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Values as Motives: Implications for theory, methods, and practice

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Abstract

The concept of human values is central to the study of culture, ethics, politics, anthropology, sociology, social psychology, environmental studies, health policy, education, management, and human capital. Because it represents the ultimate “why” behind decisions and behaviors, as a concept it plays an outsized role in both theory and practice in each of these fields. Despite the centrality of human values in these domains, the concept lacks theoretical consensus among scholars and practitioners. Like the concepts of subjective well-being, organizational culture, employee engagement, and leadership, the values literature suffers from concept proliferation and cries out for clearly stated definitions that embed the concept within a solid theoretical framework. In this article, we advocate for a fundamental reconsideration of the concept of values, anchoring it within a new psychological theory of human motivation based on first principles. Our primary contribution lies in demonstrating that the operational definitions utilized by academics and practitioners alike can be thought of as attempts to approach concepts of human motivation, specifically, emotional needs, without fully getting there. We review the leading definitions of human values in the literature, concluding that they can be distilled to a fundamental set of human emotional needs, each associated with extensive literatures of their own. We introduce a comprehensive framework of 12 human emotional needs and argue that a comprehensive motivational framework offers significant advantages over current theoretical approaches, which tend to spin off an ever-expanding list of concepts. We consider the impact of embedding values concepts within existing motivational constructs with clear benefits for: (a) theory development, (b) method development, and (c) practical applications, emphasizing the advantages of clear operational definitions.

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All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this published article (and its supplementary information files). Original source materials are available from the author by request.

Notes

  1. Major contributions to this alternative perspective include Jaan Valsiner’s systemic approach to values focusing on individuals as active agents in their own development within cultural contexts; Svend Brinkmann's focus on navigating moral landscapes in the context of lived experience and cultural practices; Angelo Branco's focus on the interaction between individual psychological processes and cultural values in developing emotion processes; Michael Cole's cultural-historical approach, emphasizing the role of cultural tools and artifacts in shaping patterns of thought and values; and Richard Shweder's anthropological approach to moral psychology, which emphasizes understanding values within their specific cultural and historical contexts. Other notable contributors to this approach to values include Elena Paolicchi, Patricia Greenfield, and Joseph Henrich.

  2. Hitlin & Piliavin (2004) argue that values are not equivalent to needs because “needs connote biological influence” (p. 361). We argue that needs exist at many different levels beginning with the biological needs of homeostasis and extending upwards to ever more abstract emotional needs for states like self-actualization, material success, social recognition, and a transcendent life purpose. In this way, values are synonymous with emotional needs. Schwartz (1992) makes this point explicitly by defining values as representations of biological needs, social coordination needs, and group survival and welfare needs.

  3. These Rokeach quotes demonstrate the dominant bias in the 1960s through 1980s toward cognition (as opposed to affect) as the central modality of interest in psychological theory. Then, values tended to be thought of as “cognitive representations” or “conceptualizations” of needs and desires, effectively bypassing their affective nature. By the 1990s, needs, strivings, and desires, and their representations as values, came to be seen as primarily affective courtesy of the emotion revolution that accompanied the “Decade of the Brain,” and newfound interest in the study of affective neuroscience, emotional intelligence, and behavioral economics. We return to the question of cognitive bias in values theory and research in the Discussion section (Implications for Methods).

  4. Aristotle (350 BC/1933) proposed the three-tiered model of states of existence: potentiality (having potential), potentiality-as-such (action that transforms latent potential), and actuality (the end result). Aristotle’s famous example is a pile of lumber. The lumber could be used to construct a house, or used to build some other structure, e.g., a shed; the lumber is in a state of potentiality, or "the buildable." The transformational action of building a house is the intermediate step in this process, potentiality-as-such. When the house is completed, the lumber is now in a state of actualization.

  5. As early as his seminal paper, Maslow (1943) explained that although there is a general trend in the hierarchy of needs, this progression is not absolute and can be fluid. He recognized that for some individuals or in certain situations, higher needs may be pursued even if lower needs remain unfulfilled. We concur with a perspective that is sensitive to the complexity, variability, and context-dependence of human motivation and behavior.

  6. Regarding any discrete need, we can be motivated to achieve more of the good or less of the bad, both, or neither. In general, promotion and prevention energies tend to behave in a complementary manner.

  7. These issues have led researchers to use simplified response methods, such as binary response options (selected, not selected) instead of cognitively taxing methods like values ranking (Inglehart 1990/2018; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Xiao, 1999, 2000).

  8. There is no conflict between the proposed theoretical model and the systemic social process tradition. Despite the social psychological literature’s position that values must be enduring, our position is that values are highly susceptible to social influence and are as changeable and dynamic as our needs because, ultimately, this is what they are. If this were not the case, indoctrination would not be possible; unfortunately, in many cases, indoctrination into destructive values is all too easy. For a detailed discussion of the ontogeny of values as the result of interplay between individual psychology and social environments across the lifespan see Valsiner (1998).

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J.D.P. composed and reviewed the manuscript, tables, and figures.

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Correspondence to J. David Pincus.

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Pincus, J.D. Values as Motives: Implications for theory, methods, and practice. Integr. psych. behav. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-024-09817-z

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