Abstract
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
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Notes
First Meditation; Descartes (1984, p. 14).
Though it falls outside the scope of this paper, I believe that a similar structure can be shown to be at work in the other main arguments in the skeptical tradition, including Descartes’s dreaming argument, the Modes of Pyrrhonism, and the problem of the criterion.
That is, externalists reject epistemic internalism. There are various ways in which internalism has been characterized; for a helpful discussion, see Fumerton (1995, pp. 60–69). One of the most widely shared is Chisholm’s characterization of epistemic justification as “internal and immediate in that one can find out directly, by reflection, what one is justified in believing at any time” (Chisholm 1989, p. 7).
See Goldman (1979) for a statement of basic reliabilism.
Moreover, even if a particular subject does have some awareness of the reliability of her faculties or belief-forming processes, the justification for her beliefs is independent of that awareness.
See Nozick (1981). Sosa (1999) defends the requirement of a modal connection between belief and the purportedly known fact in addition to the other elements of his virtue epistemology, though he appears to abandon this requirement in his (2007). See also Williamson (2000). Nozick argues on behalf of sensitivity (if p were not true, one would not believe p), where Sosa and Williamson defend safety (if one were to believe that p, it would be true that p).
This is compatible with a view such as Sosa’s, which takes the awareness of one’s fit in one’s environment to yield a better epistemic status for one’s belief than it would have had in the absence of that awareness. See his distinction between animal and reflective knowledge (2007, p. 24).
For one example of this strategy, see Van Cleve (1979) on epistemic circularity.
See my (Reed 2002) for an account of fallibilism.
Russell (1948, p. 154).
See Edmund Gettier’s classic paper (1963). Though Russell’s brief example was earlier, proper focus on the problematic nature of cases of that sort begins with Gettier.
I should emphasize, however, that neither Gettier nor any of the other philosophers who have proposed similar cases involving accidentally true justified beliefs have suggested a comparison of the sort that I will be making. See my (2007) for a different sort of presentation of the new argument for skepticism; there, I also defend the new argument against some popular anti-skeptical strategies, including contextualism and Moorean common sense.
This and the following case are modifications of one of the two examples in Gettier (1963). I shall use “B” names to refer to subjects in normal situations and “C” names to refer to those whose beliefs are accidentally true.
This and the following case are modifications of an example that appears in Goldman (1976), to whom it was suggested by Carl Ginet.
If we like, we can even make the epistemic performance of the C subjects better than that of the B subjects. For example, we could allow Connor’s belief to be grounded in a more extensive range of evidence (including, perhaps, a look at an affidavit signed by Lee stating that he will never sell his car) and Cassandra’s belief to be grounded in a better perceptual experience (e.g., she sees the barn from a closer vantage point and in better light). Still, the beliefs of the C subjects would be accidentally true.
For more on this distinction, see my (Reed 2007).
Nozick (1981, pp. 173–175).
For cases like Barn Sighting 3, see Lackey (2008).
Given this way of thinking of the traditional argument for skepticism, we can see why externalism provides a plausible reply to it. If externalists are correct about what is required for knowledge (and justification or warrant), Betty’s justification is appropriately connected to the truth. She could not have the justification she does unless her beliefs were probably true.
See Greco (2003).
See Sosa (2007, pp. 79 and 97).
Sosa says that, in a Gettier case, the subject’s competence may be the explanation for why she has the belief in question, but it does not explain why it is true—in other words, the competence accounts for the belief’s existence but not for its correctness (2007, pp. 95–96).
I am grateful to Jennifer Lackey for discussion of this point.
See Lackey (2007) for this argument. See Greco (2007), Sosa (2007), and Riggs (Riggs, W., unpublished, "Two problems of easy credit") for responses to Lackey and Lackey (forthcoming) for her further defense of the argument.
This case is drawn from Lackey (2007). She also there presents cases in which a subject apparently has knowledge but without deserving much credit for it, where the purported knowledge in question is not testimonial.
For example, in the case above, Connor is clearly performing better intellectually than David is. Connor’s disjunctive belief is not only justified, it would count as knowledge if the original disjunct were true. By contrast, David’s belief is not justified, and it would not count as knowledge even if both conjuncts happened to be true.
See Sosa’s discussion of the kaleidoscope believer—a case which is structurally similar to the barn façade case (2007, pp. 31–34, 96 n. 1, 99–101, and 104–109).
Sosa (2007, pp. 23–24). To be precise, Sosa would say that Cassandra’s belief is animal knowledge but not reflective knowledge (pp. 36–37 and 100–109), where reflective knowledge is apt belief aptly noted (p. 32). In what follows, I shall largely ignore the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, as I shall be objecting to the claim that Cassandra has any sort of knowledge.
One might object here that Cassandra has been given a defeater (counterevidence) for her belief, so her epistemic situation is in fact worse than it was before. But the point can be put in the third-person just as well. An observer who learns that Cassandra has seen only one genuine barn and two barn façades would say that the epistemic basis for her true belief is inadequate. It is not that the belief was well-supported and has since been outweighed by stronger evidence to the contrary. Rather, the epistemic basis for the belief was never good in the first place.
In the Meno, Plato says that when a subject has knowledge, there is a “tether” for her belief so that it cannot run away.
This is not to say that the subject must deserve credit for the truth of her belief. Rather, the point is merely that the knowledge must be attributable to her, even if someone else is largely responsible for putting the subject in a position to have a true belief. Similarly, an action may be attributable to an agent even in cases where someone else deserves most of the credit for making the action possible—e.g., a ballet instructor may deserve the credit for enabling her pupil to perform a pas de chat, though of course it is the pupil who is actually performing it. For more on attributability, see my (Reed 2007).
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to audience members at the Midwest Epistemology Workshop—especially E.J. Coffman, Sandy Goldberg, Matt McGrath, Andrew Moon, Ernest Sosa, and John Wynne—for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Most of all, I am very grateful to Jennifer Lackey for her helpful comments on this paper and, even more, for the many, many insights I have gained through our years of discussing the philosophical problems with which it is concerned. I am also thankful that she is not too skeptical of my skepticism.
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Reed, B. A new argument for skepticism. Philos Stud 142, 91–104 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9299-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9299-9