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Jesus and the Ratchet

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Abstract

This paper offers a rational economic reading of the career of the historical Jesus of Nazareth. A simple two-period model shows that Jesus may have been trapped by the incentive to maintain and increase his following, which led him to raise his challenge to ever higher levels and confront an increasingly hostile opposition; in a kind of ratchet mechanism, at each stage stepping back to the previous one was foreclosed and exit was made more and more difficult, leading ultimately to his ominous death. A detailed review of the Gospel evidence, informed by recent historical research, provides good support to the predictions of the model. The approach outlined here is potentially applicable to other prophets and leaders of radical religious or political movements.

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Notes

  1. Some readers who believe in the Christian doctrine of the divinity of Jesus, unlike those who do not, may be troubled by the assumption of Jesus’ imperfect foresight that underlies this analysis. However, I believe that the assumption itself is neutral as it is only predicated on the notion that Jesus the man—the Jesus of history, which is our subject here—was a normal human being. Here I can do no better than quote Sanders (1993: 134): “Ever since the fifth century (when the issue was officially settled [by the Chalcedonian Definition]), orthodox Christians have believed that Jesus was ‘true man of true man’ and that his divinity (which they also affirm) neither combined with nor interfered with his humanity: he was not an odd mixture… [which implies that] it is possible for one person to be 100 percent human and 100 percent divine, without either interfering with the other.” Logically awkward as this last proposition may be, it is a dogmatic theologian’s, not an economist’s, problem.

  2. The mechanism described in this paper seems to fit the concept of a ratchet well, hence the choice of the term. It bears, however, little relationship to the standard treatment of the ratchet effect in economic literature. This literature deals either with a firm which under-produces in order not to reveal its true production potential to the central planner of production (as in Freixas et al. 1985 and related literature) or with a worker who exerts little effort today in order not to reveal his true cost of effort to the employer (as in Lazear 1986 and related literature). By contrast, here Jesus is not engaged in any game with other parties but ties himself to the consequences of his own choices. As discussed in subsection 3.2 below, the competition with John the Baptist did drive him to undertake a more active, hence more risky, mission from the beginning; once started, however, his sole concern was his followers’ reaction, which he tried to anticipate and respond to with his next step – whence the escalation- ratchet process. Formally, the followers’ expected reaction is incorporated in Jesus’ effort decision at each stage, so the followers are not active players in a game.

  3. All quotations of New Testament texts are from the New Revised Standard Version.

  4. Furthermore, from an historical—as opposed to a theological—point of view, “there are general objections to the whole line of thought that has Jesus intending to die for others, rather than just accepting his death and trusting that God would redeem the situation and vindicate him. (…) When pushed to its limit, this view means that Jesus determined in his own mind to be killed and to have his death understood as sacrificial for others, and it must then imply that he pulled this off by provoking the authorities. (…) [This] makes him strange in any century and thrusts the entire drama into his peculiar inner psyche. The other things that we know about him make him a reasonable first-century visionary. We should be guided by them.” (Sanders 1985: 332–333; italics in the original.) On this see the further discussion in Sect. 4 below (including footnote 11).

  5. This conditional result is due to the fact that a fall in marginal cost has a direct positive effect on each period’s surplus and an indirect effect via first-period effort which is positive for \( \widehat{K}_{2} \), reinforcing the direct effect, but negative for \( \widehat{K}_{1} \) and thus working against the direct effect. This is because a fall in cost triggers an increase in e 1 and hence in \( n(e_{1} ) \), which in turn decreases \( \widehat{K}_{1} \) (the overstretch) but increases \( \widehat{K}_{2} \) because of the carry-over of followers from the first period.

  6. The last verse in which a synagogue is mentioned is Mark 6: 2, in Nazareth (out of Mark’s 16 chapters); the same story is repeated in Matthew 13: 54 ff (out of Matthew’s 28 chapters). Luke’s last synagogue story appears at 13: 10 ff (out of Luke’s 24 chapters). Despite its entirely different chronology, John’s only mention of synagogue teaching occurs at 6: 59 (out of John’s 21 chapters).

  7. See the list of “bedrock” facts in Sanders (1985: 11), and the list of Jesus’ thoughts arranged by probability of being authentic in id. (326–327). The criterion of double dissimilarity states that if a saying or a story attributed to Jesus is dissimilar both to first-century Judaism and to the teachings about him by the early church, then it is likely to be authentic because it cannot be accounted for as traditional Jewish material while later Christian redactors would have had no interest in inventing it or twisting the original record in that direction. The criterion, however, is obviously biased towards uniqueness. See the discussion in Sanders (1985: 16–17) and Fredriksen (1999: 184–185).

  8. Although all the evangelists regarded him as Messiah, Mark—the earliest writer—portrays Jesus as reticent to admit to it, so that the later evangelists had to work hard to introduce Jesus’ messianic identity into the Galilean mission. This must be because they found precious little evidence in the received traditions to support a messianic self-claim, or else they would have eagerly used it. As well, Jesus seems not to have conceded such designation when directly questioned by the high priest and by Pilate in the passion stories. See the discussion in Sanders (1993: 241–242), Fredriksen (1999: 217, 248–251), and Vermes (2001: 123–127).

  9. On the complexities attached to the titles of prophet and Messiah, in general and specifically as applied to Jesus, see the discussion in Sanders 1993, ch. 15; 1985: 237–240; Vermes 2000: 177–183, 189–193; 2001, chs. 4, 6.

  10. “Practically every detail of the Synoptic account conflicts both procedurally and substantively with any known Jewish law” (Vermes 2000: 169). See the discussion in Sanders (1985: 296–300) and Fredriksen (1999: 221–224). It seems likely that the Gospel writers knew only the bare outline of events but had no information on what went on behind the high priest’s and the prefect’s closed doors.

  11. The three episodes in which Jesus supposedly foretold his own death and resurrection (Mark 8: 31; 9: 31; 10: 32-34 and par.) are best considered as later editorial interpolations driven by the evangelists’ theological concerns, as seems obvious from the Gospels’ reports that none of the disciples recalled this prediction during the crucial hours of the Passion but all were confused and dismayed. On the other hand, the idea that Jesus knew everything in advance and intended and planned his own death, as a sacrifice to bring salvation to mankind, is Paul’s rationalization (Romans 5: 6-9: “at the right time Christ died for the ungodly”—compare Mark 10: 45: “the Son of Man came… to give his life as a ransom for many”). Though widespread in New Testament scholarship, this view should be dismissed as it corresponds so closely with early Christian doctrine that it flatly fails the criterion of dissimilarity; in effect, it amounts to saying that Jesus came to establish the Doctrine of the Atonement (see the discussion in Sanders, 1985: 332–333). In contrast, our reconstruction–following Sanders’ and Fredriksen’s–simply assumes a normal human being who hoped to see the triumph of God, not the triumph of Rome, during his lifetime, and realized he would die only when it was too late to escape with honor.

  12. Jesus is thus the perfect example of a “rational” martyr whose behavior is driven by the expectation of a cult after his death, as modelled in Ferrero (2013).

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Acknowledgments

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics and Culture (Chapman University, Orange, CA, March 21–22, 2014) and of the European Public Choice Society (Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, April 3–6, 2014), and at the HEIRS conference on “Economic Theology, Theological Economics” (Lumsa University, Rome, May 20–21, 2014). Participants to these events provided interesting discussion. I am indebted to Carla Marchese and Ronald Wintrobe for comments and to Robbie Mochrie and two anonymous referees of this Journal for an especially close reading and suggestions.

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Appendix

Appendix

Starting from the first-order conditions (4a) and (4b), some algebraic manipulation yields the following condition for \( \widehat{{e_{2} }} \) > \( \widehat{e}_{1} \):

$$ \frac{{1 - \delta (e_{2} )}}{{ - \delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )}} \le \frac{{n(e_{1} )}}{{n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )}} + \frac{{n^{{\prime }} (e_{2} ) - n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )}}{{ - \delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )}} $$
(5)

where specification of the inequality sign depends on whether c′(e) is constant or increasing. To ensure concavity of the maximization problem, we assume that n′(e) is decreasing [i.e. n(e) is strictly concave] if c′(e) is constant, while it may be constant if c′(e) is increasing [i.e. if c(e) is strictly convex]. For expositional convenience, and without loss of generality, suppose n(e) is strictly concave: then by definition \( n(e_{1} )/n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} ) \) > e 1 . Also for convenience, call the two terms of the summation on the RHS of (5) A and B respectively, hence RHS = A + B. If e 2  > e 1 then B < 0. Therefore we have the two conditions e 1  < A and RHS < A. Looking now at the LHS of (5), if the function 1 − δ(e 2 ) is (at least weakly) convex, which implies that the attrition function δ(e 2 ) is (at least weakly) concave, then by definition LHS ≤ e 2 , and so must be the RHS. Conversely, if the attrition function is strictly convex, then both LHS and RHS of (5) must be greater than e 2 . Using all these inequalities, the reader can verify that the two conditions stated above can be satisfied with any shape of the δ(e 2 ) function.

If we now carry out the same exercise for the case e 2  ≤ e 1 , the sign of inequality (5) is reversed and B ≥ 0, so the two conditions become e 1  < A and RHS ≥ A. It is straightforward to check that these conditions cannot be satisfied if LHS ≤ e 2 but require LHS > e 2 . This proves that a sufficient condition for \( \widehat{e}_{2} \) > \( \widehat{e}_{1} \) is that δ(e 2 ) be (weakly) concave.

Turning now to comparative statics, to see the effect of marginal cost, re-write the first-order conditions (4a) and (4b) with linear costs, hence c′(e) = c. Differentiating these totally with respect to e 1 , e 2 , and c yields:

$$ \frac{{de_{1} }}{dc} = \frac{{ - \delta^{{\prime \prime }} (e_{2} )n(e_{1} ) + n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} ) + \delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )}}{{\left[ {2 - \delta (e_{2} )} \right]n^{{\prime \prime }} (e_{1} )\left[ { - \delta^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )n(e_{1} ) + n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )} \right] - \left[ {\delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )} \right]^{2} }} $$
(6)
$$ \frac{{de_{2} }}{dc} = \frac{{\left[ {2 - \delta (e_{2} )} \right]n^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} ) + \delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )}}{{\left[ {2 - \delta (e_{2} )} \right]n^{{\prime \prime }} (e_{1} )\left[ { - \delta^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )n(e_{1} ) + n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )} \right] - \left[ {\delta^{{\prime }} (e_{2} )n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )} \right]^{2} }} $$
(7)

The denominator of both equations is the Hessian determinant of the second-order conditions (not reported here), which is required to be positive for a maximum. Given our assumptions about the n(e) and δ(e 2 ) functions, the numerator of (7) is certainly negative, while the sum of the first two terms in the numerator of (6) is required to be negative by the second-order conditions (which implies that δ″, if negative, must be sufficiently small in absolute value). Hence both total derivatives are negative. It is then straightforward to compute \( d\widehat{K}_{1} /dc \) and \( d\widehat{K}_{2} /dc \) from Eqs. (2) and (3) in the text and, using these results and the first-order conditions, find that the second is negative while the sign of the former is ambiguous.

Specifying \( n(e) = \sqrt e \) and hence \( \widehat{K}_{1} = \sqrt {e_{1} } - ce_{1} \), the derivatives de 1 /dc and \( d\widehat{K}_{1} /dc \) can be recalculated. Substituting into the latter \( \left[ {2 - \delta (e_{2} )} \right] \) = \( 2c\sqrt {e_{1} } \) from the counterpart to FOC (4a), we find that a sufficient condition for \( d\widehat{K}_{1} /dc \) > 0 is \( (1 - c\sqrt {e_{1} } ) \) ≤ 0, which implies \( \widehat{K}_{1} \) ≤ 0. In turn, using again the above equality from (4a) to substitute into the above expression for \( \widehat{K}_{1} \), we find that a necessary and sufficient condition for \( \widehat{K}_{1} \) ≤ 0 is \( \delta (e_{2} ) \) ≤ 0 at the optimal solution.

To see the effect of the attrition rate, re-write the FOCs (4a) and (4b) using the linear function \( \delta (e_{2} ) = 1 - \alpha e_{2} \), with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Differentiating these totally with respect to e 1 , e 2 , and α yields:

$$ \frac{{de_{1} }}{d\alpha } = \frac{{n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )\left\{ {\alpha n(e_{1} ) - e_{2} [n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )]} \right\}}}{{[(1 + \alpha e_{2} )n^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} )][n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )] - [\alpha n^{{\prime }} (e_{1} )]^{2} }} $$
(8)
$$ \frac{{de_{2} }}{d\alpha } = \frac{{ - n(e_{1} )[\left( {1 + \alpha e_{2} } \right)n^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} )] + \alpha e_{2} [n^{'} (e_{1} )]^{2} }}{{[(1 + \alpha e_{2} )n^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{1} )][n^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} ) - c^{\prime \prime } (e_{2} )] - [\alpha n^{'} (e_{1} )]^{2} }} $$
(9)

The denominator of both equations is the Hessian determinant of the second-order conditions (recalculated for this specification), which is required to be positive for a maximum. The bracketed expression in the numerator of (8) is required to be negative by the second-order conditions, as is the expression in the first brackets of the numerator of (9). So both total derivatives are positive. Finally, it is straightforward to compute \( d\widehat{K}_{1} /d\alpha \) and \( d\widehat{K}_{2} /d\alpha \) from Eqs. (2) and (3) in the text and, using de 1 / and the FOCS, find that the former is negative and the latter positive.

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Ferrero, M. Jesus and the Ratchet. Homo Oecon 33, 173–195 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0005-4

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