Skip to main content
Log in

Option implied riskiness and risk-taking incentives of executive compensation

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The riskiness developed by Aumann and Serrano (J Polit Econ 116:810–836, 2008) is a measure based on mean, standard deviation and higher order moments. Instead of relying on corporate policies as indirect measures of firm risk, we theoretically show a positive relation between the value of compensation contracts with convex payoff and the firm’s option implied riskiness through second-order stochastic dominance and provide supportive empirical evidence of this risk taking incentive. To address the endogeneity concern, we perform a difference-in-difference analysis using the implementation of FAS 123R in 2006, an accounting standard under which firms are required to recognize the fair value-based expense of stock option grants. Firms thereby are discouraged from granting executive stock options (ESO) because of the higher cost resulted from the strict expense recognition required by FAS 123R. Hence, the implementation of FAS 123R results in an exogenous negative shock to the use of ESO. Using this approach, we find a significant decrease in the option implied riskiness subsequent to FAS 123R, supportive of the risk-taking incentive associated with executive stock options.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Following the theoretical relation indicated by the Black–Scholes option pricing formula whereby the value of equity compensation increases in the risk of firm value, many have hypothesized that the convexity of compensation payoff (often referred to in the literature as vega) induces risk-averse managers to increase firm risks (e.g., Haugen and Senbet 1981; Smith and Watts 1982; Smith and Stulz 1985). However, this hypothesis also is challenged on theoretical grounds in several studies (e.g. Lambert et al. 1991; Carpenter 2000; Ross 2004; Lewellen 2006). Via sophisticated analyses, these studies find that a manager’s equity compensation holdings do not unambiguously increase risk-taking incentives, as the actual incentive effect depends on an array of manager-level characteristics such as personal wealth and risk-aversion degrees.

  2. Ferri and Li (2020) find that managers with more options-based compensation favor repurchases over cash payouts following FAS 123R.

  3. Some work in asset pricing suggests that investors favor right skewness (e.g., Rubinstein 1973; Kraus and Litzenberger 1976; Jean 1971; Kane 1982; Harvey and Siddique 2000), but are averse to tail-risk and rare disasters (e.g., Barro 2006, 2009; Gabaix 2008, 2012; Gourio 2012; Chen et al. 2012; Wachter 2013).

  4. In brief, the riskiness measure is a wealth level above which an individual will accept a particular gamble. Empirical evidences also demonstrate that the riskiness measure helps predict market downturns (Leiss and Nax 2018) and the cross-section of stock returns (Bali et al. 2011).

  5. Foster and Hart (2009) consider the possibility that an agent’s risk tolerance depends on the agent’s wealth, and define riskiness as the minimal wealth level at which they are willing to accept the risky asset.

  6. Please see Proposition 1 of this paper. The distribution F dominates G by SSD if and only if \({\int }_{a}^{x}\left[G\left(t\right)-F\left(t\right)\right]dt\ge 0\) for all x \(\in \left[a,b\right].\) Besides, please see Levy (1992) for a comprehensive survey of stochastic dominance.

  7. See p. 9 of Aumann and Serrano (2008).

  8. As for the stock price manipulation and managerial compensation, please refer to Peng and Röell (2008, 2014) and Schroth (2018).

  9. In addition, Dong et al. (2010) find that CEOs with higher convexity of compensation payoff are more likely to raise debts than to raise equity when they have financing needs. However, although R&D investment and firm focus can be regarded as risky corporate strategies, these policies can also be endogenously determined optimal corporate strategies. That is, whether managerial compensation indeed induces “excessive” risk-taking behavior is also an important research question. For example, Shen and Zhang (2013) find that R&D investments made by CEOs holding excessively high convexity of compensation payoff display low efficiencies.

  10. Kadan and Liu (2014) utilize riskiness measures for investment strategies and asset pricing anomalies. Taboga (2014) calculate the riskiness of corporate bonds to study how riskiness relates to their rating and how riskiness varies in response to changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions.

  11. Please see Appendix for the derivation of (2).

  12. Under risk neutral measure, the expected value of (ST- S0)/S0 (\({\mu }_{y,f}\)) is equal to \({e}^{(r-q)T}-1\) under F and G. In addition, if m = 0, the convexity of the payoff structure disappears and (5) will be reduced to \({e}^{-qT}\).

  13. Rasmusen (2007) uses another approach to give the sufficient and necessary condition for the increase of the call price. Please refer to Proposition 1 in Rasmusen (2007).

  14. As noted for example by Iqbal and Vähämaa (2019), vega provides an explicit measure of the risk-sensitivity of executive compensation.

  15. The proof is available on request.

  16. A comparison between using implied volatility and our riskiness measures is in order. Implied volatility is intuitive and simple to calculate. Nevertheless, the riskiness index is advantageous for the following reasons. While the increase in implied volatility will lead to the increase in call prices, the implied volatility may vary with the strike prices if the distribution of the stock price is not lognormal. Given the exact strike prices of ESOs for a certain CEO is hard to ascertain in reality, it is empirically difficult for researchers to decide which exact strike price we should use to investigate the risk-taking incentives of CEOs. Therefore, by using the riskiness index, we avoid such problem and theoretically link the convexity of the compensation payoff structure to the ESO values and the firm riskiness through the SSD.

  17. As suggested by Buss and Vilkov (2012), we select out-of-the-money options (put options with deltas strictly larger than − 0.5 and call options with deltas smaller than 0.5).

  18. Specifically, we interpolate the Black–Scholes implied volatilities inside the available moneyness range and extrapolate using the boundaries to fill in 1000 grid points in the moneyness range from 1/3 to 3.

  19. If the distribution F dominates G by SSD under risk neutral measure, the risk neutral volatility should be larger under distribution G. However, we cannot compare the volatility of distribution F and distribution G under the real world measure.

References

  • Aumann RJ, Serrano R (2008) An economic index of riskiness. J Polit Econ 116:810–836

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baber WR, Janakiraman SN, Kang SH (1996) Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. J Account Econ 21:297–318

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bakshi G, Madan D (2000) Spanning and derivative-security valuation. J Financ Econ 55:205–238

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bakshi G, Kapadia N, Madan D (2003) Stock return characteristics, skew laws, and the differential pricing of individual equity options. Rev Financ Stud 16:101–143

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bali TG, Cakici N, Chabi-Yo F (2011) A generalized measure of riskiness. Manage Sci 57:1406–1423

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bali TG, Cakici N, Chabi-Yo F (2015) A new approach to measuring riskiness in the equity market: Implications for the risk premium. J Bank Finance 57:101–117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barro R (2006) Rare disasters and asset markets in the twentieth century. Quart J Econ 121:823–866

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barro R (2009) Rare disasters, asset prices, and welfare costs. Am Econ Rev 99:243–264

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger PG, Ofek E, Yermack DL (1997) Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. J Finance 52:1411–1438

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Billings BK, Moon JR Jr, Morton RM, Wallace DM (2020) Can employee stock options contribute to less risk-taking? Contemp Account Res 37(3):1658–1686

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buss A, Vilkov G (2012) Measuring equity risk with option implied correlations. Rev Financ Stud 25:3113–3140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter JN (2000) Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? J Finance 55:2311–2331

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carr P, Wu L (2009) Stock options and credit default swaps: a joint framework for valuation and estimation. J Financ Econom 8:409–449

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen H, Joslin S, Tran N (2012) Rare disasters and risk sharing with heterogeneous beliefs. Rev Financ Stud 25:2189–2224

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen TF, Chung SL, Tsai WC (2016) Option implied equity risk and the cross section of stock returns. Financ Anal J 72:42–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coles JL, Daniel ND, Naveen L (2006) Managerial incentives and risk-taking. J Financ Econ 79:431–468

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Core J, Guay W (1999) The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. J Account Econ 28(2):151–184

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Core J, Guay W (2002) Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. J Account Res 40:613–630

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DiPrete TA, Eirich GM, Pittinsky M (2010) Compensation benchmarking, leapfrogs, and the surge in executive pay. Am J Sociol 115:1671–1712

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dong ZY, Wang C, Xie F (2010) Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking? J Bank Finance 34:2518–2529

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faulkender M, Yang J (2010) Inside the black box: the role and composition of compensation peer groups. J Financ Econ 96:257–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferri F, Li N (2020) Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? Evidence from FAS 123R. J Financ Quant Anal 55(1):291–329

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foster DP, Hart S (2009) An operational measure of riskiness. J Polit Econ 117:785–814

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gabaix X (2008) Variable rare disasters: a tractable theory of ten puzzles in macro-finance. Am Econ Rev 98:64–67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gabaix X (2012) Variable rare disasters: an exactly solved framework for ten puzzles in macro-finance. Quart J Econ 127:645–700

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goolsbee A (2000) Taxes, high-income executives, and the perils of revenue estimation in the new economy. Am Econ Rev 90:271–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gourio F (2012) Disaster risk and business cycles. Am Econ Rev 102:2734–2766

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harvey C, Siddique A (2000) Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests. J Finance 55:1263–1295

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haugen RA, Senbet LW (1981) Resolving the agency problems of external cpital through options. J Finance 36:629–647

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayes RM, Lemmon M, Qiu MM (2012) Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: evidence from FAS 123R. J Financ Econ 105:174–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iqbal J, Vähämaa S (2019) Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions. Rev Quant Finance Acc 53(4):1229–1258

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jean W (1971) The extension of portfolio analysis to three or more parameters. J Financ Quant Anal 6:505–515

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiang GJ, Tian YS (2005) The model-free implied volatility and its information content. Rev Financ Stud 18:1305–1342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kadan O, Liu F (2014) Performance evaluation with high moments and disaster risk. J Financ Econ 113:131–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kane A (1982) Skewness preference and portfolio choice. J Financ Quant Anal 17:15–25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kraus A, Litzenberger R (1976) Skewness preference and the valuation of risk assets. J Finance 31:1085–1100

    Google Scholar 

  • Lambert RA, Larcker DF, Verrecchia RE (1991) Portfolio considerations in valuing executive-compensation. J Account Res 29:129–149

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee CF, Hu C, Foley M (2021) Differential risk effect of inside debt, CEO compensation diversification, and firm investment. Rev Quant Finance Acc 56(2):505–543

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leiss M, Nax HH (2018) Option-implied objective measures of market risk. J Bank Finance 88:241–249

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levy H (1992) Stochastic dominance and expected utility: survey and analysis. Manage Sci 38:555–593

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewellen K (2006) Financing decisions when managers are risk averse. J Financ Econ 82:551–589

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machina M, Rothschild M (2008) The new palgrave dictionary of economics. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy K (1999) Executive compensation. Handb Lab Econ 3:2485–2563

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy K (2013) Handbook of the economics of finance. In: Constantinides G, Harris M, Stulz R (eds) executive compensation: where we are, and how we got there. Elsevier

    Google Scholar 

  • Peng L, Röell A (2008) Manipulation and equity-based compensation. Am Econ Rev 98:285–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng L, Röell A (2014) Managerial incentives and stock price manipulation. J Finance 69:487–526

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perry T, Zenner M (2000) CEO compensation in the 1990s: shareholder alignment or shareholder expropriation? Wake Law Rev 35:123–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasmusen E (2007) When does extra risk strictly increase an option’s value? Rev Financ Stud 20:1647–1667

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross SA (2004) Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. J Finance 59:207–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubinstein M (1973) The fundamental theorem of parameter-preference security valuation. J Financ Quant Anal 8:61–69

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Safdar I, Neel M, Odusami B (2022) Accounting information and left-tail risk. Rev Quant Finance Acc 58(4):1709–1740

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schroth J (2018) Managerial compensation and stock price manipulation. J Account Res 56:1335–1381

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shen CHH, Zhang H (2013) CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases. J Bank Finance 37:1176–1194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith CW, Stulz RM (1985) The determinants of firm’s hedging policies. J Financ Quant Anal 20:391–405

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith CW, Watts R (1982) Incentive and tax effects of U.S. executive compensation plans. Aust J Manag 7:139–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taboga M (2014) The riskiness of corporate bonds. J Money Credit Bank 46:693–713

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wachter J (2013) Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain aggregate stock market volatility? J Finance 68:987–1035

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Funding

The funding was provided by Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan, (Grand No. 102-2410-H-008-020-).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chia-Chi Lu.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix

Appendix

According to the spanning formula of Bakshi and Madan (2000) and Bakshi et al. (2003), any function of the form \(H\left(S\right)\) with \(E\left[H\left(S\right)\right]< \infty\) can spanned by a collection of call and put options:

$$H\left[ S \right] = H\left[ {\overline{S}} \right] + \left( {S - \overline{S}} \right)H_{S} \left[ {\overline{S}} \right] + \mathop \smallint \limits_{{\overline{S}}}^{\infty } H_{SS} \left[ K \right]\left( {S - K} \right)^{ + } dK + \mathop \smallint \limits_{0}^{{\overline{S}}} H_{SS} \left[ K \right]\left( {K - S} \right)^{ + } dK.$$
(8)

where \({H}_{S}\left(\bullet \right)\) and \({H}_{SS}\left(\bullet \right)\) represent the first and second derivative of H with respect to S and \(\overline{S }\) is the initial stock price. We denote

$$g_{j,T} = \frac{{S_{j,T} - S_{j,0} }}{{S_{j,0} }}$$
(9)

In addition, S denotes \({S}_{j,T}\), \(\overline{S }\) denotes \({S}_{j,0}\) and \(H\left[{S}_{j,T}\right]={e}^{-\frac{{g}_{j,T}}{{{\varvec{R}}}_{j}}}\). Since \(E\left({e}^{-\frac{{g}_{j,T}}{{{\varvec{R}}}_{j}}}\right)=1\) and by the spanning formula of Bakshi and Madan (2000) and Bakshi et al. (2003), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{E\left( {e^{{ - \frac{{g_{j,T} }}{{R_{j} }}}} } \right)}}{{\left( {1 + r_{T} } \right)}} & = \frac{1}{{\left( {1 + r_{T} } \right)}} \\ & = \frac{1}{{\left( {1 + r_{T} } \right)}} - \frac{{r_{0,T} S_{j,0} }}{{\left( {1 + r_{T} } \right)R_{j} }} + \mathop \smallint \limits_{0}^{{S_{j,0} }} v\left( {R_{j} \left[ {g_{j,T} } \right],K} \right)P_{j} \left( {K,T} \right)dK \\ & \quad + \mathop \smallint \limits_{{S_{j,0} }}^{\infty } v\left( {R_{j} \left[ {g_{j,T} } \right],K} \right)C_{j} \left( {K,T} \right)dK \\ \end{aligned}$$
(10)

where \({r}_{T}\) is the return on the risk-free security over a period T, \({P}_{j}\left(K,T\right)\) and \({C}_{j}\left(K,T\right)\) are put price and call price of stock j with strike price equal to K and time to maturity equal to T at the present time 0 respectively, and

$$v\left( {R_{j} \left[ {g_{j,T} } \right],K} \right) = \frac{1}{{R_{j} \left[ {g_{j,T} } \right]^{2} }}e^{{ - \frac{1}{{R_{j} \left[ {g_{j,T} } \right]}}\frac{{K - S_{j,0} }}{{S_{j,0} }}}}$$
(11)

Therefore, by Eqs. (10) and (11), we have (2).

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lu, CC., Shen, C.Hh., Shih, PT. et al. Option implied riskiness and risk-taking incentives of executive compensation. Rev Quant Finan Acc 60, 1143–1160 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-022-01123-2

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-022-01123-2

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation