Abstract
This paper analyzes which stock option scheme best aligns the interests of a firm’s manager and shareholders when both are risk-averse. We consider granting to the manager a basic fixed salary and one of the following four options: European, Parisian, Asian and American options. Choosing the strike of the options optimally, the shareholders can mostly implement a first best solution with all payoff schemes. The American option scheme best aligns the interests of the manager and the shareholders in the most common case in which the strike price equals the grant-date fair market value.
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Notes
Except Asian option scheme, all the other types of options can be found in the manager’s compensation scheme in practice. Some examples will be given in the subsequent sections.
Cvitanić and Zhang (2013) provide an excellent overview of contract theory. The three classical cases for principal-agent problems are: Risk-sharing with symmetric information, hidden action and hidden type. In the first case, the principal, which is represented by the shareholders here, and the agent, the manager, have the same information and can contract directly upon the agent’s actions. In this case a first-best outcome can always be achieved and the principal and the agent have to agree on how to share the risk between themselves. An early paper discussing risk sharing is for example Borch (1962). In the second case, the actions of the agent cannot be directly observed or contracted upon. Here the principal influences the agent indirectly to pick certain actions by giving him incentives through a contract. Usually, only a second-best solution can be achieved. Holmström and Milgrom (1987) discuss this setup. In the third case, the principal does not know some key characteristics of the agent, e.g. his ability. Hence, the principal offers a menu of contracts. Under certain conditions the agent will reveal his true type. Generally, the principal only gets a third-best reward in this case. A hidden type example is Cvitanić and Zhang (2007). Our paper falls into the second category. We do not allow the shareholders to directly contract upon the risk of the company, but only to offer incentives through the different stock option schemes. However, we show that a first-best outcome can be achieved in this case.
Usually in the literature the shareholders are assumed to be risk-neutral and can always sell their shares and walk away when the firm’s assets do not perform well. However, those shareholders who are able to decide on compensation scheme are large investors and probably interested in long-term investment in the firm. When the firm’s assets do not perform well, low asset price combined with high transaction costs might cause huge losses for these investors. Hence, they might choose to hold their shares until the terminal date rather than to sell them.
The price \(\Uppi(x)\) denotes the value that the shareholders assign to a certain compensation package. As the shareholders are free to trade in any derivative and markets are assumed to be complete, the price \(\Uppi(x)\) can be calculated as the expectation of the discounted payoffs under the risk-neutral probability measure. However, as managers are not allowed to hedge their stock options, the complete market assumption does not hold for them and thus the price \(\Uppi(x)\) does in general not coincide with their subjective evaluation.
Nevertheless, it might still be better for the shareholders to prefer a certain scheme, particularly under information asymmetry.
Hereby we do not consider the case of an undiversified manager. According to Kanniainen (2010), in that case the option price becomes
$$ e^{s T} e^{-\delta T} \Upphi(\tilde{\tilde{d}}_1) - K e^{-r T} \Upphi(\tilde{\tilde{d}}_2), \hbox{with} \quad \tilde{\tilde{d}}_{1/2} ={\frac{\ln {\frac{1}{K }} + (r -\delta-s \pm \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2) T }{\sigma \sqrt{T}}}, \quad s= \theta (1-\rho) \sigma $$where θ is the Sharpe ratio and ρ the correlation coefficient between the firm’s asset and the market portfolio. Some other references on the topic of ESOs and undiversification are e.g. Hall and Murphy (2002) and Jin (2002).
A Brownian excursion {Y t ,0 ≤ t ≤ 1} has the same distribution as a Brownian motion {W t ,0 ≤ t ≤ 1 }, conditional on W t > 0 for all 0 < t < 1 and W 1 = 0.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Partial derivatives of the first two moments of a European call
The derivatives of the first moments with respect to μ and σ are as follows:
Hereby we have used \({\frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \mu}}={\frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \mu}}={\frac{\sqrt{T}}{\sigma}};\, {\frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \sigma}}={\frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \sigma}} + \sqrt{T}\); and \(\phi(d_1)= K e^{-(\mu-\delta) T} \phi(d_2)\), with \(\phi(x)\equiv {\frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi} }} e^{-x^2/2}.\) The following two derivatives are:
Hereby we have used the fact that \({\frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \mu}}={\frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \mu}}={\frac{\partial d_3}{\partial \mu}}={\frac{\sqrt{T}}{\sigma}}\); \({\frac{\partial d_3}{\partial \sigma}}={\frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \sigma}} + 2 \sqrt{T}\) and \(\phi(d_1)= K e^{-(\mu-\delta) T} \phi(d_2),\,\phi(d_3)=K^2 e^{-2 (\mu-\delta) T- \sigma^{2T}} \phi(d_2)\). The optimal volatility results from numerically solving
1.2 First two moments and the corresponding derivatives under Parisian scheme
Using the implied barrier concept implies that
Note that
with \(m= {\frac{1}{\sigma}} (\mu -\delta -g -\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2).\) Consequently, we can rewrite
with Z t = W t + mt and \(\tilde{E}\) is the expectation taken under the new probability measure \(\tilde{P}\) which is defined by
We proceed with the calculation of the expected value by distinguishing two cases: k ≥ b (K S 0 ≥ B * T ) and k < b (K S 0 < B * T ). For k ≥ b, the above expectation is reduced to
This corresponds to the formula obtained in the case of the European call. For k < b, we can use the equivalence of the following events:
The above decomposition combined with the reflection principle leads to
To derive the second moment of h(S(T)), we can follow the same steps as above. First note that
Again we distinguish between k ≥ b and k < b. For k ≥ b, we obtain the same formula as in the case of the European call:
For k < b, we can use the same decomposition of the indicator function which leads to the following results:
The derivatives of the expectation with respect to μ or σ are given by the sum of the derivatives of each component in (7.1) with respect to μ or σ. Taking the derivative of the third component with respect to μ as an example, we obtain
The derivatives of the other components can be computed similarly. Note that the fact that the implied barrier B *0 is a function of μ and σ shall be taken into consideration when determining the corresponding derivatives.
Here the detailed calculations for the derivatives of the second moment are neglected. As we have learned from the European case, all the derivatives result in \({\frac{\partial U_{manager}}{\partial \mu}}\) and \({\frac{\partial U_{manager}}{\partial \sigma}}.\) With the help of
we determine the optimal σ-level numerically.
1.3 American ESO scheme
Applying Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) straightforwardly in our context, we obtain the expected terminal payoff for the American option case by distinguishing between the following two cases:
with
And finally S * is determined implicitly by solving
In order to determine the second moment of the American option, we can first decompose the square of the European call option into the following two parts:
The second term on the right-hand side is already determined, and now we can use the same technique to calculate the first term \( \left[\left(S_T/S_0\right)^2 - K^2 \right]^+. \) The expected payoff from the European option \( \left[\left(S_T/S_0\right)^2 - K^2 \right]^+ \) is given by
For δ > 0, we need to distinguish between two cases:
with
And finally S * is determined implicitly by solving
Finally, the price of the American option is given by
with
And finally S * is determined implicitly by solving
1.4 Concavity of U share
Proposition 1
Assume \(T \geq {\frac{1}{2}},\, \mu=r+\theta \cdot \sigma > \delta,\, r, \delta, \sigma, \theta \geq 0\) and λ > 0. Then
is strictly concave.
Proof
The expected utility is given by
It is sufficient to show that the second derivative of this expression with respect to σ is smaller than 0, which is equivalent to
This is equivalent to
Using the above assumptions on the parameters we can show that the LHS is larger than θ 2 and this is also larger than the RHS, which proves the proposition. □
The above proposition implies the following lemma:
Corollary 1
For a given Sharpe ratio θ there exists a unique \(\tilde \sigma(\theta),\) that maximizes the utility of the shareholders:
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Chen, A., Pelger, M. Optimal stock option schemes for managers. Rev Manag Sci 8, 437–464 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-013-0111-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-013-0111-7