Abstract
Throughout his scholarly career, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) pondered the hallowed Confucian project of self-cultivation in quest of moral realization (see Chan 1976, 1987; Schirokauer 1976). On one level, his understanding of this Confucian project has much in common with modern virtue ethics, which is receiving attention in the scholarship; on another level, he made additional philosophical efforts to justify and ramify Confucian cultivation and moral realization. In making these efforts, Zhu Xi in effect sought to set forth the grounds of genuine moral agency, which in turn led to the formation of what I consider to be his distinctive ethical theory, one that bears parallels with that of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and highlights the salience of Zhu’s contribution to ethical theory. The expression “ethical theory” covers a range of accounts of ethics. In the early twentieth century, ethical theorists in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition examined the meaning and uses of the key terms in moral and ethical discourse, such as “goodness” or “the good,” “right and wrong,” “duty,” “responsibility,” etc. The main approaches they took included intuitionism, emotivism, and prescriptivism. Subsequently, ethical theorists have tried more systematic approaches, such as utilitarianism, pragmaticism, deonotologism, and even Marxism in their efforts to explain the enterprise of ethics. In recent decades, virtue ethics has been touted as a truer to life approach to understanding people’s practical moral reflection and conduct.
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Notes
- 1.
Zhu Xi’s breakthrough lay in his recognition of the mind-heart’s volitional function, which forms the core of his ethical theory.
- 2.
- 3.
Hospers (1970) is the primary source book of twentieth century ethical theory.
- 4.
Huang Yong also shows how Confucianism offers a way out of the self-centeredness problem of virtue ethics (Huang 2010).
- 5.
B. Van Norden discusses Confucian virtue ethics and consequentialism (See Van Norden 2007).
- 6.
Philosophically, while “li” at times appears to function like “principle” in Western thought, its intended meaning is relatively immanent, and Zhu Xi associates it with pattern, patterns, patterning as in the grains in wood, the veins in leaves, the lines in jade, which were thought to give rise to the characteristics of those respective kinds of materials. For a vivid view of li, see Wade (2003). J. Rošker stresses that natural and social “structures” arise by virtue of li (Rošker 2012), while B. Ziporyn sees li as connected with “coherence” and necessary to the formation of coherent phenomena (Ziporyn 2008). The author discusses the nature and formation of li vis-à-vis its complement, qi 氣 (Thompson 2015).
- 7.
The Chinese term tian 天 (sky, firmament, heaven) is naturalistic and complements the term di 地 (earth). They form an interactive continuum rather than an ontological opposition, as in early Greek and Christian thought. At the same time, tian is active like the firmament, associated with the ancestral spirits, and involves a moral imperative expressed as tianming 天命 (mandate of heaven, conferment of heaven); hence, the present study preserves the naturalistic meaning of tian while suggesting the connotation of moral imperative. For Zhu Xi, tianli represents a pattern of perfect, fecund balance, akin to the taiji 太極 (supreme polarity) concept and diagram. See Ames and Rosemont (1998: 56–58).
- 8.
The nature is not a conceptual abstraction but is genetically implicated to form the basic disposition and propensities of each person.
- 9.
- 10.
Zhuzai means to master, mastery, as well as the master. De Bary explains zhuzai in Zhu Xi’s thought as “the master … in the mind which controls human impulses and desires, and sees that they do not conflict with reason or what is proper in a given relationship or situation,” in “‘Getting It Oneself’ or ‘Finding the Way in Oneself’ (zide 自得) as a Concept of Self-Realization in Neo-Confucian Thought” (De Bary 1991: 30).
- 11.
- 12.
In the case of sages, such reverence extends to nonhuman life forms. See Chan (1967: 302–3).
- 13.
This example expresses nuances of virtue ethics; however, it involves the recognition of a categorical side of humaneness, which alone would support such a supererogatory act.
- 14.
Kant’s clearest exposition of will occurs in Book One of Religion Within the Limits. See Kant (1960) and J. Silber (1960: xciv–cvi). Regarding Zhu Xi’s position, Chan points out, “That which unites and commands both human nature and feelings, according to Chang Tsai [Zhang Zai], is the mind. By uniting and commanding is meant the mind unifying itself by harmonizing man’s nature and feelings and by transforming the human mind into the moral mind (way mind), hence, the possibility of morality.” (Chan 1963: 590)
- 15.
See Kant (1960: 40–42): “Man himself must make himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good nor evil.… Man … is created for good and the original predisposition in man is good ….”
- 16.
The Chinese expression zhuzai is often used to mean self-mastery, self-discipline.
- 17.
- 18.
Zhuzi quanshu presents this quotation together with the two preceding quotations.
- 19.
- 20.
Beck and Silber argue that Kant holds that the spheres of causation and reason are two aspects or perspectives of one and the same world, which however cannot be mixed and do not interact (See Beck 1960: 91–194; Silber 1960: xcvii–ciii). See G. Schrader’s development of this position (Schrader 1975: 65–90). K. Ameriks offers discussion (Ameriks 1982: 230–31n67).
- 21.
Beck suggests that Kant’s conception of will as practical reason expresses a necessary condition for the possibility of an agent’s “internal unity of practice” (Beck 1960: 47–48, 70–71).
- 22.
Quoted and discussed in Qian (1971, vol. 2: 35).
- 23.
Zhu Xi describes a person’s mind-heart is their zongnao 總腦.
- 24.
Literally, “The nature is the mind-heart’s tiandi 田地.” (Rice paddy land, which is framed for cultivation and irrigation. That frame corresponds to the nature vis-à-vis the mind-heart.)
- 25.
As long as the emotions are balanced and express the nature, they will be positive. Inappropriate emotions could be expressed on the basis of misperceptions and erroneous views. Excessive emotions as well as emotions spurred by personal desires, say, can also stray off the mark and risk bad or evil impulses, responses, and deeds. The function of cultivation is to sharpen one’s perceptivity and make one epistemologically cautious; moreover, it is to rein in and manage the emotion and desires.
- 26.
See also Thompson (2016), which concentrates on Ren.
- 27.
See also Wawrytko (1982).
- 28.
For Zhu Xi, wisdom is a product of one’s cultivated sense of propriety and appropriateness. It constitutes the cognitive base for one’s moral perceptivity zhijue 知覺 and activity yundong 運動, and comprises one’s repository of learning, experience, and observation. See Okada (1988) and Thompson (2007).
- 29.
Partial translation given in De Bary (1981: 74).
- 30.
“Way mind” reflects the realization of natural/heavenly pattern in the mind-heart by virtue of the nature conferred by nature/heaven. Moral realization involves the practical identification of moral will with way mind, dedicated to natural/heavenly pattern, and set on doing what is appropriate and hitting utmost propriety in conduct.
- 31.
Cf. G. Schrader’s suggestions for interpreting Kant in Schrader (1975: 65–90).
- 32.
W. T. De Bary defines jing as “the motivation for all human action” (De Bary 1981: 14)
- 33.
See also Harbison (1980: 51n15).
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
Ibid. Somewhat reminiscent of Socrates’ teaching that nobody knowingly does wrong on the premise that to know goodness involves actually doing what is good and just at the right times.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
A recurrent theme in Kant’s ethics; for example, see Kant (1959: 21).
- 40.
- 41.
This is the standard interpretation; see Beck (1960: 226).
- 42.
Perspectivism is the philosophical position that there is no absolute or purely objective view or approach to reality; given the multiplicity of the world and the inescapable plurality of views and approaches to “it,” our understanding of the world, of reality, cannot but reflect some perspective on “it.” Zhuangzi 莊子 (c. 369–286 BCE) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) express and work out the implications of perspectivism.
- 43.
Cultivation and moral realization involve reflecting on the things at hand; one participates in the way of the early sage kings, not by profound metaphysical speculation, but by carrying out one’s sentiments of filiality and fraternity to the full. That is one’s moral-ethical proving ground and practical moral foundation.
- 44.
Zhijue 知覺 usually means perception; however, a survey of Neo-Confucians’ usage indicates that they often use the expression to express moral perception or, better, perceptivity. Yi is thus registered as an element of zhijue and functions in an aesthetic perceptual way, referring to the Ames–Hall sense of aesthetic (1987).
- 45.
- 46.
- 47.
An adaptation of Fung’s thesis, “Chinese philosophy has one main tradition, one main stream of thought. This tradition is that it aims at a particular kind of highest life. But this kind of highest life, high though it is, is not divorced from the daily functioning of human relations. Thus it is both of this world and of the other world, and we maintain that it ‘both pertains to the sublime and yet performs the common task’” (Fung 1947: 3). (On our view, the other world, the sublime, is intimately connected to this world.)
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Acknowledgements
The present chapter benefitted greatly from the insightful suggestions of the two editors of this volume. James Sellmann also read the manuscript closely and offered useful comments. Finally, the author extends his appreciation to two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Any remaining mistakes or problems are owing entirely to the author.
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Thompson, K.O. (2020). Zhu Xi’s Ethical Theory: Virtue Ethics Considerations and Kantian Parallels. In: Ng, Kc., Huang, Y. (eds) Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_39
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