one’s sense of the self as “coherent, unitary and stable” (Steele 1988: p. 262) and be experienced as a traumatic lessening of the self (Belk 1988). Consistent with this perspective, Baer and Brown (2012) found that individuals experienced self-threat when a counterpart sought to improve an idea by eliminating part of it.

Social psychologists have found that self-threat can be attenuated and even eliminated when individuals shift their focus to more positive aspects of the self (Steele 1988). Specifically, when self-threatened individuals reflect on positive self-aspects in or outside of the domain of the threat, they are effectively inoculated against the threat. An extensive body of work demonstrates that such self-affirmation reduces self-threat and ensuing defensive and self-protective cognitions and behaviors (e.g., Liu and Steele 1986; Steele 1988; Sherman et al. 2000; Sherman and Cohen 2006). For instance, layoff survivors experience fewer negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) after being provided an opportunity to self-affirm (Wiesenfeld et al. 1999).

While there is some disagreement regarding why self-affirmation reduces defensive cognitions and behaviors (McQueen and Klein 2006; Sherman and Cohen 2006), its effects on bolstering self-integrity and inoculating individuals to threats to the self are extremely robust. As a result, if a counterpart’s identical idea leads the idea originator to experience self-threat and self-affirmation effectively extinguishes self-threat, then:

H7

The relationship between idea theft and the idea originator’s experience of self-threat will be attenuated when the idea originator engages in self-affirmation.

If self-threat is the proximal cause of the negative outcomes of idea theft, it makes sense to wonder which part of the self is being threatened. Identifying individual differences in the experience of self-threat could help pinpoint the source of the self-idea connection more specifically. In other words, individual differences that create boundary conditions around the relationship between self-threat, self-affirmation, and idea theft.

Need for Uniqueness

What part of the self is threatened by idea theft? Individuals are often motivated to be distinct and unique from others (Brewer 1991; Maslach 1974), a task that becomes more difficult when a counterpart proposes an idea that is identical or related to one the idea originator proposed earlier. Idea theft might therefore threaten idea originators more when they are motivated to seen as distinct and unique.

While one’s need for uniqueness (NFU) varies across individuals, and is thus often conceptualized as a trait, it has been widely suggested that all individuals are motivated to be distinct and unique from others (Brewer 1991; Maslach 1974). Past research shows that those with a high need for uniqueness tend to be particularly motivated to engage in behaviors that set them apart from others such as by acquiring unpopular material goods (for a review, see Lynn and Snyder 2002).

Situational factors may increase the psychological value individuals place on individuality and uniqueness. For example, uniqueness becomes a more pressing concern when the personal (as opposed to social) self is highly accessible. Many intrapersonal and situational factors lead the personal self to be more accessible, including being in a competitive situation (Carnevale and Probst 1998) and when stress is high (Driskell et al. 1999). Indeed, when the personal self is accessible individuals may even experience a “dilemma of individuality” following such seemingly innocuous events as when one’s restaurant companions select a meal that one had already contemplated ordering for oneself (Iyengar and Lepper 1999: p. 350). In this way, merely similar preferences can serve as threats to uniqueness. Because of the strong self-idea connection, the extent to which others’ ideas are related to one’s own may particularly threaten this uniqueness motive. Indeed, the more the idea originator perceives their counterpart’s idea to be similar to their own, the more the idea originator’s distinctiveness is likely to be threatened.

Taken together, this work suggests that among those with a high need for uniqueness, the greater the relatedness of the idea originator and counterpart’s ideas, the more ego threat they will experience. Indeed, the aspect of the self most directly threatened by idea relatedness is likely to be the component of the self-concerned with uniqueness. Furthermore, the buffering effect of self-affirmation is likely to be most pronounced among those with a high need for uniqueness because their egos are most acutely threatened by the proposal of an identical or related idea. In contrast, for those with a low need for uniqueness, there is likely to be little ego threat that results from idea relatedness and thus self-affirmation’s effect will be smaller as there is simply less ego threat for it to buffer. Formally stated:

H8

Need for uniqueness will moderate the effect of self-affirmation on the relationship between idea theft and the idea originators’ experience of self-threat.

Proposed Model

The theory and hypotheses presented above form our model for soothing the self-threat of idea theft (Fig. 1). Idea theft will lead to negative interpersonal outcomes such as relationship conflict, negative moral emotions, malign attributions to the counterpart, and intent to ostracize the counterpart. These negative outcomes will occur to the extent that the originator feels self-threat in response to the idea theft. Engaging in self-affirmation will soothe the self-threat of idea theft, thus reducing its negative outcomes. Self-affirmation will be less effective at soothing the self-threat of those who are high in need for uniqueness.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Model of soothing the self-threat of idea theft

Full size image

Study 1 is a vignette study that tests H1 and H2 using a sample of 126 undergraduate students. It has three goals: (1) to replicate results regarding malign attributions from studies on idea theft (e.g., Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022) and (2) to expand these findings to distinguish between negative moral emotions and other negative emotions and (3) to explore differences in malign attributions caused by identical, related, and unrelated ideas.

Study 2 focuses on downstream consequences of idea theft: it tests H3 and H4 using a sample of 77 currently or recently employed individuals. It is methodologically distinct from Ellis (2022), using a personal event recall design as opposed to a fictional third-person vignette study. It aims to complement Ellis’ finding that judges of idea thieves would offer less support to them as coworkers by testing if participants in fact ostracized counterparts who engaged in idea theft in real life. It also tests for feelings of relationship conflict.

Study 3 tests the model to soothe the self-threat of idea theft using a live in-lab scenario in which 60 undergraduate participantsFootnote 1 have their idea stolen by a confederate. It tests H5-H8, seeking to establish self-threat as the mechanism governing the relationship between idea theft and negative interpersonal outcomes. Evidence of this mechanism is provided via both a direct test of mediation as well as via moderation by self-affirmation. If the individual difference of high need for uniqueness moderate the relationship between self-affirmation and self-threat as proposed in our model, it will indicate that it is the feeling of being a distinct individual that is threatened by idea theft, as well as outline a boundary condition for the model.

Study 1

Study 1 first aims to replicate results in which idea theft leads to the assignation of malign attributions to the counterpart from the idea originator (e.g., Reilly 2018; Ellis 2022) with different but related variables. Study 1 also expands these findings to distinguish between negative moral emotions and other negative emotions as results of idea theft. Finally, it explores differences in malign attributions and moral emotions caused by identical, related, and unrelated ideas.

Study 1 tests how multiple levels of idea relatedness affect idea originators’ malign attributions (H1) and negative moral emotions (H2) toward their counterpart. We anticipated the originators would assign negative attributions to the counterpart, judging them to be less trustworthy and having more sinister motives as relatedness increased. Also, the greater the relatedness of the counterpart and idea originator’s ideas, the more strongly idea originators would report negative moral emotions [anger, disgust, and resentment] toward the counterpart. These emotions are of great importance from a humanistic management perspective as they are associated with interpersonal strife (for a review, see Lerner and Tiedens 2006).

Furthermore, to tease out whether idea relatedness prompts negative affective reactions in general or only the specific negative discrete emotions hypothesized, we also tested for the effect of idea relatedness on other negative emotions. We anticipated that idea relatedness would be associated with only the moral emotions and not with the included negative emotions that lacked a moral substrate.

Method

Participants and Design

126 undergraduate students participated in the study (55 women and 71 men, Mage = 20.14, SDage = 1.02). All were enrolled in an undergraduate management course at a northeastern university and received course credit for participating. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the study’s three experimental conditions, all corresponding to levels of idea relatedness (i.e., identical, related and unrelated).

Procedure

Participants were given a paper packet containing instructions, a short vignette, in which all experimental manipulations were embedded, and a series of measures. The instructions asked all participants to imagine that “you” were a member of a class team working on a project (see Appendix for full vignette content). Noted in the vignette was the information that the project would comprise 60% of your grade for the course, and the grade was subject to peer evaluation by your teammates. Participants read, “you suggest that the company BMW would be a good subject for the group project.” The content of the vignette then varied by condition and contained the manipulation of idea relatedness as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Study 1 experimental manipulations
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Following this, the participants completed a questionnaire containing all manipulation checks and dependent variables.

Measures

Manipulation Check

To determine the success of the idea relatedness manipulation, participants were asked “how different was John’s idea to the one [they] proposed to the group?” (−3 = not at all different, 3 = very different) and to complete the sentence “The idea John proposed was ____ to yours.” (identical/quite similar/not at all similar). The two items were highly correlated as would be expected if they measured the same underlying construct, r(126) = 0.81.

Malign Attributions

To ascertain the extent to which participants perceived that John had sinister motives and had stolen their idea (as opposed to less pernicious attributions such as unconscious plagiarism), participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with three statements concerning “how John came up with his idea”: “He was intentionally stealing the idea of another team member”, “His suggestion was motivated by selfish rather than unselfish concerns”, and “He was trying to get the credit for an idea proposed by another team member earlier” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). As these three items showed good reliability (α = 0.78), they were combined into a perceived sinister motives scale.

The extent to which the participant perceived his/her counterpart (i.e., “John”) to be trustworthy was measured with five items adapted from Rempel et al. (1985). The specific trust dimension measured by these items is dependability which concerns whether individuals are trustworthy under conditions of risk and potential harm. Participants reported the extent of their agreement with such items as “I will be certain that John would not cheat on me, even if the opportunity arose and there was no chance that he would get caught” and “I will be able to rely on John to keep the promises he makes to me” (−3 = strongly disagree, 3 = strongly agree). As these items were highly correlated, they were combined into a perceived trustworthiness scale (α = 0.88).

Negative Moral Emotions

To gauge how idea originators respond affectively when a counterpart proposes an identical, related or unrelated idea, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt various emotions towards John (the counterpart) (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). The emotions of primary interest in this study were the moral emotions of anger, moral disgust, contempt and resentment. As there is much disagreement about the structure of these moral emotions with some finding little distinction between them and others seeing them as entirely distinct (e.g., Hutcherson and Gross 2011), there was sufficient justification to examine them both as distinct, discrete emotions and as a larger class.

Anger was measured by asking participants to what extent they felt “angry” towards John (their hypothetical teammate). Moral disgust, contempt and resentment were each measured with a single item (“disgusted”, “contemptful” and “resentful”). As moral disgust, resentment and contempt are highly correlated and exhibited sufficient reliability, they were treated as a “moral emotions” scale (α = 0.92), as suggested in Ellsworth and Smith (1988).

We also measured two discrete emotions associated with anxiety: “anxious” and “uneasy”. These were averaged to form an anxiety scale (α = 0.83).

Results

Manipulation Check(s)

The results of each of the two the manipulation check items revealed that idea relatedness was effectively manipulated. A one-way ANOVA of idea relatedness condition on the Likert manipulation check item was significant with those in the identical idea condition perceiving their counterpart’s idea as not very different from their own (M = −2.62, SD = 0.83) and those in the unrelated idea condition perceived it as different than their own (M = 1.26, SD = 1.50), F(2,123) = 103.54, p < 0.001. Furthermore, the mean score for those in the related idea condition fell between the other two conditions, as would be expected (M = −1.55, SD = 1.40). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) test revealed each of the condition means to be significant at the 0.05 level.

The second manipulation check item also revealed significant differences across conditions, Χ2(6, N = 126) = 129.57, p < 0.001. Of the participants in the identical idea condition, 88% reported John’s idea to be identical to theirs (10% reported John’s idea to be quite similar; 2% reported it to be not at all similar). Eighty-eight percent of participants in the related idea condition reported John’s to be quite similar (10% reported John’s idea to be identical, 2% reported it to be not at all similar). Fifty-nine percent of participants in the unrelated idea condition reported John’s idea to be not at all similar (41% reported it to be quite similar).

Malign Attributions

Sinister Motives

When analyzed via ANOVA, idea relatedness had a significant effect on the perceived sinister motives scale such that the more related the counterpart’s idea, the more sinister participants saw the counterpart’s motives to be, F(2,123) = 4.95, p = 0.009. Subsequent post-hoc comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference between the identical and unrelated conditions using Tukey’s HSD test with participants perceiving their counterpart to have more sinister motives in the identical than unrelated condition (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
figure 2

Relatedness of ideas prompts malign attributions. Note Idea originators assigned higher malign intentions toward the counterpart as the relatedness of the ideas proposed by the counterpart increased. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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Perceived Trustworthiness

A one-way ANOVA on the perceived trustworthiness scale revealed a significant effect of idea relatedness condition, F(2,123) = 9.22, p < 0.001. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD test revealed that, as predicted, when the counterpart proposed an identical or related idea, he was perceived to be less trustworthy then when he proposed an unrelated idea. There were no differences in level of perceived trustworthiness between the identical and related idea conditions.

Negative Moral Emotions

Anger

A one-way ANOVA revealed that the more related the counterpart’s idea was to the idea originator’s idea, the more the participant experienced anger, F(2,123) = 7.44, p = 0.001 (Fig. 3). Pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s HSD revealed that participants felt more anger towards counterparts who proposed identical ideas (M = 4.45, SD = 1.80) than those who proposed unrelated ideas (M = 3.07, SD = 1.75) and when compared to those who proposed related ideas (M = 3.46, 1.52), p = 0.001 and 0.023 respectively. No significant differences in level of anger were observed between the related and unrelated idea conditions (p = 0.54).

Fig. 3
figure 3

Relatedness of ideas prompts negative moral emotions. Note Idea originators experienced higher levels of negative moral emotions (including anger) as the relatedness of the ideas proposed by the counterpart increased. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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Negative Moral Emotions

A one-way ANOVA revealed that the more related the counterpart’s idea, the more the idea originator experienced negative moral emotions, F(2,123) = 9.06, p < 0.001. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that there were higher levels of these moral emotions in the identical and related idea conditions than in the unrelated condition, and identical and related ideas provoked statistically equivalent levels on the moral emotions scale (Fig. 3). A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was not a significant relationship between idea relatedness and the anxiety scale, F(2,123) = 0.911, n.s.

Discussion

As predicted, idea originators did not react as if the imitation of their ideas was the sincerest form of flattery. Instead, responses to identical ideas were systematically more negative than responses to unrelated ideas; participants reported greater levels of negative moral emotions of anger, disgust, contempt and resentment. Thus, Study 1 provides a conceptual replication of prior research which has found that the affective and cognitive reactions to idea imitation may be quite pernicious (Ellis 2022).

This study also provides initial evidence that certain emotional and inferential reactions were more negative following a counterpart’s proposal of a related versus unrelated idea. Specifically, related ideas prompted more contempt and resentment than unrelated ideas and led counterparts to be seen as just as untrustworthy. However, levels of anger and disgust were not different when the counterpart proposed a related versus unrelated idea. One possible explanation for this is that related ideas were still experienced as moral violations (hence prompting moral emotion) but because the violation was less extreme or clear (e.g., because it less directly contravened plagiarism norms or the self), participants did not feel licensed to report anger and disgust, emotions that are more strongly associated with antagonistic action tendencies than contempt and resentment.

Importantly, idea relatedness was not associated with all negative emotions measured as part of this study (i.e., anxiety), suggesting that identical and related ideas do not lead to negative affect in general. Instead, this study provides some suggestive evidence that the negative emotional consequences of idea relatedness may be limited to the moral emotions.

The discrete moral emotions included in this study have previously been associated with distinct cognitive appraisals (e.g., Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Van de Ven et al. 2012). This work shows that anger follows from an assessment that there is a direct threat to the self (Hutcherson and Gross 2011) and/or one’s valued goals, typically by another individual (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 1988). Hence, when an individual reports anger following an event, we can infer that they have experienced that event as a threat to the self that was caused by another individual. In comparison, moral disgust and contempt stem respectively from an appraisal that the emotion’s target is morally untrustworthy or incompetent (Hutcherson and Gross 2011). Furthermore, situations that are experienced as unfairness intentionally enacted by another person prompt resentment (Van de Ven et al. 2012).

The results suggest that those who adapt the idea originator’s idea (rather than having imitated it) are likely to be viewed somewhat less harshly—as related ideas were only found to generate significantly higher levels of contempt and resentment than unrelated ideas. These individuals are likely to be seen as incompetent or unintelligent, perhaps suggesting that people make sense of idea adaptation as more of a failure to be creative or to think for oneself. However, as idea adaptation also fosters feelings of resentment and resentment is associated with an appraisal that one has been intentionally treated unfairly (Van de Ven et al. 2012), this act may also be seen as an intentionally unfair event enacted by the counterpart.

Like the five studies from Ellis (2022), the vignette design used in Study 1 necessitates that participants imagine themselves in a situation which they may not have experienced and predict how they would respond. As a result, the findings are most appropriately interpreted as providing evidence of participants’ lay beliefs about how they would respond to such a situation, and such beliefs are likely to be colored by what they anticipate to be normative. To address this limitation, Study 2 employs a personal recall methodology, drawing on experiences the participants have already had. Additionally, by using a sample of American adults with work experience, Study 2 addresses another limitation of Study 1 which is that our sample consisted solely of undergraduate students, thus limiting the potential generalizability of our findings.

Study 2

Study 1 tested the extent to which idea originators assign malign intentions (H1) and feel negative moral emotions (H2) toward their counterparts who propose identical, related, and unrelated ideas. Study 2 examines the extent to which idea originators intend to ostracize their counterpart (H3) and perceive greater relationship conflict (H4) with that counterpart. These outcomes are particularly counter to humanistic management principles, which champion positive work relationships (Clark et al. 2019; Fisk et al. 2019; Baker and Lee 2020; Matheson et al. 2021). These hypotheses were tested using a national sample of individuals who recalled their own personal experiences at work. This retrospective recall methodology enables participants to report directly on their own personal experiences and reactions at work rather than imagining themselves in a situation that they may never have personally experienced, as in vignette studies.

Method

Participants and Design

77 American adult participants with substantial current or recent employment experience (M = 14.7 years work experience, SD = 10.15), drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in return for compensation (38 women; Mage = 33.64, SDage = 10.08). To participate, individuals needed to have completed at least two years of college and be native English speakers. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions corresponding to three levels of idea relatedness (identical, related, and unrelated) in this between-subjects design.

Procedure

The experimental manipulations were embedded in the instructions for the retrospective recall task. Participants read instructions prompting them to recall a specific time at work when a coworker heard them propose an idea and then that coworker subsequently proposed an idea that varied in idea relatedness: “identical”, “related (but not identical)”, or “unrelated”, and did not reference the participant’s original idea when doing so. This latter instruction was designed to ensure that the degree of credit expressly attributed by counterparts to the participant was constant across conditions.

The instructions for the recall task for each of the conditions are shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Study 2 experimental manipulations
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Participants were asked to focus on a recalled experience that “best matches the described situation” and that they “remember[ed] most vividly”. They were also instructed to “take a minute now to think of this experience before moving to the next page [of the study]”.

Following this, they were asked to confirm that they “could think of an instance when a coworker behaved that way”. Those who reported not having the experience were told that they had reached the end of the study and then paid for participating. Those who had a relevant experience were then asked to write at least three sentences describing what happened and how they felt. Following the completion of this writing task, participants completed all dependent measures and demographic questions. They were then paid for participating.

Measures

Recall Difficulty, Personal Relevance, and Relationship Closeness

Participants responded to an item assessing how difficult they found it to be to “think of an incident that fit the instructions” given in the recall task. They also indicated how personally relevant the situation they wrote about was. These items were measured on seven-point scales, (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). To assess how close of a relationship participants had with the recalled coworker, they were asked “at the time of the incident, how well did you know the coworker whose behavior you wrote about?”. We included an even number of points in the relationship closeness scale (1 = not at all well, 6 = very well) as we anticipated that relationship closeness might influence reactions to idea relatedness and wanted participants to have to choose whether they knew the coworker or not, rather than having the less cognitively taxing option of a midpoint.

Manipulation Check

Three items were included to assess the effectiveness of the manipulations in this study. Two measures of perceived similarity were adapted from (Ames et al. 2012): “in the experience you recalled and wrote about, how similar would you say your coworker’s idea was to the idea you proposed earlier?” (−3 very dissimilar, 3 very similar) and “to what extent would you say that your coworker’s idea had a good deal in common with the idea you presented earlier?” (−3 not at all, 3 a great deal; α = 0.97). An additional, categorical item asked participants to indicate whether “the relationship between the idea you proposed first and the idea your coworker proposed later” was “best characterized” as “identical”, “related but not identical” or “unrelated”.

Ostracism

To measure whether participants ostracized the coworker they recalled, we adapted the Workplace Ostracism Scale (Ferris et al. 2008). This scale was originally designed to measure the frequency with which individuals experience ostracizing behaviors at work. However, here the intent was to assess the frequency with which idea originators ostracized their counterparts (e.g., “shut him/her out of a conversation”, “treated him/her as if they weren’t there”) following the counterparts’ proposal of an idea. Hence, the scale was adapted to change the participant from the target to the enactor of the behavior (1 = never, 4 = fairly often, 7 = always; α = 0.94).

Relationship Conflict

Relationship conflict was measured using the Jehn and Mannix (2001) relationship conflict measure which includes such items as “how much emotional conflict is there between you and that coworker?” (1 = none at all, 7 = a great deal). Participants were instructed to focus on the “period of time immediately following the incident you wrote about”. (α = 0.89)

Results

One individual was dropped from the sample because they reported being unable to recall an instance conforming to the instructions. Three individuals were excluded because they failed the two attention checks (one requiring that they write “I paid attention to the instructions” in a free text field and the other asking that they choose the “I don’t know” option rather than a series of five emotions).

Check for Systemic Differences Between Conditions

Analysis was conducted to ensure there were no systemic differences between conditions on recall difficulty, personal relevance, and relationship closeness. A one-way ANOVA of idea relatedness condition on recall difficulty indicated that there was no significant effect of condition, F(2,71) = 1.65, p = 0.199 and all post-hoc pairwise comparisons were non-significant, all p’s > 0.241. Across conditions, participants found it relatively easy to recall an experience at work that corresponded to the experimental conditions (grand M = 2.09, SD = 1.52). Participants in each of the conditions found the situation that they had written about to be very personally relevant (grand M = 5.53, SD = 1.35).

An ANOVA indicated that there was no effect of idea relatedness on assessed personal relevance, F(2,71) = 0.45, p = 0.64 with each condition being statistically indistinguishable from each other, all p’s > 0.8. There was no main effect of idea relatedness on relationship closeness (F(2,71) = 1.25, p = 0.29) with none of the conditions differing significantly from any other (Tukey HSD, all p’s > 0.26) and a grand mean of 4.09 (SD = 1.24). These three factors might have been assumed ex ante to vary systematically with the experimental conditions. The lack of condition differences across these measures increases confidence that any associations observed between the experimental factors and measures of interest is not a result of the effect of these variables.

Manipulation Check

An ANOVA on perceived similarity revealed a significant effect of idea relatedness condition F(2,71) = 25.56, p < 0.001. However, pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the identical (M = 6.25, SD = 1.55) and related idea (M = 6.31, SD = 1.27) conditions were not significantly different from each other. The categorical manipulation check item also revealed a significant effect of idea relatedness condition, Χ2(4, N = 74) = 46.50, p < 0.001. Of those in the identical condition, 86.4% reported that “identical” best characterized the relationship between their coworker’s and their ideas, with 9.1% and 4.5% reporting “related” and “unrelated” respectively.

57.7% of the participants in the related idea condition reported that their coworker’s idea was “identical” to theirs, with 38.5% indicating that it was “related” and 3.8% indicating it was “unrelated”. The majority of participants in the unrelated condition reported that their coworker’s idea was “unrelated” (69.2%), with 23.1% reporting it was “related” and 7.7% identical.

Ostracism

As predicted in H3, an ANOVA revealed idea relatedness to be associated with ostracism, F(2,71) = 5.38, p = 0.007. Pairwise comparisons revealed that individuals more frequently ostracized a coworker who later proposed an idea that was identical to their own (M = 3.34, SD = 1.58) than a coworker who proposed an unrelated idea (M = 2.00, SD = 1.34), p = 0.011. They also more frequently ostracized a coworkers who proposed a related (M = 3.14, SD = 1.74) versus an unrelated idea, p = 0.027 (see Fig. 4). There was no difference in frequency of ostracism between the identical and related conditions, p = 0.90. The effect of idea relatedness condition on workplace ostracism remained significant after controlling for participant gender, age, coworker gender, and relationship closeness, F(1,67) = 4.38, p = 0.016.

Fig. 4
figure 4

Effect of idea relatedness on relationship conflict and ostracism. Note Idea originators experienced higher levels of relationship conflict and ostracized their counterparts more as the relatedness of the ideas proposed by the counterpart increased. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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Relationship Conflict

Consistent with H4, idea relatedness was significantly related to the amount of RC reported by participants, F(2,71) = 6.11, p = 0.004 (See Fig. 4). Participants reported the most RC when their coworker later proposed an identical idea (M = 4.64, SD = 1.51), the second highest RC following the proposal of a related idea (M = 4.05, SD = 1.60) and the lowest level of RC when a coworker later proposed an unrelated idea (M = 3.03, SD = 1.74). Pairwise comparisons revealed there was a significantly different level of RC elicited by identical and unrelated ideas (p = 0.003) and a marginally significant difference between related and unrelated ideas (p = 0.066). Once again, reactions to identical and related ideas were not statistically different (p = 0.43). After the covariates discussed above, there was still a significant main effect of idea relatedness condition on RC, F(2,67) = 4.35, p = 0.017.

Discussion

In this study, we found that idea originators experienced greater relationship conflict with, and reported more frequently ostracizing, coworkers who proposed identical ideas than those who proposed identical ideas. These outcomes are especially notable to humanistic managers, who prioritize positive work relationships (Clark et al. 2019; Fisk et al. 2019; Baker and Lee 2020; Matheson et al. 2021).

Overall, these findings are particularly notable given that the core dependent variables of interest—experienced relationship conflict, and ostracism—are likely to be under-reported as they are not normative and thus are low in social desirability (Zerbe and Paulhus 1987). Hence, we might anticipate some range restriction on these variables, creating a conservative test of our hypotheses.

This study provides initial evidence that the relational outcomes of idea relatedness may be pernicious. It asked participants to remember actual events, a technique that has face validity and allows us to probe individuals’ authentic feelings about idea theft in their lives. It is by nature retrospective, and while this aspect provides insight into the longevity of the negative consequences of idea theft, it may be subject to recall bias as well. Additionally, its design was low in experimental control. The design of Study 3 addresses these two issues.

Study 3

While Studies 1 and 2 indicated that idea originators react quite negatively when their counterparts propose related or identical ideas, they did not provide insight into why originators react in this way. Study 3 addresses this issue by exploring whether idea theft prompts self-threat in idea originators (H5) and whether this self-threat is responsible for the increase in relationship conflict (H6). In addition, Study 3 also proposes and tests a method for ameliorating the self-threat of idea theft via self-affirmation. Reflecting on alternative sources of self-integrity (i.e., self-affirmation) can attenuate or even eliminate self-threat (Steele 1988; Sherman and Cohen 2002, 2006; McQueen and Klein 2006). We explore whether self-affirmation attenuates or eliminates an idea originator’s negative reactions to idea theft (H7).

We also examine which aspect of the self is most threatened by idea theft. Given that a desire to be seen (by the self and others) as unique is likely to be particularly threatened by idea theft, we measured participants’ self-attributed need for uniqueness and anticipated that it would be those individuals who were high on this individual difference that would be particularly threatened by the imitation of their ideas. Thus, we test whether need for uniqueness moderates the interactive relationship between idea relatedness and self-affirmation on self-threat such that this relationship would be attenuated among those with a low need for uniqueness (H8).

Study 3 explores these questions in an engaging experimental design in which individuals generated ideas and then heard someone they were led to believe was a fellow participant (but instead was a confederate) propose an idea.

Method

Participants and Design

60 undergraduate students (30 female, Mage = 20.5, SDage = 1.44) participated. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions corresponding to the study’s 2 (idea theft, no idea theft) × 2 (self-affirmation, no self-affirmation) between-subjects design.

Procedure

Participants began the study in a small, private room. There they were told that they would be participating in a 30-min long “mock case interview study”. The experimenter informed participants that the study would have several parts: a case interview preparation phase (completed individually), the mock case interview (completed with another participant), and finally a series of tasks and questionnaires. After completing the consent form and initial questionnaire, reading and taking notes on the overview of the case interview process and the subject of the case interview, the experimenter moved the participant to an “Interview Room” in which a purported other participant, instead a confederate, was already seated.

The experimenter explained the order of tasks: (1) one “participant” would make a one-minute presentation, (2) both would complete a short self-description task, (3) the other participant would make their presentation, and (4) they would complete a series of questionnaires. Participants were strongly encouraged to take notes during each other’s presentations as it “shows engagement to case interviewers”. This instruction provided the confederate sufficient information to generate a nuanced understanding of the participant’s presentation so that she could subsequently alter her presentation based on the participant’s. The experimenter then used a purportedly random process to determine presentation order which led to the participant always presenting first.

After the participant made his/her presentation, both the participant and confederate completed the self-description task in which the self-affirmation manipulation was embedded. In the self-affirmation condition, participants identified their most important characteristic or value from a list of ten and then wrote for one minute about a time that it was important to them and made them feel good about themselves. In the no self-affirmation condition, participants identified their least important characteristic or value from the same list. They then wrote down all they had had eaten and drunk for the last 24 h.

After both completed this task, the experimenter collected the materials and asked the confederate to present. The confederate’s presentation contained the manipulation of idea theft.

In the no idea theft idea condition, her 1-min presentation was as follows:

I’m glad to be able to present my suggestions to you today. My idea [touch clavicle and look at participant] is that this space should be used as a tutoring center for college students to tutor high school students. Most of the time university-community relationships aren’t very good. Tutoring local kids would be able to help strengthen this relationship. There would be small rooms set up – one per subject – and an online signup form. We think that this use of the space would improve relationships with the community, give students a chance to practice teaching, and give students an opportunity to give back to the community. Thank you for listening to me present my ideas today.

In the idea theft condition, the confederate made a presentation that had the same beginning and end as the no idea theft condition presentation, yet the core of the content was designed to be identical to that of the participants.

I’m glad to be able to present my suggestions to you today. My idea is that the space should be … [identical proposed use and reasoning as provided by participant]. Thank you for listening to me present my ideas today.

After the confederate’s presentation, participants moved to a computer lab where they completed the remainder of the tasks and measures for the study.

Measures

Manipulation Checks

Two manipulation checks assessed idea relatedness using two seven-point items adapted from work on perceived similarity by Ames and colleagues (Ames et al. 2012; Study 4) and in which higher numbers reflected greater similarity. Specifically, participants were asked: “how similar were the presentations you and your counterpart made in terms of their content?” and “to what extent would you say that the presentations made by you and your counterpart had a good deal in common in terms of their content?” (α = 0.96).

Direct manipulation checks are often excluded in self-affirmation studies in part because even a self-esteem scale can be employed as a means of self-affirmation (Steele et al. 1993; Reed and Aspinwall 1998). As a result, it is more common to code participant essays to assess whether they completed the assigned task and used these ratings as a self-affirmation manipulation check (e.g., Harris and Napper 2005). We employed this latter strategy and had two raters blind to condition read the essays.

Self-threat

Past research has identified decrements in state self-esteem (SSE) as evidence of self-threat (Vohs and Heatherton 2003). Our measure of SSE consisted of the academic performance and social evaluation subscales of the Heatherton and Polivy (1991) SSE scale. Participants reported what they were thinking during their interaction with their counterpart and completed such measures as “I feel inferior to others in this moment” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely; α = 0.94). For reporting of means and within figures, the scores were averaged and subtracted from 7 (the top of the scale) to create our measure of self-threat.

Relationship Conflict

Relationship conflict was measured using the same Jehn and Mannix (2001) measure employed in Study 2 although in the present study they were asked to focus on “the interaction you just had with your case interview counterpart” (α = 0.86).

Need for Uniqueness

Trait need for uniqueness was measured using the 4-item, self-attributed need for uniqueness scale (Lynn and Harris 1997). A sample item is “being distinctive is important to me” (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) (α = 0.83).

Results

Manipulation Checks

The manipulation checks revealed that idea relatedness was successfully manipulated. Individuals in the identical idea condition indicated that their counterpart’s idea was more similar to their own (M = 6.32, SD = 1.23) than those in the unrelated idea condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.59), F(1,56) = 120.24, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.682. There was also a marginally significant effect of self-affirmation condition on the manipulation check, F(1,56) = 3.60, p = 0.063, ηp2 = 0.060, but no interaction, F(1,56) = 0.62, p = 0.435, ηp2 = 0.011. A review of the self-affirmation task materials completed by participants by the two raters indicated that all had completed the task appropriately.

Self-Affirmation Reduces Self-Threat and Relationship Conflict

Self-Threat

To test whether the idea originator will experience more self-threat in the case of idea theft (H5) and whether that self-threat will be attenuated when the idea originator engages in self-affirmation (H6), we performed a 2 × 2 ANOVA to examine the effects of the manipulated conditions on self-threat. The results of this test were consistent with expectations; there was a main effect of idea theft condition such that when the counterpart proposed an identical idea, self-threat was higher than when the counterpart proposed an unrelated idea, F(1,56) = 6.98, p = 0.011, eta-sq = 0.111 (see Fig. 5).

Fig. 5
figure 5

Interaction of idea theft and self-affirmation on self-threat and relationship conflict. Note: Idea originators experienced higher levels of self-threat and relationship conflict following idea theft. These outcomes were attenuated when idea originators engaged in self-affirmation. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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As would be expected if the self-affirmation manipulation were effective, there was also a main effect of self-affirmation condition such that those in the self-affirmation condition reported having lower self-threat than those in the no self-affirmation condition, F(1,56) = 21.71, p < 0.001, eta-sq = 0.279 (see Fig. 5).

More importantly, the expected interaction of idea theft and self-affirmation emerged, F(1,56) = 4.49, p = 0.033, eta-sq = 0.079. Simple effects revealed that this interaction took the predicted form: idea theft significantly increased self-threat for those who were not self-affirmed (F(1,56) = 11.66, p = 0.001, eta-sq = 0.172) but was not significantly related to self-threat for those who self-affirmed, F(1,56) = 0.102, p = 0.750, eta-sq = 0.002.

Furthermore, self-affirmation was significantly related to self-threat only for those in the idea theft condition (F(1,56) = 23.45, p < 0.001, eta-sq = 0.295; simple main effect of self-affirmation in the no idea theft condition: F(1,56) = 3.05, p = 0.086, eta-sq = 0.052). Post hoc comparisons indicated that self-threat was significantly higher in the idea theft-no self-affirmation condition than in each of the other cells, and that these three other conditions were not significantly different from each other.

Relationship Conflict

We also tested the effect of self-affirmation on relationship conflict. Results of an ANOVA revealed significant main effects for both idea theft (F(1,56) = 5.81, p = 0.019, eta-sq = 0.094) and self-affirmation (F(1,56) = 6.93, p = 0.011, eta-sq = 0.110), thus providing further support for H4. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction of idea theft and self-affirmation (F(1,56) = 4.55, p = 0.037, eta-sq = 0.075), as stated in H6. See Fig. 5. The simple main effect of idea relatedness for each level of self-affirmation revealed that the interaction took the predicted form; there was only a significant effect of idea condition among those who were not self-affirmed (F(1,56) = 10.33, p = 0.002, eta-sq = 0.156) and not among those who were self-affirmed (F(1,56) = 0.038, p = 0.845, eta-sq = 0.001).

We also predicted that self-threat would mediate the interaction effect of idea theft and self-affirmation on RC, and that the strength of the hypothesized indirect effect would depend on whether self-affirmation was present or absent (Table 3). To test this moderated mediation model, we used regression analysis with bootstrapping in an SPSS macro (modmed) designed by Preacher et al. (2007). This macro uses widely accepted bootstrapping techniques and allows for testing of the significance of the indirect effect via the mediator at different levels of the moderator variable. The procedure produces bootstrapped confidence intervals of the indirect effect at different levels of the moderator variable. When these confidence intervals exclude zero, one can conclude that the effect is significant at the chosen alpha level.

Table 3 Moderated mediation regression results for relationship conflict
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The results of the test of moderated mediation indicate that, consistent with expectations, self-threat does not mediate the effect of idea relatedness on RC among those who had an opportunity to self-affirm (95% CI: −0.1482, 0.3260). However, the indirect effect of idea relatedness on RC via self-threat was significant among those who had not engaged in self-affirmation (95% CI: 0.0156, 0.8559).

Need for Uniqueness

Personal need for uniqueness is an aspect of the self likely to be threatened by idea imitation. As a result, the interaction between idea relatedness and self-affirmation is likely to be particularly pronounced among those who indicated that they had a higher need for uniqueness (H8).

To test this, we regressed self threat on idea theft condition (coded 1 for idea theft, 0 for no idea theft), self-affirmation (coded 1 for self-affirmation, 0 for no self-affirmation), self-attributed need for uniqueness and all possible 2 and 3-way interactions of these predictors (see Table 4). The results of this analysis reveal that the 3-way interaction was significant, and the pattern of results was consistent with predictions, in that the need for uniqueness moderates the relationship between idea theft and self-affirmation on self-threat such that this relationship is weakened among those with a low need for uniqueness but not a high need for uniqueness (H8).

Table 4 Regression analyses examining predictors of self-threat
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Discussion

Consistent with H5, results showed that self-threat was higher following idea theft. H7 was also supported as this increase in self-threat was reduced by self-affirmation. As state self-esteem losses are accepted as providing evidence of self-threat (Vohs and Heatherton 2003, 2004) and self-affirmation works to buffer individuals against self-threat, these results provide evidence from multiple angles that idea theft is experienced as self-threat. This study also replicates results on an organizationally important consequence of idea theft—namely relationship conflict, thus providing additional support for H4.

Importantly, this study provides a potential managerial intervention to reduce the chances that the idea theft will spur relationship conflict and subsequent conflict spirals (Jehn and Bendersky 2003), outcomes which likely harm workplace solidarity (Baker and Lee 2020). Specifically, managers who provide opportunities for idea generators to self-affirm may be able to dampen the negative consequences of perceived or feared idea theft.

General Discussion

Taken together, these experiments provide support for our model to soothe the self-threat of idea theft (see Fig. 1). Our results were demonstrated using student and working professional samples and three different experimental designs: vignette, personal recall, and an in-lab experiment.

Studies 1 and 2 reinforced findings in the nascent literature of idea theft that negative interpersonal outcomes likely follow perceived idea theft (Ellis 2022). As shown, idea theft can prompt hostile behavioral outcomes including relationship conflict and ostracism. Negative moral emotions, not negative emotions in general, were also triggered by idea theft. Counterparts proposing related ideas (as opposed to identical ones) also engendered negative interpersonal consequences, although to a lesser degree. These results suggest that idea originators feel wronged by the actions of the counterparts.

The reason why idea theft prompts such negative reactions is explored in Study 3, which finds evidence supporting the role of the self-threat as the mechanism linking idea theft to negative interpersonal outcomes. Study 3 also suggests self-affirmation can protect individuals from the self-threat of idea theft, which in turn could alleviate the negative social consequences. People who have a high need for uniqueness will benefit less from self-affirmation, indicating that it is people’s feeling of being a unique and distinct individual that is threatened by idea theft. Thus, need for uniqueness is also a boundary condition of the model.

Theoretical Contributions

This research makes several contributions to the organizational behavior and social psychological literatures. First, it contributes to an emerging body of literature in idea theft, which outlines an understudied area for idea generation scholars to explore—namely the reactions of those whose ideas are imitated or adapted. Existing research on idea generation explicates when and why individuals propose identical or related ideas in group idea generation settings, but has done little to explore its downstream outcomes other than to find the generation of semantically similar ideas may further constrain the diversity of subsequently generated ideas (Nijstad et al. 2002).

Overall, the idea generation literature has given little attention to interpersonal consequences of the phenomena it addresses. This is particularly surprising given that it is well recognized that individuals generate ideas in social contexts and that these social contexts have important effects on people’s ability to generate ideas. Yet, it remains an open question how the ideas that people generate in these social contexts reciprocally influence the contexts in which the idea generation occurs. This paper addresses one aspect of this by demonstrating that idea originators are more likely to feel hostility towards, to experience relationship conflict with and to ostracize those who imitate their ideas. Yet the prior idea generation literature has shown that the imitation and adaption of ideas is often nonconscious and, thus, lacking in intentionality. Taken together with our work, it suggests that idea generation contexts may be rife with social misunderstandings.

Our findings regarding reactions to idea theft also suggest that, contrary to the consistent findings that behavioral mimicry and similarity promote social attraction and harmony (e.g., Byrne et al. 1971; Hoyle 1993; Chartrand et al. 2005), imitation and similarity in the domain of ideas can lead to the degeneration of interpersonal relationships. Indeed, work on behavioral mimicry suggests that, paradoxically, when an idea generator is imitated and they subsequently socially exclude their counterpart, this may spur even greater imitation by the counterpart (Lakin et al. 2008). In other words, idea imitation can prompt ostracism which may spur even greater imitation—whether in the domain of ideas, or via gestures, speech patterns or tone of voice.

Implications for Practice

The current work has several practical implications for organizations and managers. Our research suggests that inhibiting idea theft is critical for fostering employee flourishing and dignity as well as workplace relationship quality. Organizations should be mindful that there are potential costs to situating idea generation in groups (Sutton and Hargadon 1996; West and Anderson 1996; Thompson and Choi 2006). Because individuals generating ideas in group commonly mimic or adapt each others’ ideas (Dugosh et al. 2000; Nijstad and Stroebe 2006; Paulus and Brown 2007; Stark and Perfect 2007; Perfect and Stark 2008a, b), the conditions for idea theft to emerge in organizations are widespread and should be mitigated to prevent long-term, negative consequences.

The downstream negative consequences of idea theft for employees demonstrate that idea theft is an important issue for managers to attend to both from a humanistic and mechanistic perspective. Perceived idea theft leads individuals to feel stronger negative moral emotions, especially contempt and resentment, which are associated with perceptions that the emotion’s target is untrustworthy, incompetent and willfully unfair (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Van de Ven et al. 2012). This can threaten employee wellbeing and effectiveness (Grant et al. 2007) and even trigger aggression, violence and other counterproductive work behaviors (c.f. Spector et al. 2006). Furthermore, the relationship conflict and ostracism that we demonstrate can result from idea theft will reduce the quality of interpersonal interactions between coworkers, that if unchecked may ultimately result in perceptions of a hostile work climate (Dash et al. 2023) as well as lowering job satisfaction and commitment (Howard et al. 2020). As a result, perceived idea theft can trigger a cascade of effects that ultimately may reduce employee flourishing and undermine the healthy interpersonal relationships and sense of dignity that are essential to the humanistic organization (c.f. von Kimakowitz 2011).

Beyond the social and interpersonal consequences of concern, instances of perceived idea theft may reduce the quality and quantity of ideas shared among employees. Idea theft’s negative outcomes could directly reduce further idea sharing, or employees might fear sharing ideas in anticipation that the ideas will be stolen, or that they will be seen as an idea thief themselves. Additionally, the relationship conflict that stems from idea theft is negatively and reliably associated not only with group performance generally but also with creative performance specifically (for meta-analytic reviews, see De Dreu and Van Vianen 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 2003). Hence idea theft may reduce the ability of organizations to generate new ideas and reduce firm competitiveness. Firm competitiveness is tied to innovation, which relies on successful idea sharing of innovative ideas to be improved and implemented rapidly (Edwards-Schachter et al. 2015; Zhou 2015; Khalili 2016).

How can managers mitigate the downstream consequences of idea theft? First and foremost, we believe managers should consider brainstorming to be a sensitive context in which individuals may feel undermined and threatened by their peers. Our work demonstrates that one pathway to reduce the harm that idea theft can cause to the self and relationships at work: provide employees an opportunity to self-affirm, and thereby buffer themselves from self threat. Hence, prior to idea sharing, managers can directly self-affirm employees by encouraging them to reflect on their values. During idea sharing, managers can enact high process fairness which has been shown to affirm recipients (Wiesenfeld et al. 2000). Processes that would likely be seen as fair and affirm employees include recognizing their contributed ideas, encouraging employees to provide input into decisions related to their ideas, and acting in an unbiased manner. These processes would also bolster feelings of psychological safety, which is important to employee wellbeing (for a review, see Edmondson and Lei 2014), especially when they are tasked with innovating (Daly and Sætre 2023). The current work identifies an important population for managers to help affirm: those with high need for uniqueness.

Managers can also structure the idea generation process such that idea crediting is less ambiguous. Nominal group brainstorming, in which members of a group individually generate ideas before meeting together (for a review, see Paulus and Kenworthy 2019), is an effective idea-generation technique and would allow for an idea to be attributed to an originator.

In addition to affirming employees, managers can emphasize the collective benefits of creativity and idea sharing (e.g., Astola et al. 2022). By shifting members’ self-definitions to the group or by reducing the salience of the self, individuals may be less focused on threats to themselves—and more concerned about the standing of the group. They then may be less aware of and sensitive to threats to the individual-level self. Managers can facilitate this by fostering group identification and providing rewards for group, not individual, performance. Notably, managers must avoid credit-taking if they wish to nurture feelings of respect that raise work-group identification (Johnson et al. 2023). Avoiding credit taking may be difficult for managers: recent work has highlighted that “vertical credit creep” is common (Ploeger-Lyons et al. 2022; Johnson et al. 2023; Ploeger-Lyons and Bisel 2023). The current work underscores that, although it may be common, idea theft by managers is likely to be harmful.

Conclusion

As humanistic management practices prioritize employee wellbeing (Melé 2003, 2016) and the development of positive relationships among employees (Clark et al. 2019; Fisk et al. 2019; Baker and Lee 2020; Matheson et al. 2021), promoting positive sharing of ideas has intrinsic value. The field of idea theft is just now emerging: to our knowledge, ours is among the first empirical papers testing this phenomenon (see Ellis 2022; Ploeger-Lyons et al. 2022; Ploeger-Lyons and Bisel 2023). The literature to date has underscored the negative implications of perceived idea theft. The current work reiterates that idea theft causes multiple negative interpersonal consequences, both immediate and downstream. More importantly, we propose and test a model for soothing the self-threat of idea theft, thus suggesting a pathway by which these negative outcomes can be lessened. With consideration and planning, managers and employees can alleviate the self-threat inherent in idea sharing. By soothing this self-threat, managers will buttress the principles and practices espoused by proponents of humanistic management (e.g., Melé 2003, 2016; Clark et al. 2019; Fisk et al. 2019). In addition, they will be answering a call to ensure that work contributes to employee flourishing (Fontrodona and Melé 2022).