Abstract
In the Buddhist tradition, there is an expansive collection of texts that explore the topic of ethics, addressing moral questions concerning the right and wrong behaviors, virtues, vices, and so forth. However, when examining the main texts of this tradition, we find an absence of a structured moral philosophy that systematically and critically analyzes moral values and principles. Therefore, Buddhist scholars have responded in different ways to the perplexing situation in which Buddhism largely lacks an explicit theory in moral philosophy. Some scholars argue that we should read Buddhist moral teachings as one of the contemporary ethical theories, such as consequentialism or virtue ethics. Damien Keown is one of the scholars who claims that “virtue ethics” is the best way to understand Buddhist ethics. This paper analyzes and critiques Damien Kewon’s reading of Buddhist moral teachings as Virtue ethics. I argue that such interpretation poses problems, primarily because it may overlook key aspects of Buddhist beliefs deemed inconsequential to contemporary ethical debates, and secondly, it could result in the imposition of non-authentic Buddhist ideas on Buddhist ethics.
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Notes
In It’s Ethics, Jim, but Not as We Know It, Keown suggests two main reasons to explain why Buddhism lacks a theory in ethics. The first reason is that Buddhists’ intellectual interests are undermined by metaphysics, and they lack an example of moral philosophy to follow. The second and the third reasons are sociological, in that Buddhists were not interested in politics and social life while, in the West, ethics is linked to political science and the development of democracy (2017, 30).
For instance, only the department of philosophy at University of Hawai’i offers graduate courses on Buddhism.
Aristotle did not use the term “summum bonum” since he did not speak Latin. However, Kant used this term.
In this section, I use the terms “emotions” and “feelings” interchangeably.
The term saññā is often translated as cognition, ascertainment, perception, identification or differentiation.
The term cetanā is often translated as volition or intention.
The term citta is often translated as mind.
Sometimes, saññā is translated as identification, perception, cognition and discrimination.
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Sharaf, A. Buddhist Moral Teachings is not Virtue Ethics: A Critical Response to Damien Keown’s View. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00325-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00325-4