Abstract
We generalize Ripley’s results on the transitivity of consequence relation, without assuming a logic to be monotonic. Following Gabbay, we assume nonmonotonic consequence relation to be inclusive and cautious monotonic, and figure out the implications between different forms of transitivity of logical consequence. Weaker frameworks without inclusiveness or cautious monotonicity are also discussed. The paper may provide basis for the study of both non-transitive logics and nonmonotonic ones.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Note that for brevity we write \(\varphi \vdash \psi \) for \(\{\varphi \}\vdash \psi \) for all \(\varphi ,\psi \in {\mathcal {F}}\).
Another common substitution of monotonicity in nonmonotonic logic is rational monotonicity, i.e., if \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \varphi \) and \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \hspace{-1em}/~\lnot \psi \), then \(\Gamma , \psi \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \varphi \). But rational monotonicity is a controversial property. Stalnaker [18] gave a counterexample to it. Moreover, rational monotonicity is not relevant to any form of transitivity, so we will not consider it here.
We pronounce kc ‘kinda complete’, following Ripley.
Similar results in Set-Set framework can be obtained correspondingly through Ripley’s counterparts.
For Set-Fmla properties, this is obvious. For Set-Set properties, though there are multiple conclusions, these conclusions state different possibilities. That is, \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \Delta \) means \(\bigwedge \Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \bigvee \Delta \), to which cautious monotonicity could not be applied. For instance, we cannot get \(\varphi , \Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \Delta \) from \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \Delta , \varphi \), since \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \Delta , \varphi \) does not mean \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \Delta \) and \(\Gamma \,|\hspace{-0.5em}\sim \varphi \).
The consequence relation of default logic is defined as follow: \(W\vdash _D \varphi \) iff \(\varphi \) is included in all extensions of the default theory (W, D). For details, see [1]. It is easy to come up with a counterexample for each linking property.
References
Antoniou, G., Wang, K.: Default logic. In: Gabbay, D.M., Woods, J. (eds.) Handbook of the History of Logic 8, pp. 517–555. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2007)
Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., Prade, H.: Some syntactic approaches to the handling of inconsistent knowledge bases: a comparative study part 1: the flat case. Stud. Logica. 58(1), 17–45 (1997)
Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D., van Rooij, R.: Tolerant, classical, strict. J. Philos. Logic 41(2), 347–385 (2012)
Cobreros, P., Égré, P., Ripley, D., Van Rooij, R.: Reaching transparent truth. Mind 122(488), 841–866 (2013)
Da Silva Neves, R., Bonnefon, J.-F., Raufaste, E.: An empirical test of patterns for nonmonotonic inference. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 34(1), 107–130 (2002)
Gabbay, D.M.: Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert systems. In: Apt, K.R. (ed.) Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems, pp. 439–457. Springer, Berlin (1985)
Gabbay, D.M.: What is a logical system? An evolutionary view: 1964–2014. In: Siekmann, J.H. (ed.) Handbook of the History of Logic 9, pp. 41–132. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2014)
Gentzen, G.: Investigations into logical deduction. Am. Philos. Q. 1(4), 288–306 (1964)
Humberstone, L.: The Connectives. MIT Press, Cambridge (2011)
Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., Magidor, M.: Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artif. Intell. 44(1–2), 167–207 (1990)
Lehmann, D.: Plausibility logic. In: Börger, E., Jäger, G., Kleine Büning, H., Richter, M.M. (eds.) International Workshop on Computer Science Logic, pp. 227–241. Springer, Berlin (1991)
Manor, R., Rescher, N.: On inference from inconsistent premises. Theor. Decis. 1, 179–219 (1970)
Pfeifer, N., Kleiter, G.D.: Coherence and nonmonotonicity in human reasoning. Synthese 146(1), 93–109 (2005)
Reiter, R.: A logic for default reasoning. Artif. Intell. 13(1–2), 81–132 (1980)
Ripley, D.: On the ‘transitivity’ of consequence relations. J. Log. Comput. 28(2), 433–450 (2018)
Schurz, G.: Non-monotonic reasoning from an evolution-theoretic perspective: ontic, logical and cognitive foundations. Synthese 146(1), 37–51 (2005)
Shoesmith, D. J., Smiley, T. J.: Multiple-conclusion logic. CUP Archive (1978)
Stalnaker, R.: What is a nonmonotonic consequence relation? Fund. Inf. 21(1–2), 7–21 (1994)
Tarski, A.: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN, 2nd edn,: Papers from 1923 to (1938). Translated by J. H, Woodger, Edited and with an introduction by John Corcoran (1983)
Van Rooij, R.: Vagueness, tolerance, and non-transitive entailment. In: Cintula, P., Fermüller, C.G., Godo, L., Hájek, P. (eds.) Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical, and Linguistic Perspectives, pp. 205–221. College Publications, Suwanee (2011)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This research was supported by the 2021 Humanities and Social Science General Program sponsored by the Ministry of Education of China (Grant No. 21YJA72040001).
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Chen, L., Wen, X. On the Transitivity of Logical Consequence without Assuming Monotonicity. Log. Univers. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-024-00345-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-024-00345-3