Abstract
The starting point of this paper is twofold. First, managers are often undiversified. Second, an increase in systematic risk could increase the market’s discount rate and consequently effect a contemporaneous change in the underlying stock’s market price. The paper makes comparative static analyses of these circumstances by using Meulbroek’s (Financ Manag 30:5–44, 2001) executive stock option model together with the dividend discount model, and shows that options do not provide incentive to increase the proportion of systematic risk to firm-specific risk, as commonly argued. The paper also demonstrates that the option’s value to the manager can be monotone decreasing, but may also show an inverted U-shape with respect to firm-specific risk. The option’s value exhibits a similar pattern against the total risk. In addition, the study finds that total risk incentives may under some conditions lower the shareholder value; executive options may thus encourage managers to act against principals’ interests.
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Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to editor Wolfgang Kürsten and the two anonymous referees for many valuable suggestions. All remaining errors are the author’s sole responsibility. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Academy of Finland (project 123058), the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, and the OP-Ryhmä Foundation.
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Appendix
Appendix
Let N denote the standard cumulative normal distribution function, and N′, the derivative of N, the density function of standard normal distribution. Moreover, let \(\Upsilon(x)={N^{\prime}(x)}/{N(x)}\) . Then \(\Upsilon(x)\) is the strictly decreasing function of x for all \(x \in {\mathbb{R}}\) such that \(\Upsilon(x)=\infty\) as x→−∞, and \(\Upsilon(x)=0\) as x→∞. This means that the cumulativne standard normal distribution function N(x) is a logarithmically convex function.
Proof
We understand that
and hence require that
for all \(x \in {\mathbb{R}}\) . The above holds because
and because
that is strictly positive for all \(x\in{\mathbb{R}}\) . Thus \(\Upsilon^{\prime}(x)<0\) for all \(x\in{\mathbb{R}}\) . Finally, it is clear that
because N′(x) = 0 and N(x) = 1 as x→∞. Using again l’Hospital’s rule, we obtain
which completes the proof.□
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Kanniainen, J. Risk incentives of executive stock options for undiversified managers. Rev Manag Sci 4, 7–32 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-009-0033-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-009-0033-6