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General Properties of Long-Run Supergames

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Abstract

Supergames are repeated games in which a fixed known finite one-shot game is repeated over and over. Information about the actions chosen at each stage is provided by a signalling technology. This paper studies the main properties that are valid over this whole class of games and both surveys known results and provides new ones.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. TSE, (GREMAQ, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole), 21 allée de Brienne, 31000, Toulouse, France

    Jérôme Renault

  2. Economics and Decision Sciences Department, HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351, Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, France

    Tristan Tomala

Authors
  1. Jérôme Renault
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  2. Tristan Tomala
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Correspondence to Jérôme Renault.

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Renault, J., Tomala, T. General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. Dyn Games Appl 1, 319–350 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0018-3

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