Abstract
Extended simples are physical objects that, while spatially extended, possess no actual proper parts. The theory that physical reality bottoms out at extended simples is one of the principal competing views concerning the fundamental composition of matter, the others being atomism and the theory of gunk. Among advocates of extended simples, Markosian’s ‘MaxCon’ version of the theory (Aust J Philos 76:213–226, 1998, Monist 87:405–428, 2004) has justly achieved particular prominence. On the assumption of causal realism (i.e., on the assumption that a Humean account of causation is false), I argue here that the reality of MaxCon simples would entail the reality of irreducible, intrinsic dispositional properties. The existence of dispositional properties in turn has important implications for another central debate in metaphysics, namely that between two major competing views concerning the ontology of laws: dispositionalism versus nomological necessitarianism.
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Notes
Regarding the contemporary scene, there appears to be some ambiguity. One might argue that atomism is widely held, having the status of something like a default position; this seems particularly true for those who work in philosophy of mind, where, as Schaffer (2003) and Nagasawa (2012) observe, the claim that nature bottoms out in fundamental material objects is an important background assumption in reductionist ontologies of the mental. However, while it is true that there are many advocates of the idea that there must be a fundamental layer to the material world, oftentimes these authors do not specify whether they think that material fundamentality entails atomism or whether a bottom layer of extended simples would suffice to fulfill the explanatory role of a ‘fundamental’ level. Sometimes treatments of fundamentality acknowledge the ambiguity between atoms and extended simples, as in Newman (2013). Authors who unambiguously defend atomism are in fact relatively few in the recent literature, though atomism does have unambiguous opponents, like Giberman (2012). By contrast, the gunky view has been the topic of a number of sympathetic treatments: see for instance Forrest (2004), Schaffer (2003), Sider (1993), and Zimmerman (1996a, b). Favourable discussions of extended simples include Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006), Markosian (1998, 2004), McDaniel (2007, 2009), Parsons (2000), Scala (2002), Sider (2007), Simons (2004), and Toner (2008, 2011).
For present purposes ‘properties’ can be taken as neutral between universals and tropes, although all nomological necessitarians and most dispositionalists are realists (whether moderate or Platonic) about universals.
Categorical properties are typically thought of as non-dispositional, and include such paradigm cases as shape, size, spatial extension, spatial boundaries, and perhaps qualitative properties like colour (for those who take colour to be an irreducible feature of reality), etc. ‘Categoricalists’ are those who maintain that the only irreducible intrinsic properties found in nature are categorical.
Dispositions / powers / capacities / abilities (I’ll use these terms as synonyms) are intrinsically causally significant properties whose identity conditions consist (whether wholly or in part) of stimulus and manifestation conditions, along with any ceteris paribus clauses. E.g., fragility is an intrinsically causally significant property whose possession by an object determines that it will break when subjected to certain stresses, ceteris paribus; mass is an intrinsically causally significant property whose possession by a body determines that it will attract other massive bodies (with a determinate force given a certain distance, along a determinate vector etc.) upon coming into spatial proximity with them, ceteris paribus.
Most dispositionalists would drop the ‘some or all laws of nature are descriptive...’ in favour of a straight-out ‘all.’ However, Dumsday (2013) argues that dispositionalism entails a kind of nomic realism, such that dispositionalism is compatible with a certain sort of nomological necessitarianism. I don’t want to get into that intra-dispositionalist debate here, so I’ll leave the formulation neutral.
For defences of regularity theory see for instance Barker (2013), Beebee (2011), Lewis (1986), and Smart (2013); advocates of nomological necessitarianism include Armstrong (1983, 1997, 2010), Dretske (1977), Fales (1990), Foster (2004), Latham (2011), Maudlin (2007), Psillos (2006, 2009), and Tooley (1977, 1987); for dispositionalism see for instance Bauer (2012, 2013), Bird (2007), Chakravartty (2007), Ellis (2001, 2002, 2009), Heil (2003, 2005), Jacobs (2010, 2011), McKitrick (2003), Mumford (1998, 2004), Oderberg (2007), Thompson (1988), and Tugby (2013). Note that some ontologies of law, such as Lange’s (2004, 2009a, b) arguably do not fit neatly into any of these three main types of theory (though Lange’s seems closest to nomological necessitarianism—certainly he explicitly rejects regularity theory and dispositionalism).
It is an interesting further question whether a Humean could accept the reality of MaxCon extended simples. I think she could, though I will not delve into this here. My thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the need to clarify the relationship my argument bears to regularity theory.
Note Markosian’s assumption that any actual proper parts of an object must themselves be objects.
McDaniel (2007, 2009) follows Markosian in this pluralism; by contrast, Simons (2004) argues not merely for the possibility of extended simples but for their reality and indeed necessity, in the sense that matter is real but atoms and gunk are impossible, leaving extended simples as the only option.
Markosian provides a more formal definition (1998, p. 223), derived from van Inwagen (1981, p. 123): “For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by M at time t, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R at t.”
I take the liberty of updating Markosian’s statue of Joe Montana.
So do MaxCon simples count as divisible? If by ‘divisible’ one refers to the real possibility that an object might be made to go out of existence by a physical stimulus and be replaced by new objects constituted by the stuff that used to constitute the original object, then yes, MaxCon simples are divisible. But they are not divisible in the sense that we often think of composites as being divisible, where composites are divisible because the bonding relations obtaining between their actual proper parts can be eliminated, such that the composite object ceases to exist and all that remains is the objects that formerly composed it. (Note that Simons (2004) holds that extended simples are indivisible. However, because he doesn’t elaborate on what exactly he means by ‘divisible,’ it’s not clear whether he and Markosian disagree.)
See for instance Balashov (2002).
Note that this claim needs to be distinguished from a very different proposition: “if something is necessarily x, then it is not x solely by virtue of external intervention.” There could perhaps be counterexamples to the latter proposition; imagine for instance the case of a necessarily existent, necessarily benevolent Leibnizian deity who in all possible worlds wills that Tim Tebow be a skilled football player. In such a scenario, Tebow would necessarily possess a property, skill, but would possess it solely by virtue of an external intervention. (I am borrowing here from Kit Fine’s (1994) well-known distinction between essential properties—properties definitive of a thing’s or kind’s identity—and properties that something possesses by logical necessity but which do not form any part of its identity. The classic example is Socrates and his accompanying singleton set). My thanks to a referee for pointing out the need to clarify this.
In making that last point I am adopting two plausible background assumptions:
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(1)
If an entity lacks all categorical properties it must still possess some other sort of property, with the only other game in town being dispositions. This further assumes that no entity can exist wholly devoid of properties, wholly characterless. This might be thought to conflict with substratum theory, but for the most part that is not the case, insofar as most substratum theorists maintain that substrata can only exist while instantiating some attribute or set of attributes. [A notable exception on this score is Sider (2006).]
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I am also assuming that an entity devoid of shape would lack all other geometrical/structural properties (insofar as any such property must be linked to shape) and would also lack any other sort of categorical property, like qualitative properties. If there are any intrinsic irreducible qualitative categorical properties (analogous to colour, perhaps, if it were intrinsic and irreducible), then they must be dependent on geometrical/structural categorical properties. Colour needs a surface etc. It is difficult (impossible?) to name an uncontroversially qualitative categorical physical property that does not somehow rely on structural categorical properties. (For present purposes I exclude of course mental properties like qualia). If one wishes to dispute the present point, I await such an example!
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That is, anything coloured is always some colour or other, anything shaped is always some shape or other etc.—no real entity in nature is just generically ‘coloured’ or ‘shaped.’
And what fills in that additional content? Since it must be another essential intrinsic aspect of the entity, I would argue that the best candidate is the entity’s natural-kind essence. That natural-kind essence grounds the essential presence of the determinable and likewise fixes the conditions under which the non-essential determinates of that determinable are changed. I would in fact wish to argue that the need to posit an intrinsic ground of these facts constitutes evidence for the reality of an irreducible overarching natural-kind essence of the sort defended by essentialists like Ellis (2001), Lowe (2006) and Oderberg (2007). But that is an argument for another day.
At this point one might ask: why not just run this argument for dispositionalism on silly putty (or some other comparable macro-level stuff), rather than bringing in the whole apparatus of MaxCon simples? Because one can plausibly argue that silly putty (and most other analogous macro-level ‘stuffs’) are fully reducible to collections of individual particles, such that there is really no entity there to possess (uncontroversially) any property, let alone an intrinsic essential determinable. By contrast, MaxCon simples, and the fundamental stuff out of which they are composed, are not thus reducible, such that stuff can (if real) uncontroversially be the bearer of properties, including intrinsic essential determinables.
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Dumsday, T. MaxCon extended simples and the dispositionalist ontology of laws. Synthese 194, 1627–1641 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1009-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1009-5