Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Counterfactuals, Computation, and Consciousness

  • Published:
Cognitive Computation Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Using a specially designed cellular automaton capable of emulating completely the function of a human brain, we explore ways in which counterfactual sensitivity, that is, the ability of a computational system to respond to any valid inputs, relates to discrete-state machine consciousness. In this computational framework, the distinction between a computation and the recording of a computation can be blurred arbitrarily, yet the physical implementation of the computation itself is unchanged. From this, we conclude that a purely computational account of consciousness is unsatisfactory.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Next output state is “on” if exactly three neighboring cells are on, unchanged if exactly two neighboring cells are on, otherwise “off.”

  2. To remove any question of whether there are “extra” photons in the projected case, we can arrange things so that when projecting onto a unit cell, the total light is the same as the unprojected case, with either source individually brighter than the detection threshold. So when not projecting, each unit cell could output, say, 4 × the photons needed for detection by the neighbors, but when the projector is on, each unit cell could output only 2 × the threshold, with the projector also outputting 2 × the threshold, so that the total brightness is the same for both the projected and unprojected cases. It is also important to remember that the construction of the CA involves the use of a clock signal that indicates when each unit cell is to sample its inputs, and this signal changes only after both photon sources have fully mingled. This means that there can be no notion of which photons “really” indicated the state, since the laws of physics guarantee that all photons of the same wavelength are identical.

References

  1. Maudlin T. Computation and consciousness. J Philos. 1989;86(8):407–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Bishop JM. A cognitive computation fallacy? Cognition, computations and panpsychism. Cogn Comput. 2009;1(3):221–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Bishop JM. Counterfactuals cannot count: a rejoinder to David Chalmers. Conscious Cogn. 2002;11(4):642–52.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  4. Putnam HW. Representation and reality. Cambridge (MA): Bradford Books; 1991. 154 p.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Chalmers DJ. Response to articles on my work: Mark Bishop, counterfactuals cannot count [Internet]. Canberra: David Chalmers; [cited 2011 Jul 14]. Available from: http://consc.net/responses.html#bishop.

  6. Sandberg A, Bostrom N. Whole brain emulation: a roadmap [Internet]. Oxford (UK): Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University; 2008. Technical Report No.:2008-3. Available from http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/3853/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf.

  7. Gardner M. Mathematical games: the fantastic combinations of John Conway’s new solitaire game “life”. Sci Am. 1970;223(4):120–3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Berlekamp ER, Conway JH, Guy RK. Winning ways for your mathematical plays, vol. 2. New York: Academic Press; 1982. p. 472.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Chalmers DJ. Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese. 1996;108:309–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Hardcastle VG. Conscious computations. Electron J Anal Philos [Internet]. 1993 Aug [cited 2008 Jul 23];1(4). Available from: http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1993.august/hardcastle.html.

  11. Chrisley R. Counterfactual computational vehicles of consciousness. Paper presented at: Tucson VII. 7th Biannual Toward a Science of Consciousness; 2006 Apr 4–8; Tucson, AZ, USA.

  12. Marchal B. Mechanism and personal identity. In: De Glas M, Gabbay DM, editors. Proceedings of WOCFAI 91; 1991 Jul 1–5; Paris. [place unknown]: Angkor; c1991. p. 335–45.

Download references

Acknowledgments

Though I cannot say I am persuaded by his conclusions, (e.g., that all reality results from the operation of a universal computer whose mere Platonic existence implies a sort of modal realism), Marchal [12] discusses a thought experiment with projection onto a two-dimensional computer which was an important inspiration for some of the ideas in this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tucson, AZ, USA

    Mark Muhlestein

Authors
  1. Mark Muhlestein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mark Muhlestein.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Muhlestein, M. Counterfactuals, Computation, and Consciousness. Cogn Comput 5, 99–105 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-012-9155-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-012-9155-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation