Abstract
Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct argument for the truth of maximal attributabilism. Therefore, we need not be persuaded by Reed's new argument for skepticism.
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Notes
All, or almost all: The paper starts with Reed’s firm claim that “all of [the views currently on offer]” are committed to the two theses he discusses (236), but by the end of the paper Reed has weakened this claim somewhat so that “just about every epistemological view that is a going concern” is committed to the two theses (261). Reed mentions no actual exceptions, so he seems to simply be acknowledging (what he sees as) an abstract possibility.
Reed cites McDowell (1995).
Reed’s claim that his new argument for skepticism afflicts both internalist views and externalist views receives special attention and emphasis in Reed (2009).
We might add that the existence of the mountain (to be climbed), the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere, and so on, likewise seem to be factors wholly extrinsic to my achievement, and yet it seems very strange to think that these factors would negate the credit commonly associated with reaching the summit. Moreover, mountain climbers often climb in pairs or groups, sharing equipment, advice, and offering the occasional helping hand to their partners. Do these reflections suggest that there are few or no climbers such that their reaching the summit is attributable to them? (Presumably not.)
The example comes from Nagel (op. cit., 25-6), though I’ve presented it in my own way.
Reed does call this initial formulation a “rough statement of the thesis” (238); however, the only refinement he subsequently makes to it is to insist that the attribution of knowledge must be made to a person (or an “epistemic agent,” or a “cognitive ‘Real Self’”)—rather than to a mere “subpersonal belief-forming process.” See 238–45 for his discussion of this point.
Characteristically, though perhaps not always. The general point made in the text seems correct to me, even if Russell’s “stopped clock” case isn’t too terribly improbable. And even in that case, the necessary scenario is far from likely. Have you ever been stopped-clock-Gettiered? (For the source of this example, see Russell (1948), 154.)
In fact, informed readers may call to mind Unger’s old (“short road”) skeptical argument based on absolute terms. See Unger (1975/2002). Just as we sometimes call things “flat” that are not absolutely flat, we call some states “knowledge” which are not really knowledge (since knowledge requires absolute certainty, which we rarely have). In a similar way, Reed sees “attributability” as an absolute term requiring total attributability.
Although taking up the burden implied in (2) would force Reed to give up his claim that the “new skepticism” “embodies no controversial conceptions of knowledge” (or at least none which it doesn’t “take from its opponents”) (262). Thus, if Reed accepted the burden implied in (2) then the new skepticism would no longer be anchored in purely ad hominem, dialectical argumentation.
References
Fogelin, R. (1994). Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, J. (2008). What luck is not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86, 255–267.
McDowell, J. (1995). Knowledge and the internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 877–93.
Nagel, T. (1979). Moral luck. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reed, B. (2007). The long road to skepticism. Journal of Philosophy, 104, 236–62.
Reed, B. (2009). A new argument for skepticism. Philosophical Studies, 142, 91–104.
Russell, B. (1948). Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Unger, P. (1975/2002). Ignorance: A case for scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On certainty. New York: Harper & Row.
Acknowledgement
My sincerest thanks to my friend Dan Cheon for many enjoyable conversations on these issues. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for help in clarifying some of the points in this paper.
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Ribeiro, B. Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism. Philosophia 38, 789–793 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9249-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9249-6