Conceptualization of state collapse
Our understanding of state collapse is based on an institutionalist understanding of the state in the tradition of Max Weber.Footnote 3 This is due to pragmatic considerations: we need a concept of the state that is amenable to comparative research and that is similar to those approaches that are already being used in research on fragile and collapsed states. Thus, we opt for an ideal-type definition of the state which follows the (sometimes implicit) standard in the literature on fragile states, Weber’s institutionalist theory of the state. We reject alternative approaches that frame the state as a provider of governance outputs (Eriksen 2011) for several reasons: first, output approaches take a normative position about which tasks a state should engage in, which is often based on the “OECD model” of statehood. Second, where non-state actors compensate for the state’s incapacity by providing crucial public goods, an output approach will undererstimate the degree of state dysfunctionality. And finally, output approaches usually exhibit a “democracy bias” by including the rule of law or political participation as one of the definitional elements of statehood.
We use Weber’s well-known definition of the state as our point of departure: “A compulsory political organisation with continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 1978, p. 54). Weber himself exhorted social scientists to think of statehood as a variable: “Even in cases of such social organisation as a state (…) the social relationship consists exclusively in the fact that there has existed, exists, or will exist a probability of action in some definite way appropriate to this meaning” (Weber 1978, p. 27). The corollary is that if the state only exists as a particular likelihood of certain forms of social action, then there must logically be different degrees of statehood.
Therefore, we define the ideal type of the state as an institution that is characterized by monopolies of rule-making, violence and taxation within a defined territory and the population living therein. This institution finds its organisational expression in an administrative apparatus, political organs and bodies for collective decision-making. It is represented by symbols and social practices that remind citizens of the existence of the political order. The monopoly of rule-making is inherent in the concept of the state as the institution making binding decisions for society. The monopoly of violence follows logically from the monopoly of rule-making—to enfore its decisions, a state has to be able to implement them even in the face of resistance. The monopoly of taxation is needed to finance the administrative apparatus that enacts and upholds the previous two monopolies. These monopolies imply that no one else is entitled to make binding rules, use violence or collect taxes unless specifically empowered to do so by the state.
States’ abilities to exercise this “holy trinity” of monopolies vary considerably. Variation in statehood can be represented as a three-dimensional space (see Fig. 1). Theoretically, a state can inhabit any point within this space, although some of the extremes are very unlikely to exist in practice. We expect that deficits in one dimension correlate with deficits in the other two, but that is ultimately an empirical question.
Fragile states are close to the (0,0,0) point. It is, however, unclear where the boundaries of this cluster of cases are. Call (2008) and Ulfelder (2012) argue that concepts of state fragility and state failure should be abandoned entirely, since they are too broad and too vague (see also the review by Ferreira 2016). They point out that the line between failed/fragile and non-failed/non-fragile states is impossible to define, and that cases within the group of failed/fragile states are too heterogeneous, which makes comparison almost impossible. We agree with this critique and follow Call’s and Ulfelder’s exhortation to focus on extreme instances of failure which they call state collapse, borrowing a term from Zartman (1995). We view collapsed states as cases closely clustered around the (0,0,0) point that represent a subset of the larger, ill-defined population of fragile states.
The term state collapse characterizes a condition, not a process, even though a protracted process usually precedes the condition of “collapse”.Footnote 4 State collapse, as we understand it, is the binary opposite to our ideal-type of the state. Hence, we define state collapse as a situation in which the state has no significant capacities in all of its three core dimensions, 1) making and implementing binding rules, 2) controlling the means of violence, and 3) collecting taxes, for an uninterrupted period of at least six months. We thereby establish a threshold between the two groups of our comparison, collapsed and non-collapsed fragile states.
Explaining state collapse
We draw on theories of state-society relations (Migdal 1988) and elite settlements (Putzel and DiJohn 2012) to explain state collapse. At the intersection of these theories, state institutions are viewed as both socially embedded and co-constitutive with elite relations. Social embeddedness means that the state exists in a space where it competes or cooperates with societal authority figures. Indeed, the state’s very raison d’être is bound to its claim to represent some sort of general will, compelling the state to seek recognition for this claim. As for elite settlements, political institutions are not usually the product of conscious design but more a historically contingent reflection of power relationships. Institutions provide a framework for managing elite relations (Geddes 1999) and are sustained by an elite consensus (Dewal et al. 2013). When this consensus changes, institutions must adapt, and where elite coalitions break down, institutions are worn down or swept away. Crucially, if an elite coalition breaks down but is quickly replaced by a new coalition, the state is usually able to re-consolidate while averting collapse.
Our core assumption is that state collapse is best explained by combining structural and dynamic explanations. Structural explanations point to relatively static social conditions while dynamic explanations focus on the agency of political elites and the contingent results of their interaction. These two dimensions cannot be viewed in isolation, very much like the mutual constitution of institutions and elite relations. We therefore view the process leading to state collapse as an escalating power struggle between competing elite factions that weak state institutions are unable to contain (similar to Englehart 2007). To theorize likely causes of state collapse, we derive causal assumptions from several different fields.
First, the literature on fragile statehood and civil war offers explanations for violent power struggles. In line with contract theories of the state (e.g. Ismail 2016; Wagner 2007), it claims that if the formal security apparatus of the state—the military, the police, the judiciary—is unable to deter or punish the use or threat of force by non-state actors, the central legitimizing claim of the state is in question (Posen 1993; Vinci 2006). Likewise, Lambach (2009) points out the detrimental effect of the militarization of political actors in the context of a polarized political system, and Bates et al. (2002) highlight how political actors militarize to gain access to rents (see also Bates 2008b). In some cases, the capacity of formal security institutions is deliberately sabotaged from the inside. Englehart (2007) argues that weak regimes may undermine security forces and the bureaucracy to prevent the formation of alternative power centers within the state. Rulers also sometimes create unofficial militias outside the formal security apparatus, operating under their personal control. These “pro-government militias” (Carey et al. 2013) directly threaten state control of violence even as they prop up the regime.
There is a wealth of theories on how specific modes of governance affect the resilience of state institutions. Concerning transitions to democracy, Bates (2008a, p. 8–9) argues that demands for democratization threaten autocratic incumbents, who turn to predatory and repressive tactics to disrupt the opposition, pushing protesters towards violent rebellion. In a similar vein, Collier cautions that democratization “might at best be a two-edged sword, introducing the possibility of accountability but at the price of a greater risk of large-scale political violence” (Collier 2009, p. 233). This literature also suggests repression as a causal condition because it provides citizens with a motivation to mobilize against the government (Saxton 2005), especially if this government only represents, or is perceived to represent, an ethnic minority of the population (Bates 2008a, p. 6–8).
This echoes the macro-historical argument advanced by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). While their understanding of “failure” is more economic than political, their work fits with other explanations for state collapse. Acemoglu and Robinson focus on the role of institutions in development, arguing that inclusive political and economic institutions decentralize power and lay the foundation for sustainable economic and social development. In contrast, extractive institutions centralize power among the few at the expense of the wider population. Acemoglu and Robinson’s core claim is that extractive political institutions create and safeguard extractive economic institutions that transfer wealth to a narrow elite, thus maintaining that elite’s privileged position.
However, there are dissenting viewpoints on political institutions, specifically whether particular regime types are more susceptible to state collapse. Whereas Allen (1995) sees autocratic regimes as more prone to state collapse, Carment et al. (2008) consider hybrid regimes as more at risk. Goldstone et al. (2010) broaden this discussion and claim that hybrid regimes with a high degree of factionalism, i.e. a style of politics primarily concerned with parochial interests, are most likely to fail.
A related field of research explores how rent-seeking behavior by elites relates to state collapse, using concepts such as neopatrimonialism, personalism, clientelism, rentierism or informal politics (e.g. Englehart 2007). Rent-seeking practices probably do not cause state collapse by themselves because they are a common feature in almost all fragile states and even in many non-fragile ones. These practices can even stabilize a regime, sometimes for long periods of time, while they erode the institutions on which state authority rests. But this only works if the country’s political economy is sound—neopatrimonial and clientelist systems depend on a steady influx of rents. If a sudden decline in government revenues or a reduction of external aid dries up opportunities for personal gain, the ruling coalition will fracture (Allen 1999). Due to the relatively high number of cases in the early 1990s, some observers claim the loss of superpower patronage following the end of the Cold War to be another causal factor of state collapse (e.g. Iqbal and Starr 2016).
Finally, the literature on state formation shows how state-society relations develop over time. Buzan (1991) argues that society needs an “idea” of the state as a legitimate political authority. Tusalem (2016) finds that pre-colonial stateness reduces the likelihood of post-colonial state fragility and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) show a strong positive association between African pre-colonial polities and contemporary levels of local economic development but these results only hold for cases in which pre- and post-colonial polities are mostly congruent. In contrast, “weblike societies” (Migdal 1988, p. 39) mainly consisting of local associations and traditional authorities without an overarching system of symbols and values represent infertile ground for state-building. Similarly, Boone (2003) shows how strong institutions in rural society impede state-building efforts in African post-colonial states. However, due to the ubiquity of these social forms in post-colonial countries, we focus on those that are the most long-lived and thus, presumably, best institutionalized. We thus expect a particularly high risk of collapse in cases in which a localized polity existed in pre-colonial or pre-imperial times that did not cover the entire territory of the post-colonial state. These polities provide a reference point for factionalist politics in the post-colonial political system (but see Wig 2016).