Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The Marikana Massacre, the Rule of Law and South Africa’s Violent Democracy

  • Article
  • Published:
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

On 16 August 2102, 34 striking miners were killed by the South African Police Service at a platinum mine in Marikana in the north-west of South Africa. The massacre recalled the kind of violence that was supposed to have disappeared with the end of apartheid in 1994. This article examines the context in which the massacre occurred, the manner in which it was policed, and draws conclusions about governance and the rule of law in post-apartheid South Africa. The Marikana Commission of Inquiry appointed by President Jacob Zuma concluded that the killings were not justified and that the police had engaged in a cover up. Police violence and a lack of government accountability turn the logic of the rule of law on its head. There has been a pattern of impunity and indifference to the rule of law during Zuma’s presidency that is symptomatic of a loss of democratic legitimacy that threatens the rule of law in South Africa’s violent democracy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996.

  2. ‘Smuts Ngonyama quits Cope’ news24, www.citypress.co.za/politics/smuts-ngonyama-quits-cope/. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  3. Two-thirds (66 %) of South Africans viewed bribery and corruption as rampant in the SAPS; 38 % hold the view that there is considerable bribery and corruption among Home Affairs officials (38 %), national politicians (37 %), officials awarding public tenders (37 %), and people working in the judicial services (36 %). Gordon et al. (2012).

  4. Seventeen miners were killed at Scene 1 and 17 at Scene 2, the ‘killing kopje’ outside the media’s view. Lonmin plc, formerly the mining division of Lonrho plc, is a British company that produces platinum group metals in the Bushveld Complex of South Africa. It is listed on the London Stock Exchange.

  5. Alexander et al. (2012, p. 176).

  6. On 21 March 1960, police in the township of Sharpeville opened fire on a crowd of 5000–7000 demonstrators protesting against the pass laws. Sixty-nine demonstrators were killed. On 16 June 1976 (now commemorated as Youth Day) clashes erupted between unarmed protesters and the police in Soweto and resulted in at least 575 deaths. Police violence caused 451 deaths and 2389 injuries caused by the police according the government appointed Cillie Commission. On the Soweto uprising, see Bonner and Segal (1998) and Ndlovu (1998).

  7. See Dyzenhaus (2007).

  8. The doctrine enables the state to charge all those present at the alleged commission of a crime with the same mens rea, effectively making all the mineworkers at Marikana on the day of the massacre equally responsible for the deaths of their fellow protesters. The doctrine was extensively used by the state as apartheid collapsed to criminalise the actions of all protesters and the courts applied the doctrine to all members of a crowd who ‘actively associated’ with the criminal conduct of one of them. See Grant (2014).

  9. This statement was in a letter delivered to Zuma by attorneys Maluleke Msimang and Associates: ‘Zuma told: Release miners by Sunday’, City Press, www.citypress.co.za/politics/zuma-told-release-miners-by-sunday-20120831/. Accessed 2 November 2015. Mandy de Waal, ‘Marikana: NPA drops “common purpose” charges, but critical questions remain’, Daily Maverick, www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-09-03-marikana-npa-drops-common-purpose-charges-but-critical-questions-remain#.VLQCZHski1k. Accessed 4 December 2014.

  10. Miner’s wages often support more than one family.

  11. Frankel writes that no South African miner ‘can feel reasonably sure that he will return home with life and limb intact at the end of each working day.’ Frankel (2013) loc 270. More than 70,000 people have been killed since the inception of mining in South Africa and 300 injuries occur daily. Frankel (2013) loc 270, n. 15. The death rate from accidents has declined but deaths from tuberculosis are high amongst former mineworkers and those who work in the platinum mines.

  12. AMCU broke away from the NUM in 1998 and was formally registered as a union in 2001. At the time of the strike it represented approximately 70 % of Lonmin employees in comparison to 20 % represented by the NUM. The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution includes the right to strike (Sect. 23) and freedom of assembly. Section 17 states ‘Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.’ Unprotected strikes are not illegal and employers are entitled to dismiss workers who participate. Freedom of assembly is limited by the requirement that participants should be unarmed, although it is not clear whether the traditional weapons wielded by striking miners are regarded as arms.

  13. Maeve McClenaghan, ‘South African massacre was the tip of an iceberg’, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/10/18/south-african-massacre-was-the-tip-of-an-iceberg/. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  14. The unions refuted this and pointed to the fact that both had members on the strike committee. Alexander et al. (2012, p. 171) rebut this allegation and insist that the strike united the workforce.

  15. Africa Check FACTSHEET: South Africa’s official crime statistics for 2013/14, http://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-crime-statistics-for-201314/. Accessed 2 November 2015. There were violent outbreaks of xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015.

  16. The commission was chaired by retired Supreme Court judge Ian Farlam and is also referred to as the Farlam Commission.

  17. For a brief history of commissions of inquiry since 1994 see D.T. McKinley, ‘Commissions of Inquiry or Omission? The South African Civil Society Information Service’, www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/2347. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  18. To date there is a relative death of academic literature on the massacre. For this reason, this article relies on news reports and the report of the Marikana Commission in addition to the sources cited.

  19. This emerged in the company’s evidence to the Marikana Commission.

  20. Gabi Falanga, ‘“Toxic” Lonmin-police collusion blamed for Marikana massacre’, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-30-toxic-lonmin-police-collusion-blamed-for-marikana-massacre. Accessed 2 November 2015. For a detailed description of the sequence of events leading to the massacre see Alexander (2013). Lonmin’s mining licence requires it to meet social and labour plan obligations. During the hearings it emerged that these had not been met; for example, it had built on three show houses of the 5500 it had promised under its legally binding Social Labour Plan which enabled it to acquire a mining licence. Niren Tolsi, Marikana: ‘The end of a bitter road promises little closure’, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-13-marikana-the-end-of-a-bitter-road-promises-only-closure. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  21. Falanga, above n. 20.

  22. Alexander et al. (2012).

  23. The evidence documents are available at www.marikanacomm.org.za/documents.html.

  24. I.G. Farlam. P.D. Hemraj and B.R. Tokota, ‘Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on matters of public, national and international concern arising out of the tragic incidents at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in the North West Province’, www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/marikana-report-1.pdf, p. 438. Accessed 19 October 2015.

  25. Lloyd Gedye ‘The ANC’s prodigal son returns’, Mail & Guardian, 2 November 2012. In 2011 Ramaphosa received R680,000 in director’s fees. Jacques Pauw and Thanduxolo Jika, ‘The great R1.2 m divide’, City Press, 26 August 2012.

  26. Farlam et al., above n. 24, p. 520.

  27. Farlam et al., above n. 24, p. 182.

  28. Farlam et al., above n. 24, p. 169.

  29. Farlam et al., above n. 24, Chapter 25.

  30. The government indicated that it would establish an alternative dispute settlement mechanism expedite compensation payments. The Presidency, ‘Update on the civil claims against Government arising from the Marikana incident’, www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=20765. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  31. Farlam et al., above n. 24, pp. 452-453.

  32. On the political, economic and class aspects of South Africa’s transition from apartheid see Marais (2011).

  33. On the ANC’s neoliberal policies see Satgar (2012). On disciplinary neoliberalism as a form of constitutionalism see Gill and Cutler (2014). Former cabinet minister Ronnie Kasrils describes the ANC’s Faustian moment, when it took an IMF loan on the eve of the first democratic election in 1994. ‘From 1991 to 1996 the battle for the ANC’s soul got under way, and was eventually lost to corporate power: we were entrapped by the neoliberal economy—or, as some today cry out, we “sold our people down the river”.’ Ronnie Kasrils, ‘How the ANC’s Faustian pact sold out South Africa’s poorest’, The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/24/anc-faustian-pact-mandela-fatal-error. Accessed 20 October 2015.

  34. The official rate of unemployment rate averaged 25.27 % between 2000 and 2014, reaching a peak of 31.20 % in the first quarter of 2003, www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  35. Gross domestic product was less than 2 % in the second quarter of 2015, and the mining industry had contracted by 6.8 % quarter-on-quarter, www.statssa.gov.za/?p=5323. Accessed 19 October 2015.

  36. The facts in this section are derived from www.projectsiq.co.za/mining-in-south-africa.htm. Accessed 2 November 2015. South Africa is the world’s largest producer of chrome, manganese, platinum, vanadium, and vermiculite and the second largest producer of ilmenite, palladium, rutile, and zirconium.

  37. Media Club South Africa South Africa's economy: key sectors, www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/economy/37-economy/economy-bg/111-sa-economy-key-sectors#mining. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  38. Black economic empowerment is a government programme designed to redress the inequalities of apartheid by transferring ownership of the country’s wealth to the black majority. It includes employment preference measures, skills development, socioeconomic development and preferential procurement.

  39. Department of Mineral Resources, South Africa, www.platinumwagenegotiations.co.za/assets/downloads/fact-and-figures/platinums-contribution-to-south-africa.pdf. Accessed 2 November 2105.

  40. See for example Wiseman Khuzwayo, Londiwe Buthelezi and SAPA ‘SA strike season is in full swing’, Business Report, www.iol.co.za/business/news/sa-strike-season-is-in-full-swing-1.1571992#.VLQKEHski1k. Accessed 2 November 2015. South Africa has a reputation for being ‘strike prone’. Its long-term strike rate is fifth in the world with 206 days lost per 1,000 workers according. H. Bhorat and D. Tseng, ‘South Africa’s Strike Data Revisited Africa in Focus’ (Brookings Institution), www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/03/31-south-africa-strikes-bhorat. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  41. Kasrils, above n. 33. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans protest against service delivery every year. Between 2008 and the end of 2011, there was an average of 8.5 protests per month. Plaut and Holden 2012, chapter 12.

  42. Neil Coleman, ‘More questions than answers’, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-02-more-questions-than-answers/. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  43. Marikana: Statement by South African Social Scientists, http://marikanastatement.blogspot.co.uk/. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  44. ‘Sad South Africa: ‘Cry, the Beloved Country’, The Economist, www.economist.com/news/leaders/21564846-south-africa-sliding-downhill-while-much-rest-continent-clawing-its-way-up. Accessed 2 November 2015. Duncan pointed to the government’s willingness to suspend civil liberties like the right to protest during the 2010 World Cup as evidence of its repressive tendencies. Jane Duncan, ‘The Return of State Repression’, The South African Civil Society Information Service, www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/489.1. Accessed 2 November 2015. For an extended analysis, see Duncan (2014).

  45. In 2014, Public Protector Thuli Madonsela found that Zuma had unduly (and in effect corruptly) benefited from non-security upgrades to his private residence at Nkandla and recommended that Zuma should reimburse the state for ‘a reasonable percentage of the cost’, Public Protector of South Africa, Secure in Comfort Report No. 25 of 2013/14, www.publicprotector.org/library%5Cinvestigation_report%5C2013-14%5CFinal%20Report%2019%20March%202014%20.pdf, p. 68. Accessed 19 October 2015.

  46. Carvin Goldstone, ‘Police must shoot to kill, worry later—Cele’, IOL News, www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/police-must-shoot-to-kill-worry-later-cele-1.453587#VLKFzXski1k. Accessed 2 November 2015. More violent policing appears to be a contradictory way of reducing overall violence in South Africa. Cele replaced Jackie Selebi, who was suspended in January 2008 following charges of corruption. Cele was suspended from duty, due to allegations of corruption. ‘Bheki Cele suspended over lease saga’, www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Bheki-Cele-suspended-over-lease-saga-20111024. Accessed 19 October 2015. He was dismissed in June 2012 and appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in May 2014.

  47. Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC), Submission by CASAC to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry: The role of the South African Police Service at Marikana on 16 August 2012, www.casac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Farlam-Submission-final-220113.pdf. Accessed 2 November 2015, pp. 2–3.

  48. Amnesty International (2012).

  49. Alexander et al. (2012).

  50. Dixon (2013, p. 8).

  51. Alexander (2010, p. 25).

  52. Saul (2012, p. 593).

  53. Von Holdt (2013, p. 595).

  54. Von Holdt (2013, p. 596).

  55. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90/37 ILM 1002 (1998)/[2002] ATS 15. See Kende (2014, p. 38), Morei and Tshehla (2014).

  56. Whittle (2015).

  57. Tamanaha (2004), Costa et al. (2007).

  58. Raz (1979, p. 212).

  59. Mangu (2015).

  60. Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 402 (24 June 2015). On 16 September 2015, the High Court denied the State leave to appeal.

  61. Para. 40.

  62. Para. 37.2. The ICC asked the government to explain its failure to arrest Bashir. Order requesting submissions from the Republic of South Africa for the purposes of proceedings under Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 September 2015, www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2044798.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2015. The government was given until 15 October to respond. The outcome was unknown at the time of writing. The government has subsequently declared that the ICC is no longer useful and in October 2015, the ANC voted to withdraw from the ICC. Aislinn Laing, ‘South Africa’s ruling party ANC votes to withdraw from the International Criminal Court’, The Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/11925482/South-Africas-ruling-party-ANC-votes-to-withdraw-from-the-International-Criminal-Court.html. Accessed 19 October 2015.

  63. Justice Alliance of South Africa v. The President of the Republic of South Africa, 2011 (5) SA 388 at para. 40. On the early development of South African constitutional jurisprudence on the rule of law, see Michelman (2005).

  64. Gumede (2015, p. 337).

  65. Ibid., p. 328.

  66. Ibid., p. 331.

  67. Mandela (1995, p. 308). See Fitzpatrick (2004).

  68. Ibid., p. 21.

  69. Tamanaha (2008, p. 15).

  70. In the Court of Public Opinion: Attitudes towards the Criminal Courts, Human Sciences Research Council, www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-may-2013/in-the-court-of-public-opinion-attitudestowards-the-criminal-courts. Accessed 1 December 2014.

  71. Thompson (1975, p. 267).

  72. Hay (1977).

  73. Of the population 50 % lives off 8 % of national income, and the Gini coefficient increased from 0.64 in 1995 to 0.68 in 2009 while the worker’s share on income declined from 56 to 51 % over the same period. Z. Vavi, Keynote address to the Civil Society Conference, 27 October, www.cosatu.org.za. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  74. France (1917, chapter 7).

  75. Bond (2013).

  76. The constitution protects property owners while recognising the need for land reform through expropriation subject to fair compensation. Section 25(5) and (7) provide for land redistribution and land restitution; both have been extremely slow. See McCusker et al. (2015).

  77. Adelman (2013).

  78. The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v. Fick and Others, 2013 (CCT 101/12) ZACC 22 (S. Afr.), paras. 60, 61.

  79. Interview, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg, 20 March 2015.

  80. Klare (1998). See Venter (2012).

  81. Justice Pius Langa, Prestige Lecture delivered at Stellenbosch University on 9 October 2006.

  82. Baxi (2013, p. 23).

  83. Cited in Tim Fish Hodgson ‘Towards an active citizenry: bringing the Constitution to the people’, Daily Maverick, www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-30-towards-an-active-citizenry-bringing-the-constitution-to-the-people/#.VUionkaULVI. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  84. Vavi, above n. 73.

  85. Ngoako Ramatlhodi, ‘ANC’s fatal concessions’, Timeslive, www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/commentary/2011/09/01/the-big-read-anc-s-fatal-concessions. Accessed 2 November 2015. Ramatlhodi has been criticised for a dangerous populist promotion of kleptocracy: Pierre de Vos Why Ramatlhodi promotes an autokratic kleptocracy, http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/why-ramatlhodi-promotes-an-autokratic-kleptocracy/. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  86. Von Holdt (2013, p. 593).

  87. Von Holdt (2013, p. 589).

  88. Von Holdt (2013, p. 590).

  89. Marais (2011, p. 427).

  90. McKinley, above n. 17.

  91. Saul and Bond (2014, p. 257).

  92. Steven Friedman, ‘Little evidence that Marikana changed anything’, BDLive, www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/08/20/little-evidence-that-marikana-changed-anything. Accessed 2 November 2015.

  93. Saul and Bond (2014, p. 258).

References

  • Adelman S (2013) Sovereignty, citizenship and the universality of socio-economic rights. In: Vilhena O, Baxi U, Viljoen F (eds) Transformative constitutionalism comparing the apex courts of Brazil, India and South Africa. Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp 557–579

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander P (2010) Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests—a preliminary analysis. Rev Afr Polit Econ 123:25–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander P (2013) Marikana, turning point in South African history. Rev Afr Polit Econ 40(138):605–619

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander P, Lekgowa T, Mmope B, Sinwell L, Xezwi B (2012) Marikana: a view from the mountain and a case to answer. Jacana Media, Johannesburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Amnesty International (2012) Amnesty International annual report 2012—South Africa. Amnesty International, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Baxi U (2013) Preliminary notes on transformative constitutionalism. In: Vilhena O, Baxi U, Viljoen F (eds) Transformative constitutionalism comparing the apex courts of Brazil, India and South Africa. Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp 19–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Bond P (2013) Sub-imperialism as lubricant of neoliberalism: South African ‘deputy sheriff’ duty within brics. Third World Q 34(2):251–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonner P, Segal L (1998) Soweto: a history. Maskew Miller, Cape Town

    Google Scholar 

  • Costa P, Zolo D, Santoro E (2007) The rule of law: history, theory and criticism. Springer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dixon B (2013) Waiting for Farlam: Marikana, social inequality and the relative autonomy of the police. SA Crime Q 46:5–11

    Google Scholar 

  • Duncan J (2014) The rise of the securocrats: the case of South Africa. Jacana Media, Johannesburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyzenhaus D (2007) The pasts and future of the rule of law in South Africa. S Afr Law J 124(4):734–761

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitzpatrick P (2004) Juris-fiction: literature and the law of the law. ARIEL 35(1–2):215–229

    Google Scholar 

  • France A (1917) The red lily. The Modern Library, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankel P (2013) Between the rainbows and the rain: Marikana, migration, mining and the crisis of modern South Africa. Agency for Social Reconstruction, Oxford [Ebook]

  • Gill S, Cutler AC (2014) New constitutionalism and world order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon S, Roberts B, Struwig J, Dumisa S (2012) Business unusual: perceptions of corruption in South Africa. HSRC Rev 10(2):12–15

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant J (2014) Common purpose: Thebus, Marikana and unnecessary evil South African. J Hum Rights 30(1):1–23

    Google Scholar 

  • Gumede W (2015) Marikana: a crisis of legitimacy in the institutions that form the foundations of South Africa’s 1994 post-apartheid political settlement. Soc Dyn 41(2):327–343. doi:10.1080/02533952.2015.1072654

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hay D (1977) Property, authority and the criminal law. In: Hay D, Linebaugh P, Rule J, Thompson EP, Winslow C (eds) Albion’s fatal tree: crime and society in eighteenth-century England. Peregrine Books, Harmondsworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Kende M (2014) Enforcing the South African constitution: the fight for judicial independence and separation of powers. Transnatl Law Contemp Probl 23:35–49

    Google Scholar 

  • Klare K (1998) Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism. S Afr J Hum Rights 14:146–188

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandela N (1995) Long walk to freedom. Abacus, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mangu AM (2015) The Bashir case and backpedalling on human rights and the rule of law in post-Mandela South Africa. Afr J Democr Gov 2(1&2):179–200

    Google Scholar 

  • Marais H (2011) South Africa pushed to the limit the political economy of change. Zed Books, London

    Google Scholar 

  • McCusker B, Moseley WG, Ramutsindela M (2015) Land reform in South Africa: an uneven transformation. Rowman & Littlefield, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Michelman FR (2005) The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the constitution. In: Chaskalson M, Kentridge J, Klaaren J, Marcus G, Spitz D, Stein A, Woolman S (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa. Juta, Cape Town

    Google Scholar 

  • Morei N, Tshehla B (2014) Is South Africa experiencing some threat to judicial independence or necessary teething pains? Mediterr J Soc Sci 5(23):425

    Google Scholar 

  • Ndlovu SM (1998) The Soweto uprising: counter-memories of June 1976. Ravan Press, Johannesburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Plaut M, Holden P (2012) Who rules South Africa?. Biteback Publishing, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1979) The authority of law: essays on law and morality. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Satgar V (2012) Beyond Marikana: the post-apartheid South African State. Afr Spectr 47(2/3):33–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Saul JS (2012) The transition in South Africa: choice, fate … or recolonisation? Crit Arts South North Cult Media Stud 26(4):588–605

    Google Scholar 

  • Saul JS, Bond P (2014) South Africa—the present as history: from Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana. James Currey, Woodbridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Tamanaha BZ (2004) On the rule of law: history, politics, theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tamanaha BZ (2008) A concise guide to the rule of law. In: Palombella G, Walker N (eds) Relocating the rule of law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson EP (1975) Whigs and hunters: the origin of the Black Act. Penguin, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Venter F (2012) South Africa as a ‘Diceyan rechtsstaat’. McGill Law J 57(4):721–747

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Von Holdt K (2013) South Africa: the transition to violent democracy. Rev Afr Polit Econ 40(138):589–604

    Google Scholar 

  • Whittle B (2015) Profession stands behind chief justice and judiciary in raising concern on attacks on the judiciary and the rule of law: LSSA news. De Rebus 555:14–16

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Advocate George Bizos, who acted for the Legal Resources Centre and the Bench Marks Foundation at the Farlam commission, and Kally Forrest for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

    Sam Adelman

Authors
  1. Sam Adelman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sam Adelman.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Adelman, S. The Marikana Massacre, the Rule of Law and South Africa’s Violent Democracy. Hague J Rule Law 7, 243–262 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-015-0017-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-015-0017-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation