Skip to main content
Log in

Constituted Simples?

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Of course, there are in fact no such artworks, and no such microscopes. But I take it that proponents of the view in question do not want to rely on such accidental facts—or on how impressive our eyesight is.

  2. Including constitutionalists such as Lynne Rudder Baker: see e.g. her (1997), (2000), (2007).

  3. I am ignoring four-dimensionalism here. A four-dimensionalist could describe the case as follows: the artwork is a spatial simple which is a proper temporal part of the spatial simple that used to belong to the original lump. Of course, a defender of the view I am attacking cannot say this, because constitutionalism is a three-dimensionalist view. (Moreover, I suspect that most four-dimensionalists would deny that the artwork is essentially an artwork.)

  4. I make no claim here about what Burke would say about the present case.

  5. It would hardly be a good idea to respond that simples are impossible. Constitutionalists often emphasize that their view has the clear advantage (over, in particular, mereological nihilism, according to which there are no composite objects) of being compatible with both the existence and the non-existence of simples.

  6. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very useful comments

References

  • Baker, L. R. (1997). Why constitution is not identity. The Journal of Philosophy, 94, 599–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, L. R. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, L. R. (2007). The metaphysics of everyday life: An essay in practical realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burke, M. (1994). Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 591–624.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2003). Substantial change and spatiotemporal coincidence. Ratio, 16, 140–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markosian, N. (2004). Simples, stuff, and simple people. The Monist, 87, 405–428.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jens Johansson.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Johansson, J. Constituted Simples?. Philosophia 37, 87–89 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9134-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9134-8

Keywords

Navigation