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Well-Being and Moral Constraints: A Modified Subjectivist Account

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that a modified version of well-being subjectivism can avoid the standard, yet unintuitive, conclusion that morally horrible acts may contribute to an agent’s well-being. To make my case, I argue that “Modified Subjectivists” need not accept such conclusions about well-being so long as they accept the following three theoretical addenda: 1) there are a plurality of values pertaining to well-being, 2) there are some objective goods, even if they do not directly contribute to well-being, and 3) some of these values and goods (from 1 and 2) are bound-up with one another.

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Notes

  1. See Feldman (2004), Heathwood 2006).

  2. All references to Hausman in this paper will refer to this book.

  3. Hausman never names his framework, but this moniker seems to me to accurately capture the spirit of the view.

  4. Finnis (2011) is a standard example of an objectivist view of well-being.

  5. Though the precise origins of this critique are unclear, see Fletcher (2013:210) for a discussion of this objection to objective list views.

  6. Although Hausman does not explicitly name goods to be found on such lists, we can infer he must mean to include things like quality human relationships, bodily pleasure, a sense of meaning and purpose, enjoyment of beauty, etc.

  7. Manuscript, “Eudaimonism, Asceticism, and Well-Being”.

  8. See also Veatch (1995)

  9. “Protestants, Porn, and the ‘Purity Industrial Complex’”, by Isaac Chotiner, May 3rd, 2019

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  1. The University of Arkansas, Little Rock, Stabler Hall 307, 2801 University Ave., Little Rock, AZ, 72204, USA

    Megan Fritts

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  1. Megan Fritts
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Fritts, M. Well-Being and Moral Constraints: A Modified Subjectivist Account. Philosophia 50, 1809–1824 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00545-5

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